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Abstract
The increasing availability and pervasiveness of multimedia data in our society is be-
fore our very eyes. As a result of globalization and worldwide connectivity, people from
all over the planet are exchanging constantly increasing amounts of images, videos, audio
recordings on a daily basis. Coupled with the easy access to user-friendly editing soft-
ware, this poses a number of problems related to the reliability and trustworthiness of such
content, as well as its potential malevolent use. For this reason, the research field of multi-
media forensics focuses on the development of forensic tools for verifying the authenticity
of multimedia data. The hypothesis of pristine status of images, videos or audio tracks
is called into question and can be rejected if traces of manipulation are detected with a
certain degree of confidence. In this framework, studying traces left by any operation that
could have been employed to process the data, either for malicious purposes or simply to
improve their content or presentation, turns out to be of interest for a comprehensive
forensic analysis.
The goal of this doctoral study is to contribute to the field of multimedia forensics by ex-
ploiting intrinsic statistical and deterministic properties of multimedia data.
With this respect, much work has been devoted to the study of JPEG compression traces
in digital images, resulting in the development of several innovative approaches. Indeed,
some of the main related research problems have been addressed and solution based on
statistical properties of digital images have been proposed. In particular, the problem of
identifying traces of JPEG compressions in images that have been decompressed and saved
in uncompressed formats has been extensively studied, resulting in the design of novel sta-
tistical detectors. Given the enormous practical relevance, digital images in JPEG formats
have also been considered. A novel method aimed at discriminating images compressed
only once and more than once has been developed, and tested on a variety of images and
forensic scenarios. Being the potential presence of intelligent counterfeiters ever increas-
ingly studied, innovative counterforensic techniques to JPEG compression based on smart
reconstruction strategies are proposed.
Finally, we explore the possibility of defining and exploiting deterministic properties re-
lated to a certain processing operation in the forensic analysis. With this respect, we
present a first approach targeted to the detection in one-dimensional data of a common
data smoothing operation, the median filter. A peculiarity of this method is the ability of
providing a deterministic response on the presence of median filtering traces in the data
under investigation.
Keywords
Multimedia forensics, JPEG compression forensics, counterforensics, deterministic analy-
sis, median filter.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“What is essential is invisible to the eye”
A. de Saint-Exupe´ry
Multimedia objects have become more and more pervasive in our society. This is
mainly due to the increasing number of devices able to take pictures and record audio-
video tracks, such as low-cost digital cameras, smartphones or tablets. At the same time,
modifications and manipulations of such multimedia content can nowadays be performed
by non-expert users, thanks to the availability of user-friendly software tools. Finally,
the easy access to sharing platforms offered by the web and the cloud technologies (such
as social networks, blogs, online newspapers) allows users to instantaneously broadcast
multimedia objects that might be significantly modified.
As a result, the trustworthiness of media contents is strongly compromised, with effects
that span in many practical scenarios. Considering also the more intuitive and immedi-
ate impact of visual data with respect to textual documents, the potential diffusion of
distorted or completely fake multimedia content on websites, information media, adver-
tisement and legal proceedings seriously represents an issue to be addressed. It appears
evident that the authenticity of multimedia data can no longer be taken from granted,
and their fidelity to reality should be called into question. In other words, the develop-
ment of media-related technologies has to be combined with effective techniques for their
protection and verification. This would help in avoiding an illegitimate exploitation, be it
malicious or not, of the semantic message they may convey. Indeed, the role of visual con-
tent manipulation is currently under debate, questioning how manipulated images impact
users’ perceptions and opinions on topics and people [37, 143].
We report in Fig. 1.1 some edited images, serving as examples of the implications that
superimposed visual changes can have when shared on a large scale. Fig. 1.1a contains
the original image of the construction site of the hydroelectric dam of Belo Monte in
Brazil, while Fig. 1.1b contains its digitally modified version, published on The Spiegel
newspaper in 2013 in an article evaluating the environmental impact of the structure1.
The visual impact of the image is clearly altered, as the site looks more degraded due to
1www.spiegel.de/international/world/growing-concern-that- news-photos-are-being-excessively-manipulated-
a-898509.html
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 1.1: Example of modified images on the web.
the social and environmental consequences of the construction of the dam. An example
involving international politics concerns the march featuring state leaders from all over
the world that was organized in Paris after the Charlie Hebdo terroristic attack in January
2015. An orthodox paper published a modified image (Fig. 1.1d) where female leaders
were deliberately edited out from the original image (Fig. 1.1c)2. A further example is
reported in Fig. 1.1e and 1.1f: the modified picture on the right was published on Twit-
ter by the 10 Downing Street profile, revealing the superimposition of a Remembrance
Sunday poppy (traditionally exposed at the day of publication to commemorate fallen
2http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/charlie-hebdo-female-world-leaders-4976457
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soldiers during World War I) onto David Cameron’s lapel. After this was spotted in the
first place, the episode went viral on the web and social networks3.
As a matter of fact, the verification and authentication of information, including mul-
timedia content, in web and social media is drawing increasing attention from a journal-
istic and enterprise perspective [1]. Moreover, nowadays multimedia objects are strongly
present in modern digital investigations, where digital images, audio tracks and video se-
quences more and more frequently represent potential digital evidences to the court [119].
In this scenario, in addition to the analysis of physical machines (i.e., computer forensics
[23]), it is necessary to perform a forensic analysis of the multimedia data itself, in order
to assess the reliability of the content.
Driven by such motivations, in the last decade the scientific community has been de-
veloping a constantly increasing amount of techniques targeted to the authentication of
multimedia objects, under the name of digital multimedia forensics [125]. Differently from
active techniques like digital watermarking, where an imperceptible digital code (a wa-
termark) is inserted into a multimedia object before its delivering/sharing, in multimedia
forensics we do not assume such a priori information. Indeed, this would imply the use
of special equipped devices when creating the multimedia content, whereas in a general
scenario data generated by a large number of different devices need to be analyzed. For
this reason, forensic methods are said to be passive and they are generally based on the
following principle: manipulations of the multimedia signal may be visually unperceivable
but leave traces that can be detected by means of proper forensic methodologies.
In particular, great attention has been paid to digital image forensics for which a wide
variety of different processing have been studied [51]. In this framework, the traces left
by JPEG compression, the most popular coding scheme for images, have been widely
analyzed and exploited in different forensic scenarios. Indeed, there are methods aimed
at detecting traces of previous compression in uncompressed images, double compression
in compressed images, inconsistencies within the same image. As other kind of process-
ing, a single or repeated JPEG compression performed with reasonably high quality level
generally does not leave evident traces from a perceptual perspective (especially in high
resolution images), thus excluding the possibility of a preliminary visual inspection. In
Fig. 1.2, we report the same image processed according to different compression chains,
as a demonstration of the generally unperceivable visual effect of one or more compres-
sions. Thus, in absence of a priori information or metadata, the only way to determine
whether previous compressions occurred is to analyze the underlying statistics of the two-
dimensional signal, from which potential anomalies can be revealed. With this respect, a
number of notable approaches have been proposed in the literature, although most of the
them still present significant limitations in terms of detection capabilities and robustness
to diverse kind of images.
In addition, as it happened to digital watermarking and steganography, the need of
an adversary-aware perspective recently emerged also in multimedia forensics. Indeed,
while forensic methods are quite effective in case of unrefined manipulations, the poten-
3http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/nov/02/poppy-photoshopped-david-cameron-facebook-picture
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(a) No compression (b) Single compression with quality factor 70.
(c) Single compression with quality factor 90. (d) Double compression with quality factors 90 and 70.
Figure 1.2: Different chains of compression are applied to the same image.
tial presence of a smart adversary compromises the reliability of current techniques: recent
research has shown that they can be deceived if the forger is aware of the forensic tools
and adopts specific countermeasures, namely counter-forensic (or anti-forensic) attacks
[76].
Several counter-forensic methods have been proposed, with particular attention to the
case of JPEG compression. Research in this direction helped in highlighting drawbacks
and limitations of forensic methods and, consequently, in assessing their reliability. As
a matter of fact, the expression adversarial signal processing [12] has been introduced,
referring to any branch of signal processing that is conceived in an adversary-aware per-
spective, such as watermarking, spam filtering, secure machine learning, network intrusion
detection, anti-spoofing biometrics.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
1.1 Novel solutions and innovative aspects
In this doctoral study, we propose contributions to the forensic task of detecting certain
processing operations in multimedia data, with particular attention to digital images. The
general rationale behind our work is to leverage statistical and deterministic properties
that are common to the kind of data under investigation. As it will be explored in
detail, this helps the forensic analysis in several directions, like assessing the confidence
of a certain decision or avoiding preliminary training phases by exploiting closed-form
theoretical derivations.
The main contributions of our work is detailed as follows:
• Detection of JPEG compression traces in uncompressed format images.
Intrinsic statistical properties of natural uncompressed images are used in image
forensics for detecting traces of previous processing operations. We perform a the-
oretical analysis of Benford–Fourier coefficients (BF) computed on the 8× 8 block-
DCT domain, originally proposed in [109]. The distribution of such coefficients is
derived theoretically both under the hypotheses of no compression and previous
compression with a certain quality factor, allowing also for the computation of the
respective likelihood functions. Then, three classification tests based on different
statistics are proposed, relying on discriminative thresholds that can be determined
automatically, without the need of any training phase. The statistical analysis is
based on the assumption of Generalized Gaussian distribution of DCT coefficients,
which generally holds for any uncompressed image. As a result, the method proves
to be suitable for images of different size and source camera. Experiments on real im-
ages and comparisons with state-of-art techniques show that the proposed approach
outperforms existing ones and overcomes issues due to dataset-dependency.
• Detection of multiple JPEG compression traces in JPEG images. The
analysis of BF coefficients is extended to the case of JPEG images, resulting in a
forensic method for the identification of multiple aligned JPEG compressions and
the estimation of the corresponding quality factors. It is based on the computation
of likelihood function values for the null hypothesis of single compression and the al-
ternative hypothesis of multiple compression with a certain sequence of quantization
tables. In principle, the technique allows for the detection of an arbitrary number of
compressions, depending on the pool of the tested alternative hypotheses. Experi-
mental results show that the performance of the proposed technique is good also in
the case of last compression heavier than the previous ones, where existing meth-
ods usually lead to high false negative rates. Moreover, the entire chain of JPEG
compression is reconstructed also in case of triple compressed images, while existing
methods generally estimate only one previous quality factor applied.
The effectiveness of the method is also explored in the challenging case of double
high quality JPEG compression, for which specific improvements are adopted. In
this case, the detection scheme needs to be modified to avoid high false alarm rates,
and complementary techniques are integrated to perform a comprehensive analysis.
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• Counterforensics of JPEG images. Two counterforensic techniques are pro-
posed for the reconstruction of statistical properties of natural and JPEG images.
They both target the modification of the First Significant Digit (FSD) histogram of
the DCT coefficients, in order to conceal traces of single and, in some cases, multiple
compression. The first one operates in the FSD modular logarithmic domain, from
which FSD and DCT coefficients distribution typical of uncompressed images are
consequently reconstructed. It is applied to single compressed JPEG images and
restores the Gaussian-like statistical distribution of DCT coefficients and the Ben-
ford’s law distribution of the FSD randomization strategy in a specific domain, the
method is compared with a well-established existing anti-forensic attack in terms
of quality of the resulting image. In addition, the effectiveness of our approach as
counter-forensics processing is assessed by measuring its impact on the performance
of two different forensic tools.
On the other hand, the second one directly targets the reconstruction of a given
FSD histogram and can be seen as universal to detectors based on FSD first-order
histogram. Based on heuristic criteria, the technique provides a close-to-optimal
solution for the problem of FSD histogram modification with minimal distortion
in terms of Mean Square Error (MSE) distortion. The problem is expressed as a
two-step optimization process and the proposed solution is tested in a more gen-
eral forensic scenario where statistics after an arbitrary number of compressions is
targeted, including comparison with state-of-the-art similar techniques.
• Deterministic detection of median filtering in data sequences. This work
represents our first attempt to define and leverage properties that are deterministi-
cally related to a certain processing, in contrast with typical forensic methodologies
based on statistical properties. We propose a forensic technique able to detect the
application of a median filter to 1D data. Relying on deterministic mathematical
properties of the median filter, we identify specific order relationships among the
sample values that cannot be found in filtered sequences. Hence, their presence in
the analyzed 1D sequence allows excluding the application of the median filter. Due
to its deterministic nature, the method ensures a null false negative rate and, al-
though false positives (not filtered sequences classified as filtered) are theoretically
possible, experimental results show that the false alarm rate is null for sufficiently
long sequences. Furthermore, the proposed technique has the capability to locate
with good precision a median filtered part of 1D data and provides a good estimate
of the window size used.
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1.2 Outline
The remaining part of the thesis is structured as follows.
In Chapters 2, we introduce the field of multimedia forensics and an overview of the
existing techniques based on JPEG compression traces.
The first contribution on the detection of JPEG compression traces in uncompressed
format images is presented in Chapter 3.
The analysis of JPEG format images and the detection scheme of multiple compression
traces are reported in Chapter 4, while we deal with the case of high quality repeated
compression in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, novel counterforensic techniques for JPEG compression are presented.
Chapter 7 proposes the methodology designed to detect median filter in one-dimensional
data sequences based on deterministic properties of the filter.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Multimedia forensics and JPEG
compression forensics
In this chapter, we present a brief overview of the field of multimedia forensics, illustrating
the different kind of problems arising and methodologies proposed, as well as highlighting
the main open research directions. Then, we report a review of forensic and counterforen-
sic techniques devoted to JPEG images and the analysis of their digital history. In partic-
ular, existing methods are divided according to the forensic task they target and their main
limitations are discussed, thus representing the starting point for the novel approaches de-
veloped in this doctoral study. Finally, the benchmarking datasets used throughout the
thesis are presented.
2.1 Digital multimedia forensics: advances and limitations
Multimedia forensics focuses on verifying the authenticity of audio-visual content, by
determining its processing history and origin. Differently from approaches as digital wa-
termarking, no a priori knowledge on the object under investigation is assumed, meaning
that the forensic analyst does not look for a specific signature. On the other hand, she
should consider a variety of potential manipulations occurred.
We can trace back the origins of multimedia forensics to the seminal work reported in
[49], where the idea of detecting manipulations in digital multimedia objects by means of
mathematical models was introduced. Since then, a variety of forensic scenarios have been
targeted and methods facing specific tasks have been developed. Moreover, a fascinating
aspect of multimedia forensics is its strongly interdisciplinary nature. Indeed, application
requirements has brought researchers to connect and jointly exploit methodologies typ-
ically used in different research fields, like signal processing, computer science, machine
learning, game theory. This results in a wide variety of existing tools, for which rigorous
classifications and boundaries are hard to determine.
A number of survey papers and books are available and propose different ways of grouping
the methods available [51, 122, 121, 117, 65, 125, 111]. We choose to consider as a first
distinction the following four main research areas [121] [125]: tampering detection, coun-
terforensics, source identification and discrimination between CG and natural content. In
13
CHAPTER 2. MULTIMEDIA FORENSICS AND JPEG COMPRESSION FORENSICS 14
the following, we give an overview of the main goals and approaches for each of them.
The list of contributions mentioned is by no means exhaustive, but we address the reader
to the overview papers mentioned above and the references therein for a comprehensive
review. Moreover, since the research activity within this doctoral study mainly focused
on the tampering detection and counterforensics areas, a special attention is devoted to
them.
• Tampering detection: the goal is to determine the presence or the absence of
forgery traces in the content under investigation, thus gathering information on its
authenticity. Given the diverse kinds of processing a multimedia object can undergo,
many methods have been proposed to detect different types of forgeries, by exploit-
ing various features of the analyzed object.
In order to give an overview of the existing tools, we refer to the classification pre-
sented in [51] for images, keeping in mind that it can be extended to techniques for
audio-visual content in general [90]. A very wide class is represented by the pixel-
based methods, designed for specific forensic problems. This group of techniques
study the statistical behaviour of pixel values and identify anomalies or unexpected
periodicities produced when the image is altered. They can be applied to detect dif-
ferent forgeries and are particularly efficient in case of copy-move [83, 8, 40, 5] (por-
tion of an image is copy and pasted in the same scene) and splicing [96, 41, 41, 142]
(portion of an image is inserted in another one), or resampling [133, 130, 52], a very
common process occurring anytime an image is resized. Camera-based techniques
rely on the assumption that any recording device leaves an intrinsic signature in a
image and any forgery generates inconsistencies in chromatic aberration phenomena,
color filter array patterns or sensor noise (PRNU) statistical patterns. Such methods
are often used for source identification problem [87], as described below.
Unfortunately, the traces used by the classes described above are strongly compro-
mised when a lossy coding scheme is applied to the image, like in the case of JPEG,
and only few methods are robust enough to be reliable also after a compression.
Being the most commonly used image format, the analysis of JPEG images plays
a key role in the forensic analysis and many efforts have been addressed to the
study of statistical traces left by such coding scheme. This leads to another class of
methods, the format-based ones, where unique properties of coding schemes are used
in different forensic decision problems. Finally, physics-based and geometric-based
techniques are proposed. In these approaches, the image is decomposed by means
of 2D or 3D models and potential forgeries are exposed by detecting inconsistencies
in the distribution of light [28] or in the object projection geometry with respect to
the camera [38, 73, 68].
• Counterforensics. Literature on digital image forensics rapidly developed in the
last decade and efficient methods for diverse kinds of manipulation are available.
The situation dramatically changes when a smart counterfeiter is aware of the foren-
sic tools and adopts specific countermeasures. The possibility of skilled adversaries
able to deceive the forensic tools was pointed out in [63] and formalized in [14, 123],
drawing a growing attention among researchers and currently representing a very
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active topic.
Counter-forensic techniques have been proposed for defeating specific pixel-based,
camera-based and format-based forensic methods by concealing the traces of pre-
vious manipulations, and prove to have a very strong impact on the performance
of the forensic detectors they target. For instance, methodologies have been pro-
posed for defeating resampling detectors [74], median filtering detectors [55], camera-
based methods [63], lossy compression detectors [124], CFA-based techniques [75],
histogram-based methods [11, 43].
• Source identification. Such branch of multimedia forensics aims at establishing
a link between an object and the device it was acquired with (e.g., camera, mobile
phone, scanner). This is done by characterizing noise-like patterns overlaid onto
the object during the acquisition process. A number of effective methodologies
has been proposed in the literature, exploiting chromatic aberration phenomena
[69], demosaicing artifacts [26], sensor defections [45], photo-response non-uniformity
noise (PRNU) [29, 82]. An overview of related approaches can be found in [87].
• Discrimination between CG and natural content
Modern computer graphics technologies are nowadays able to produce extremely
realistic content, forcing researchers to develop methods to passively distinguish
natural scenes from computer generated (CG) ones. Techniques targeting the iden-
tification of CG characters and faces have been proposed, exploiting different features
of the content under investigation. In addition to geometrical and statistical prop-
erties of natural scenes [46, 97], motion and lighting patterns have been used to
discriminate faces of CG characters [42], as well as physiological signals [35].
2.1.1 Open problems and research directions
Although a wide literature is available for different multimedia forensic scenarios, the
available methodologies still present relevant open issues. In the following, we enumerate
some of the general limitations of the current state-of-the-art in multimedia forensics tam-
pering detection. Besides currently compromising the actual applicability of existing tools
in real situations, such flaws represent stimulating challenges for the scientific community,
which is intensively working towards these directions.
• Lack of theoretical models: a relevant issue is the fact that many forensic tools
are based on statistical properties for which theoretical models are not available.
Although they usually achieve excellent results in certain experimental settings, the
absence of a generalized model might result in non-controllable performance when
the test setting is modified, since the parameters of the methods change as well.
This generally happens, for instance, for approaches implying the need of machine
learning techniques. Although they represent extremely useful tools and are able to
automatically capture statistical patterns, they usually require training phases that
are not always feasible. Moreover, they suffer from typical automatic learning issues
(as overfitting or dataset-dependency), which might have a strong impact on the
applicability of multimedia forensic techniques in different fields. On the other hand,
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a closed-form statistical model of the quantities involved would help in assessing the
confidence of the results obtained. It would also allow to design hypothesis tests
with confidence intervals determined theoretically, instead of relying on dataset-
dependent thresholds.
As an example, we consider the class of format-based methods for JPEG images
based on the distribution of First Significant Digits (FSD) of DCT coefficients. In
[59], a generalized version of Benford’s law is proposed and in [81] the distance
with respect to such distribution is exploited for discriminating single and double
compressed images. In [91], the histogram of FSDs is also used for identifying
the number of previous compressions by means of a combination of binary SVM
classifiers. However, at the current state there is no theoretical explanation for
the behavior of FSDs at different compression stages and how it depends on the
quantization steps used, which is clearly crucial for the final distribution. As a
consequence, in realistic situations where a blind analysis is performed and no clue on
the quantization steps used is available, it would be hard to quantify the confidence
of the outcome, thus limiting the reliability of the method.
• Chain of processing operations: when forensic detectors are targeted to the de-
tection of a specific processing, they are rarely robust to changes in the forgery pro-
cess. This is an intrinsic problem in the forensic analysis, since the traces left in the
object are in any case due to a specific operation and may be more or less sensitive to
pre- and post-processing, even if their mathematical model is accurate and complete.
Indeed, in a realistic scenario, an object most likely undergoes a chain of oper-
ators, for instance blurring/compression, or compression/resampling/compression,
and so on. The problem of modeling completely the traces left by a cascade of
operations is rather demanding. First attempts in this direction have been pro-
posed, addressing certain operations like linear filter/compression [36], compres-
sion/resizing/compression [20], compression-contrast enhancement-compression [53].
Moreover, the related problem of multimedia phylogeny [98, 39] is currently inten-
sively investigated and nowadays represents one of the main challenges of multimedia
forensics.
• General adversarial framework: counter-forensic techniques significantly com-
promise the performance of traditional forensic methods, but they typically intro-
duce a distortion that can lead to a visual degradation of the image and depends
on the strength of the attack. A strongest action guarantees a good recovery of the
statistical properties considered but decreases the visual quality; a lightest one pre-
serves the visual features but might be not effective in defeating the forensic tools.
With this respect, we can notice that the optimality of anti-forensics techniques is
rarely discussed, and a specific forensic detector is usually targeted [12]. Moreover, a
strong distortion would make the counterforensic action detectable [131] and useless
in practical scenarios.
Significant steps forward have been done in this direction: in [11] and [33, 34] the
transformation of the histogram that minimizes the Mean Squared Error (MSE) dis-
tortion is applied, guaranteeing an effective anti-forensics is theoretically derived. In
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other words, the optimal attack (in the MSE sense) against histogram-based forensic
detectors is obtained.
A promising direction that is currently investigated, is to study the interplay be-
tween the forensic analyst and the adversary by means of game theory, as it has
been done in [123] and [13]. In this framework, a number of theoretical results
on the asymptotic game equilibrium under different hypotheses [14, 15] have been
obtained, going toward a general theory in adversarial multimedia forensics.
• Fusion of the outcomes from different techniques: in addition to the optimal
design of single detectors, another problem arising in the forensic analysis is how to
fuse and exploit multiple responses from the forensic tools.
Indeed, as the current literature offers different methods for facing a wide range
of manipulations, an analyst would likely exploit a set of detectors in analyzing
an image. This can lead to inconsistencies in the different results and, hence, to
uncertainty in the final decision. How to deal with this variety and embed the
different results in a fusion system remains an open problem. However, research is
quite active in this directions and some approaches have been presented [56, 54, 10],
relying on statistical theories. Moreover, attention has been devoted to adversary-
aware settings [13, 57].
• Localization of tampered regions: most existing techniques for tampering de-
tection are not able to provide automatically the location of the suspect part, or they
require the knowledge of a region of interest, to be compared with the external area
[56]. Given the relevance of the problem in application scenarios, research in this
direction is extremely active and and number of recent approaches show significant
advances [9, 41, 142, 7, 60, 19].
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2.2 JPEG image forensics
The JPEG compression scheme consists in the steps depicted in Fig.2.1. The core of the
compression algorithm is the quantization of 8 × 8-block DCT coefficients at a certain
frequency with a quantization step q, depending on the chosen quality level. Thus, being
x the value of a generic DCT coefficient, during the compression it is transformed into
xq = sign(x) · round
( |x|
q
)
· q,
where sign(·) is the sign function and round(·) is the rounding function to the nearest
integer. Such quantization, together with the partition in 8 × 8 blocks, leaves typical
artifacts both in the pixel and DCT domain, that are widely studied and used for forensic
purposes.
Fig. 2.1 also represent the two possible paths in the digital history of the image, both
studied in the literature: it can be decompressed (potentially manipulated) and then re-
saved in uncompressed format (TIFF, PNG, BMP, GIF, ecc...); it can be decompressed
(potentially manipulated) and recompressed in JPEG format a number of times. More-
over, the presence of a smart counterfeiter might imply a counterforensic phase before the
forensic analysis.
In the following, we review the main approaches presented in the literature and identify
the more relevant limitations of existing tools to the forensic problems highlighted in red
in Fig. 2.1, for which novel contributions are proposed in the following chapters.
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coefficients 
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Figure 2.1: Pipeline of the JPEG compression scheme and possible life cycles of compressed
images.
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2.2.1 Detection of compression traces in uncompressed image formats
In several scenarios, a digital image is available in an uncompressed format (for instance,
photographic images delivered in TIFF format), while it potentially underwent prior pro-
cessing or coding. In these cases, we might be interested in deciding whether that image
had been previously compressed and which were the compression parameters being used.
One of the first approaches was proposed in [48]: there, the blocking artifacts left by a
JPEG compression in the pixel domain are exploited, and a detector based on inter- and
intra-block pixel differences is designed. Such values are combined in a final statistic K,
expressing the strength of blocking artifacts, and images presenting a value of K higher
than a certain threshold are classified as compressed. In the same paper, a procedure
based on ML estimation of the used quantization table is proposed. An improved version
is presented in [95], where the joint detection of both the quantization table and the used
color space transformation is achieved.
As the quantization of the 8 × 8-block DCT coefficient represents the core of the JPEG
compression procedure and leaves characteristic footprints, several methods on JPEG
images focus on the analysis of the DCT domain for extracting information on the com-
pression history. In [88], the distribution of DCT coefficients after quantization and
reprojection on the pixel domain is studied: in particular, the authors observe how the
DCT coefficients behave differently around 0 when the image is pristine or previously
compressed. Such different behaviours are captured in a 1D feature, discriminating be-
tween original and compressed images; for the latter case, a simple procedure is proposed
for estimating the quantization steps.
Both previous methods are characterized by a low complexity and good performance, also
in case of small images; on the other hand, the used statistics present a quite different
behaviour when varying the size of the image and therefore the performance is strongly
dependent on the initial set of images used for determining the optimal threshold.
Another statistic that has been explored in image forensics is the distribution of the
First Significant Digits (FSD) of the DCT coefficients. Indeed, when the DCT coeffi-
cients are quantized, their FSDs change together with their distribution. In particular,
for uncompressed images we have that the FSDs follow a logarithmic distribution, known
as Benford’s law, which is perturbed when a quantization occurs. Driven by this ob-
servation, the authors in [59] proposed a JPEG compression detector based on an SVM
classifier which uses as feature the empirical frequencies of the nine FSDs on all the DCT
coefficients in the image. The method achieves good results on the considered dataset
and requires a relatively low computational complexity; however, it does not provide an
estimate of the quality factor or quantization table used, since no theoretical model for
the FSD distribution is available, and the results are strongly dependent on the dataset.
Recently, a first approach based of Benford–Fourier coefficients has been proposed in [109],
inspiring the design of our novel approaches (see Section 3.1).
MAIN CURRENT LIMITATIONS:
• a theoretical model for the statistics used is not available, thus generating uncertainty
in the case of different parameters
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• a training phase on a preliminary set of images is needed, being prone to dataset-
dependency issues
2.2.2 Detection of multiple compression traces in JPEG images
Since the JPEG format is adopted in most of the digital cameras and image processing
tools, we can expect that a forger will open a JPEG image, modify it and re-compress
it a number of times, probably with a different quality factor. Hence, the traces of
multiple compression, or inconsistencies of such traces between areas in the same image,
can represent a proof of tampering.
In addition, the second compression might not respect the 8× 8 grid of the previous one,
thus leading to two cases: aligned and non-aligned double JPEG compression.
For the former one, a great number of methods rely on the analysis of DCT coefficient
first-order statistics, i.e., the histogram. An effective approach was proposed in [86], and
later improved in [110]. Here, it is observed that consecutive quantizations introduce
periodic artifacts and shifted peaks into the histogram of DCT coefficients: this behavior
is called double quantization effect and represents a significant trace of aligned double
JPEG compression (see example in Figure 2.2). Clearly, it is related to the values of
the two quantization steps used and, in addition, it helps estimating the primary quality
factor. The double quantization effect was also analyzed in detail by authors in [112],
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Figure 2.2: Histogram of DCT coefficients at a certain frequency; quantization steps are 5 and
2.
that propose a new statistical model for the artifacts of double compression.
After these two important approaches, a number of refinements based on different anal-
yses of DCT histogram have been proposed, leading to higher accuracy in the forensic
classification and in the estimation of the primary quality factor.
In [50], a different perspective is adopted: exploting the idempotency of the coding op-
eration, JPEG images are recompressed with different quality factors and if at least one
of them presents a high correlation with the starting one, it was likely previously com-
pressed.
Histogram of FSDs at certain frequencies of the DCT are also exploited for discriminating
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single and double compressed images [81], or even images compressed different number of
times [92].
Regarding non-aligned double compression, the analysis of blocking artifacts in the
pixel domain can once again provide useful information. Indeed, in [89] a Blocking Arti-
fact Characteristics Map (BACM) is computed, starting from the approach in [48]. An
asymmetric BACM will reveal the presence of misaligned double compression; some fea-
tures are then extracted from the BACM and fed to a classifier in order to understand
whether a portion of the image underwent non-aligned quantization or not.
A similar method is presented in [30], where the blocking artifacts are measured by means
of first-order derivative and fitted to a linear model. Features related to the probability
map of each pixel following this model are fed to an SVM.
A different approach is adopted in [18], where the main idea is to detect non-aligned
double compression by measuring how DCT coefficients cluster around a given lattice,
defined from the JPEG quantization table, for any possible grid shift. In addition, the
parameters of the lattice also give an estimation of the primary quantization table. Such
method outperforms results obtained with methods based on blocking artifacts and is
more robust to quantization parameters. In [17], the same authors present a tampering
localization procedure, so that the suspect region does not need to be manually selected.
Finally, few methods aim at detecting either block-aligned or misaligned recompression
at the same time have recently been proposed. In [31], a set of features is computed to
measure the periodicity of blocking artifacts, perturbed in presence of non-aligned double
compression, and another set to measure the periodicity of DCT coefficients, perturbed
when an aligned double compression is applied. By combining the two groups, nine
features are used to train a classifier, detecting whether an image has undergone double
JPEG compression. Moreover, authors in [19] present an improved unified statistical
model and an algorithm that aumatically computed a likelihood map, indicating for each
8× 8 block the probability of being double compressed.
MAIN CURRENT LIMITATIONS:
• a lighter primary compression is hardly detected
• method typically address double compression
• detection of high quality compression is rarely assessed
2.2.3 JPEG counterforensics and adversarial perspectives
Special attention has been paid to the case of JPEG compression counterforensics. Indeed,
the problem of concealing compression artifacts has been faced in [124]. Here, an anti-
forensic dither is added to DCT coefficients of a JPEG image, thus restoring the original
statistics and destroying the artifacts introduced during the compression. As a result, the
image looks uncompressed and, if compressed again, it is classified by forensic detectors
as single compressed. Such procedure is tested against different forensic methods and
turns out to be very effective for the adversary. This approach has then been enhanced
by applying a spatial distribution that minimizes the degradation due to noise addition
[131]. With the same intention, a different anti-forensic scheme has been proposed in [47],
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where a cost function expressing the distortion is minimized by means of a variational
approach.
In response to this kind of attacks, techniques aimed at detecting the anti-forensic action
in [124] has been developed [80] [132], based on peculiar effects introduced in the image
by that specific algorithm.
MAIN CURRENT LIMITATIONS:
• optimality of the methods in terms of distortion introduced is rarely addressed
• lack of a general adversarial framework
2.3 Benchmarking
Before moving to the presentation of the novel contributions in the field, we briefly discuss
some aspects of the experimental setting we adopted in our validation tests.
First, experiments on JPEG images have generally been performed in Matlab environ-
ment, using built-in functions to read and write images. When specified, libjpeg and
libtiff libraries, released by the Independent JPEG Group (IJG) and used in common
software, are also used. Throughout the thesis, we refer to the IJG standard quantization
tables computed as function of a quality factor QF ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 100}, as done by both the
libjpeg library and the Matlab built-in encoder.
Moreover, a common benchmarking of algorithm performance is still an open issue in
image forensics [44]. Despite the number of general image datasets available online (e.g.,
MIRFlickr [67]), only few of them are suitable for our purposes due to the uncontrolled
nature of the provided images in terms of compression history and kind of processing
applied. Indeed, in order to assess the performance of our models, we need images that are
uncompressed and not post-processed, as their pristine condition is an essential starting
point for building the testing sets needed. Because of that, we selected the following four
datasets of uncompressed format images:
• LIU: subset of the database used in [84], composed of 1000 bitmap images (256×256).
• UCID: database proposed in [120], composed of 1338 TIFF images 512× 384. Orig-
inally proposed for image retrieval validation, it is probably the most used bench-
marking dataset in image forensics.
• DRESDEN: database proposed in [62], particularly oriented to camera-based source
identification techniques. We used the 1488 images in TIFF format, whose size
ranges from 3072× 2304 to 4352× 3264.
• RAISE: database proposed by our research group in [44] as a benchmarking tool
for image forensics. We used subset packages of the original database, composed of
8156 images available both in TIFF and NEF format.
The novel methods developed in this work are tested on all or a subset of such four
datasets. This allows us to validate our algorithms on extremely diverse images in terms
of content, resolution, acquisition parameters. In particular, the size of the image will be
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Figure 2.3: Image size proportions among different datasets.
relevant for the tests in Chapter 4, where size-adaptive detectors are developed. Fig. 2.3
visually represents the different datasets and their size proportions.
CHAPTER 2. MULTIMEDIA FORENSICS AND JPEG COMPRESSION FORENSICS 24
Chapter 3
Single compression traces in
uncompressed format images
In this chapter, we present the novel solutions proposed for the forensic problem of de-
tecting traces of JPEG compression in images that are stored in uncompressed formats.
We first introduce and define the Benford-Fourier coefficients, a mathematical tool that
we extensively exploit in our analysis. Then, the statistical characterization of never com-
pressed and previously compressed images is illustrated. Finally, the design of the final
detectors is presented, together with results on the benchmarking datasets.
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Figure 3.1: Forensic scenario considered in this Chapter.
We stressed in Chapter 2 the importance of having a solid theoretical backround
behind the design of forensic detectors. For this reason, we tackle from a theoretical
perspective the problem of detecting the traces of a previous JPEG compression in images
that are stored in uncompressed formats. Such issue appears when the forensic analysis
is performed on images supposedly taken by a device set to provide raw images (like
professional or semi-professional cameras) or, in general, in every situation where the
subject image is supposed to be never compressed, and the presence of JPEG compression
traces would suggest that the image has been taken from a different camera or it has been
already processed by someone. Indeed, although the JPEG standard represents the most
used format for digital images, the need for analyzing uncompressed formats arises, for
instance, when professional photographic images are involved. In this case, it is common
to deliver images also in uncompressed format (mostly TIFF) to preserve quality.
The closed-form statistical analysis of Benford–Fourier coefficients allows us to define
a hypothesis testing framework where the null hypothesis is the pristine condition of the
image, and the alternative hypothesis is represented by a previous compression. Here, we
propose three novel tests based on different statistical schemes, namely the R-test, log L0-
test and the λ-test, with the aim of discriminating images that have never compressed
from images previously compressed, as depicted in Fig. 3.1.
An interesting peculiarity of the proposed methods is that the statistical description
on the BF coefficients, derived analytically, explicitly depends on the number of DCT
coefficients considered, i.e., it is related to the size of the subject image. Moreover, all
the statistical parameters involved in the model are estimated directly from the data
without relying on any predetermined dataset. This results in size-adaptive JPEG com-
pression detectors, which do not require any training phase. Experimental results on
several datasets and JPEG compression parameters show the benefits of this approach
with respect to state-of-the-art methods.
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3.1 Benford–Fourier coefficients
Benford–Fourier coefficients have been originally introduced in [108] and have a precise
mathematical meaning which makes them extremely suitable for the forensic problem
considered.
For the sake of clarity, in the following we will indicate univariate real or complex
random variables with capital letters, whose realization will be represented by the corre-
sponding lower case letters.
Then, let X be a random variable representing the non-zero DCT coefficients and fX
its probability density function; we suppose fX is symmetric with respect to 0. Then, we
define the random variable Z whose values are in R+0 such that
fZ(z) = 2 · fX(z), ∀z ∈ R+0
By doing so, Z models the behavior of |X| in R+0 (fX is symmetric), i.e. discarding the
value 0 as possible outcome. Then, we define the random variables
Z ′ .= log10 Z
Z˜
.
= log10 Z mod 1,
representing the absolute valued positive DCT coefficients in the logarithmic and mod-
ular logarithmic domain, respectively. The r.v. Z˜ is particularly relevant because of
its relationship with the pdf of the FSD of X [109] and it has been exploited in image
counter-forensic techniques [100] [34].
Now, the Benford-Fourier (BF) coefficients in n ∈ N are defined as the Fourier trans-
form of fZ′(z
′) evaluated in 2pin, i.e.,
an =
+∞∫
−∞
fZ′(z
′)e−j2pinz
′
dz′ =
+∞∫
−∞
fZ(z)e
−j2pin log10 zdz. (3.1)
Such coefficients turn out to be particularly suitable for characterizing the DCT coefficient
behaviour since they have a key role in the statistical description of Z˜: in fact, in [108] it
has been showed that, for a generic continuous r.v. Z, we have
fZ˜(z˜) = 1 + 2
+∞∑
n=1
|an| cos(2pinz˜ + φn), z˜ ∈ [0, 1). (3.2)
Moreover, in [108] the authors show that if X is a Generalized Gaussian (GG) r.v.
with standard deviation σ and shaping factor ν, i.e.,
fX(x) = Ae
−|βx|ν , x ∈ R,
β =
1
σ
√
Γ(3/ν)
Γ(1/ν)
, A =
βν
2Γ(1/ν)
,
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the theoretical expression of an, n ∈ N, and its magnitude can be derived as functions of
the GG parameters:
an =
+∞∫
−∞
fZ′(z
′)e−j2pinz
′
dz′
=
2A
βν
ej
2pin log β
log 10 Γ
(−j2pin+ log 10
ν log 10
)
,
|an|2 =
∞∏
k=0
[
1 +
(2pin)2
log2 10(νk + 1)2
]−1
. (3.3)
As seen in (3.3), the magnitude of the coefficients increases with ν and does not depend
on the variance of the GG. In Table 3.1, we report the values of |an| computed as in (3.3)
(where k ranges from 0 to 105) for different values of n and ν, as it is well-known that
the DCT coefficients of uncompressed images can be modeled by a Generalized Gaussian
r.v. with a shaping factor generally ranging from 0.5 to 1.2 [22]. We can notice that, in
particular, when n ≥ 3, these values are always lower than 10−4.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ν = 0.5 6.1 · 10−3 3.2 · 10−6 1.1 · 10−9 3.3 · 10−13 9.0 · 10−17 2.2 · 10−20 5.5 · 10−24 1.3 · 10−27
ν = 0.75 2.7 · 10−2 1.6 · 10−4 7.4 · 10−7 3.1 · 10−9 1.2 · 10−11 4.8 · 10−14 1.8 · 10−16 6.7 · 10−19
ν = 1 5.6 · 10−2 1.1 · 10−3 1.8 · 10−5 2.9 · 10−7 4.6 · 10−9 6.9 · 10−11 1.0 · 10−12 1.5 · 10−14
ν = 1.25 8.8 · 10−2 3.5 · 10−3 1.2 · 10−4 4.5 · 10−6 1.5 · 10−7 5.4 · 10−9 1.8 · 10−10 6.2 · 10−12
Table 3.1: Magnitude of |an| for different values of ν and n.
This represents a useful information in JPEG image forensics and suggests that the
behavior of the BF coefficients can be used to characterize uncompressed images. Indeed,
a first approach in this direction was proposed in [109], where the BF coefficients from the
DCT coefficients of the whole image are estimated by computing the FFT of the empirical
distribution of Z˜. Then, the first five coefficients (i.e., n = 1, . . . , 5) are used as feature
to train an SVM discriminating between natural uncompressed images and images that
underwent a JPEG compression, obtaining promising results.
Although the Benford-Fourier coefficients defined as in (3.1) have a precise meaning
given by the expression (3.2), we can extend such definition to the entire real line and, in
the following, we will consider as BF coefficient at ω ∈ R the complex number given by
aω =
+∞∫
−∞
fZ′(z
′)e−jωz
′
dz′ =
+∞∫
−∞
fZ(z)e
−jω log10 zdz. (3.4)
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3.2 Statistical analysis of Benford–Fourier coefficients
In light of what has been obtained in [109], we address the problem of discriminating
compressed images saved in uncompressed format from images that underwent a JPEG
compression. Accordingly, for each DCT frequency we want to quantify the probabil-
ity that the DCT coefficients have never been quantized or they have been previously
quantized with a generic step q. To this aim, we consider the BF coefficients at a fixed
DCT frequency and develop a statistical model for each of these two cases. Such models
will then be exploited for the design of novel hypothesis tests, where the hypotheses of
no compression and compression with a quality factor among a predetermined pool are
considered. Whereas the hypothesis testing scheme will be described in detail in Section
4.3, in the following we present the statistical models derived for the BF coefficient of a
single DCT frequency.
3.2.1 Uncompressed image model
In order to use BF coefficients for analyzing an image, we need a numerical procedure to
estimate such coefficients given the subject image.
By looking at (3.4), we can notice that aω is the expected value of the complex random
variable gω(Z) = e
−jω log10 Z , whose values lie on the unit circle. Thus, as it is usually done
in statistics, we can obtain an estimate of aω = E{gω(Z)} by considering the sample mean
of gω(Z) provided by the DCT coefficients of the image through the different 8×8 blocks.
In other words, if we denote as Zm the r.v.’s representing the DCT coefficients at the
chosen frequency in the m-th block (that we suppose to be independent and identically
distributed), we can consider the r.v.
Aˆω
.
=
M∑
m=1
e−jω log10 Z
m
M
, m = 1, . . . ,M (3.5)
and define the estimator of aω as the realization of Aˆω
aˆω
.
=
M∑
m=1
e−jω log10 z
m
M
, m = 1, . . . ,M (3.6)
where M is the total number of 8× 8 blocks in the image.
Although the sample mean is a minimum variance unbiased estimator of the expected
value (i.e., E{Aˆω} = aω), we should consider the fact that the actual accuracy of aˆω in
the estimation of aω depends on the size of the sample considered. For this reason, we are
interested in studying the distribution of Aˆω as a function of the number of samples M .
To this end, we can observe that Aˆω is a sum of M independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables gω(Z
m). Then, by applying the Central Limit Theorem (CLT)
to the real and imaginary parts of Aˆω, we have that their distribution is asymptotically
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Figure 3.2: The figure depicts the behaviour of BF coefficients when varying the number M
of samples used in the sum (4.1). For M = 64, 1024, 16384, 262144, we generated 1000 sets of
M elements distributed according to a zero-mean Generalized Gaussian pdf with ν = 1 (which
is common for DCT coefficients of natural images) and varying standard deviation. Then, the
estimate of BF coefficient magnitude |aˆω| (with ω = 8pi) have been computed on each set and
their histograms for the different values of M are plotted (blue bars). The red curves are the
Rayleigh pdfs (3.8) determined by the corresponding value of M in each case. The goodness of
fit of the proposed model is confirmed by the values of the χ2 statistics (computed on 10 equally
spaced bins from 0 to the highest magnitude value obtained in each case).
Gaussian with expected values <(aω) and =(aω), respectively [16]. In other words,
Aˆω = aω +W0,
where W0 is a zero-mean complex normal random variable.
A necessary and sufficient condition for W0 to be circularly symmetric (i.e., with real
and imaginary parts independent and identically distributed [16]) is that E{W 20 } = 0.
Starting from the definition of Aˆω, it is easy to prove that
E{W 20 } = E{(Aˆω − aω)2} =
1
M
(a2ω − a2ω). (3.7)
Hence, |E{W 20 }| ≤ (|a2ω| + |a2ω|)/M and, by looking at Table 3.1, we can conclude that
the value of (3.7) will be very close to 0 (for instance, when ν = 1 and ω = 6pi its order
of magnitude is 10−11). Therefore, Aˆω is approximately a circular bivariate normal r.v.
with non-zero mean.
It is well known that the r.v. R
.
= |Aˆω| follows the Rice distribution with mean
parameter |aω| and scale parameter σ, where σ is the standard deviation of both its real
and imaginary parts [115]. Similarly as before, we can now obtain σ2 by exploiting the
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fact that for a Rice distribution
σ2 =
E{|Aˆω|2} − |aω|2
2
=
1
2M
(1− |aω|2).
As we observed, |aω| is lower than 10−4 when ω ≥ 6pi and we can reasonably assume
|aω| ≈ 0, thus considering the special case of Rice distribution with mean parameter 0,
i.e., the Rayleigh distribution with scale parameter σ = 1/
√
2M . According to this, we
can define p(aˆω|NQ) (NQ means “never quantized”) as the probability density function
of obtaining a BF coefficient aˆω under the hypothesis of no previous quantization and
compute it as follows:
p(aˆω|NQ) = 2M |aˆω|e−M |aˆω |2 , (3.8)
where the expression on the right is the Rayleigh pdf with σ = 1/
√
2M . By considering
its properties, we have that |aˆω| is in any case an overestimate of |aω| = 0, where its mean
is given by 1√
M
·
√
pi
2
(the expected accuracy increases linearly with
√
M) and its variance
is given by 1
M
· 4−pi
4
(the expected accuracy variance decreases linearly with M).
An example of the model is showed in Fig. 3.2.
3.2.2 Compressed image model
When computing the DCT from an image stored in uncompressed format that was pre-
viously compressed, the DCT coefficients at a certain frequency have a distribution like
in Fig. 3.3a. The error affecting the histogram is due to the quantization in the pixel
domain after the block-DCT quantization and the rounding/truncation errors in the DCT
computation, and has been modeled in the literature as a Gaussian r.v. [19].
We propose here an alternative statistical description whose accuracy has been assessed
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Figure 3.3: In panel (a), histogram of DCT coefficients at a single frequency after quantization
with q = 17. In panel (b), the coefficients corresponding to the r.v. Z17 are reported and the
red curve is the Laplacian pdf estimated from the histogram.
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by extensive numerical tests. We can restrict our analysis to a single quantization interval
[kq − q/2, kq + q/2[, k ≥ 1 (q is the quantization step) and consider the DCT coefficients
contained in such interval. Without any loss of generality, we can suppose k = 1 (which is
the most natural choice, since the first “bell” in Fig. 3.3a is certainly the one containing
more elements and providing more reliable statistics), although the following analysis can
easily be extended to any value of k.
If we denote as Iq the interval [q− q/2, q+ q/2[ and Zq the r.v. representing the DCT
coefficients falling in Iq, we can approximate its distribution with a Laplacian truncated
outside the quantization interval, as in Fig. 3.3b. Then, the pdf of Zq is given by
fZq(z) =
L(z; q, σ)
Nσ,q
· 1Iq(z), (3.9)
where L(·; q, σ) is a Laplacian pdf with mean q and standard deviation σ (which is un-
known and needs to be estimated), Nσ,q is the integral of L(z; q, σ) over Iq (so that
expression (3.9) is a pdf) and 1I(·) is the indicator function of Iq
1Iq(z) =
{
1 z ∈ Iq
0 z /∈ Iq.
Starting from this hypothesis, we can define aω,q as the Benford-Fourier coefficients of Zq,
and derive its theoretical value as follows:
aω,q
.
=
+∞∫
−∞
fZq(z)e
−jω log10 zdz (3.10)
=
1
Nσ,q
∫
Iq
1
σ
√
2
e−
√
2
σ
|z−q|e−jω log10 zdz (3.11)
=
1
Nσ,qσ
√
2
(
e−
√
2
σ
kq
q∫
q−q/2
e
√
2
σ
zz−j
ω
ln 10dz + e
√
2
σ
q
q+q/2∫
q
e−
√
2
σ
zz−j
ω
ln 10dz
)
. (3.12)
In other words, assuming a Laplacian distribution of Zq and given an estimate of σ, we can
obtain the theoretical value of aω,q from the previous expression in (3.12) by numerically
computing the integrals.
Now, we can adopt the same approach as the uncompressed case: consider the sample
mean
Aˆω,q =
Mq∑
m=1
e−jω log10 Z
m
q
Mq
, m = 1, . . . ,Mq (3.13)
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and the estimate of aω,q
aˆω,q =
Mq∑
m=1
e−jω log10 z
m
q
Mq
, m = 1, . . . ,Mq (3.14)
where Mq is the number of DCT coefficients falling in the interval Iq at the chosen fre-
quency. Then, study its distribution in order to obtain an expression of p(aˆω,q|q), the
probability of obtaining aˆω,q under the hypothesis that the DCT coefficients at the chosen
frequency underwent a quantization with step q.
We can partially exploit the logical steps of the uncompressed case reported in Section
3.2.1. Indeed, exactly in the same way, we can conclude that
Aˆω,q = aω,q +W0,q,
where W0,q is a complex zero-mean Gaussian random variable. In addition
E{W 20,q} =
1
Mq
(a2ω,q − (aω,q)2).
Differently from the NQ case, we have no clue on the magnitude of a2ω,q, aω,q, thus we
cannot claim that E{W 20,q} ≈ 0 and W0,q is circularly symmetric.
Because of that, we consider the distribution of Aˆω,q in the complex plane and we
study the real and imaginary parts of W0,q. For the sake of simplicity, we will denote
them as Wr and Wi, respectively, (i.e., dropping the dependence on ω and q) and treat
their joint pdf fWr,Wi(wr, wi) as a zero-mean real bivariate Gaussian
1, so that
p(aˆω,q|q) = fWr,Wi(<(aˆω,q − aω,q),=(aˆω,q − aω,q)). (3.15)
The analysis is slightly harder than the NQ case, since here we need to determine the
parameters of a real bivariate Gaussian whose pdf is given by
fWr,Wi(wr, wi) =
1
2pi
√|Σ| exp
(
− 1
2
[
wr wi
]
Σ−1
[
wr
wi
])
,
Σ =
[
σ2Wr Cov(Wr,Wi)
Cov(Wr,Wi) σ
2
Wi
]
.
In other words, we need the three different entries of the covariance matrix, necessary
for computing fWr,Wi(wr, wi). All of them have been theoretically derived in order to
obtain closed form expressions and are reported in the following:
• σ2Wr , σ2Wi:
1In particular, we treat W0,q as a real bivariate r.v. instead of a complex normal r.v., i.e., in terms of variance
and covariance of the two single parts instead of complex covariance and pseudo-covariance (as it is usually done
when dealing with complex r.v.’s).
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Figure 3.4: The figure depicts the behaviour of BF coefficients in case of compression when
varying the number of samples belonging to the interval Iq considered. We considered the case
of q = 17 and, for M = 500, 5000, 50000, we generated 1000 sets of M elements distributed
according to a Laplacian pdf with mean 17 and standard deviation σ = 1. Then, the estimate
of the complex BF coefficient aˆω,17 (with ω = 8pi) have been computed on each set and its
histograms (for the complex values, the real and imaginary parts) for the different values of Mq
are plotted (pale blue bars). The blue curves beside are the theoretical pdf for the complex
r.v. and the marginal pdfs of the real and imaginary parts, determined as in Section 3.2.2. The
match between the histograms obtained and the pdfs derived theoretically is confirmed by the
value of the χ2 statistics, computed on 25 two-dimensional bins (5 along the real part and 5
along the imaginary part).
We have that σ2Wr and σ
2
Wi
are given by the variances of the r.v.’s <(e−jω log10 Zq)
and =(e−jω log10 Zq), respectively, divided by the number of summands in the sample
mean (3.14). The exact expressions are:
σ2Wr =
1
Mq
1∫
−1
∑
z′′∈Dc
e−
√
2
σ |10
z′′
ω −q|10
z′′
ω
σ
√
2Nσ,qω
c2 ln 10√
1− c2 dc−<(aω,q) (3.16)
σ2Wi =
1
Mq
1∫
−1
∑
z′′∈Ds
e−
√
2
σ |10
z′′
ω −q|10
z′′
ω
σ
√
2Nσ,qω
s2 ln 10√
1− s2 ds−=(aω,q) (3.17)
where Dc and Ds are discrete finite set of points that can be determined from the
values of c and s. A complete derivation can be found in the Appendix A.
Note that an estimate of σ (the parameter of the Laplacian) is necessary and can be
obtained from the data by means of an unbiased sample variance.
• Cov(Wr,Wi):
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We have that
E{W0,q} = E{W 2r } − E{W 2i }+ 2jE{WrWi} (3.18)
=
a2ω,q − (aω,q)2
Mq
(3.19)
and Cov(Wr,Wi) = E{WrWi}. Then, we can obtain
Cov(Wr,Wi) =
=
(
1
Mq
(a2ω,q − (aω,q)2)
)
2
(3.20)
Fig. 3.4 depicts an example of the pdfs obtained by fixing a Laplacian distribution
and generating sample vectors with varying length Mq. It can be noticed that derived
statistical models fit the data very accurately.
Finally, we can summarize the necessary steps to obtain p(aˆω,q|q) as follows:
• identify the set of DCT coefficients falling in Iq,
• estimate the parameter σ of the Laplacian distribution by means of an unbiased
sample variance,
• compute the theoretical value of aω,q by means of (3.12) (in this phase numerical
integration will be used),
• compute σ2Wr , σ2Wi and Cov(Wr,Wi), by means of (3.16), (3.17) and (3.20),
• compute the estimate aˆω,q from the DCT coefficients as in (3.14) obtain its proba-
bility under the hypothesis of quantization with step q as in (3.15).
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3.3 Hypothesis tests
Given the statistical characterization of BF coefficients under both the hypotheses of
no previous quantization and quantization with a generic step, we can now exploit such
statistical descriptions for JPEG compression detection.
The statistical models derived allow us to formulate different hypothesis tests and use
different discriminatory statistics. In particular, the null hypothesis is always given by
H0: the image has never been compressed
and we will differentiate the tests according to the alternative hypothesis H1 considered
(simple or composite) and the set F of DCT frequencies considered in the analysis. For
the sake of clarity, we will indicate the BF coefficients at a certain DCT frequency f ∈ F
as aˆfω.
In the following, we propose three tests involving different amount of information from
the image under investigation, together with experimental validation on the benchmarking
datasets.
3.3.1 Single-frequency simple alternative hypothesis: the R-test
In this first test, the alternative hypothesis is given by the fact that the image underwent
a JPEG compression. Thus, H0 is as in 3.3, while
H1: the image has been previously compressed
Moreover, the DCT frequency considered is only one:
F = {f}, f ∈ {1, . . . , 64}
Then, the statistics used is the magnitude of the BF coefficients R = |Aˆfω| at a certain
DCT frequency f and some ω ≥ 6pi. We know from Section 3.2.1 that the probability
density function of obtaining a BF coefficient aˆω under the hypothesis of no previous
quantization is the following:
p(aˆω|NQ) = 2M |aˆω|e−M |aˆω |2 . (3.21)
Then, we can design a test with an upper threshold, that can be derived by fixing a
significance level and using the cdf of the Rayleigh distribution in (3.21), given by
FR(r) = 1− e−Mr2 .
As a general approach, once a significance level α is fixed, we can reject the null hypothesis
when the value of r obtained from the image is such that r ≥ τα where τα is computed
such that
1− FR(τα) = α.
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3.3.2 Multiple-frequency simple alternative hypothesis: the log L0-test
The null and alternative hypothesis are the same as before, but in this case we consider
a set F of DCT coefficients with cardinality |F | > 1.
Thus a number |F | of BF coefficients are available aˆfω and their value can be combined
to obtain a likelihood function value. Indeed, assuming statistical independence between
DCT frequencies [19]) we can compute the likelihood function value for the null hypothesis
from the probabilities p(aˆfω|NQ) as
`0 =
∏
f∈F
p(aˆfω|NQ). (3.22)
Such value is then thresholded in order to classify an image as never compressed or
compressed, by means of a full statistical characterization. Indeed, we can consider the
likelihood function itself as a r.v. L0 depending on the r.v.’s Aˆ
f
ω and study its distribution.
Thus, we can reformulate expression (3.27) as
L0 =
∏
f∈F
p(Aˆfω|NQ) (3.23)
=
∏
f∈F
2M |Aˆfω| exp(−M |Aˆfω|2) (3.24)
where M is the number of DCT blocks in the image.
Equivalently, we can consider its natural logarithm:
log L0 =|F | log (2M) +
∑
f∈F
log(|Aˆfω|)−M
∑
f∈F
|Aˆfω|2 (3.25)
= |F | ln (2M) +
∑
f∈F
log |Aˆfω|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lf
−M |Aˆfω|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bf

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sf
(3.26)
where |F | is the cardinality of F .
The r.v.’s |Aˆfω| are i.i.d. (assuming independency among DCT frequencies) and they
follow a Rayleigh distribution with scale parameter σ = 1/
√
2M . Starting from this we
can study Lf , Bf and Sf .
• Each Lf is a log-Rayleigh random variable. According to [116], we have that
E{Lf} = − logM
2
− γ
2
V ar{Lf} = pi
2
24
,
where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
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• Each Bf is a squared Rayleigh r.v. multiplied by a constant term −M . It can be
shown (via r.v. transformation) that a squared Rayleigh r.v. with scale parameter
σ has an exponential distribution with rate parameter 1/2σ2 (in our case M). By
scaling with a factor −M , we have that
E{Bf} = −1
V ar{Bf} = 1.
• Each Sf ’s is sum of two r.v., hence we have that
E{Sf} = E{Lf}+ E{Bf}
= − logM
2
− γ
2
− 1
V ar{Sf} = V ar{Lf}+ V ar{Bf}+ 2Cov{Lf , Bf}
=
pi2
24
,
as the value of the covariance has been derived by means of symbolic computation
and is equal to −1/2.
• Finally, log L0 is a sum of the iid r.v.’s Sf plus a constant term |F | log (2M). Then,
we have that
E{log L0} = |F | ln (2M)− |F |
(
logM
2
+
γ
2
+ 1
)
,
V ar{log L0} = |F | · pi
2
24
.
We can notice that the statistical models is properly scaled according to M , the num-
ber of DCT coefficients involved in the estimation of the Benford-Fourier coefficients, thus
allowing flexibility when analyzing images of different size. Thanks to these results is pos-
sible to design a threshold-based test on the value of the likelihood function by exploiting
the Chebyshev’s inequality:
p
(
| log L0 − E{log L0}| ≥ k
√
V ar{log L0}
)
≤ 1
k2
, k ∈ Z.
Thus, we can fix a significance level α and by setting k = ±√1/α we have that the
probability that log l0 deviates from E{log L0} more than k times the standard deviation
of log L0 is lower than α. By considering that log L0 expresses the likelihood of the null
hypothesis, we can define the threshold
τα = E{log L0} −
√
1
α
·
√
V ar{log L0},
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Figure 3.5: Scheme of the proposed JPEG compression detection algorithm.
and design a threshold-based test as follows:
H0 is accepted if log `0 ≥ τα
H0 is rejected if log `0 < τα.
It is worth pointing out that τα can be theoretically determined, thus avoiding again the
need of any preliminary training on data.
3.3.3 Multiple-frequency composite alternative hypothesis: the λ-test
In this case, we consider a pool of possible quality factors {QF1, . . . , QFT} and corre-
sponding quantization tables, and define the null alternative hypotheses as:
H1: the image has been compressed
with a quality factor among QF1, . . . , QFT
Thus, we can consider the alternative hypothesis as composite since it includes a set
of possible parameters, the potential quality factors. Now, we propose a discriminative
test encompassing statistical models of both null and alternative hypotheses. Also in this
case, we propose to automatically determine an acceptance region for the null hypothesis
H0 without the need of any training phase, and provide a final binary output on the
subject image (i.e., never compressed or compressed).
The test consists in the application of the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT)
[21] to the given problem and its workflow is represented in Fig 3.5. As in 3.25, we
compute the BF coefficients aˆfω for the chosen set F of DCT frequencies and obtain the
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likelihood function value for the null hypothesis as
`0 =
∏
f∈F
p(aˆfω|NQ). (3.27)
Moreover, we want to provide a likelihood value for each parameter of the composite
alternative hypothesis, hence for each quality factor considered. To this end, for each
frequency f and quality factor QFi, the corresponding quantization step q
f
i at that DCT
frequency is retrieved. Similarly as the null hypothesis, we can compute the BF coefficient
estimate aˆf
ω,qfi
and its probability value p(aˆf
ω,qfi
|qfi ) can be obtained as in Section 3.2.2,
thus obtaining a likelihood function value for each QFi:
`QFi =
∏
f∈F
p(aˆf
ω,qfi
|qfi ). (3.28)
Finally, according to the GLRT design, the discriminative statistic is given by
λ =
`0
maxi∈{1,...,T} `QFi
. (3.29)
Then, we propose to obtain the final decision on the image as follows:
H0 is accepted if λ ≥ 1
H0 is rejected if λ < 1.
Indeed, setting the threshold to 1 means that we reject the null hypothesis as soon as
we find an alternative one which achieves an higher value of the likelihood function. It is
worth pointing out that this choice is not driven by a theoretical model, as it happens in
the two previous tests. Indeed, as a distribution model of λ would be required in order to
fix an optimal threshold at a certain false alarm probability upperbound. However, we will
see in the next section that the results achieved in the experimental settings considered
are comparable to the ones obtained with an optimal threshold, numerically derived from
the data by means of a false alarm upperbound criterium.
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3.4 Experimental results
We performed extensive tests in order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed approach,
both in classifying images as uncompressed or compressed and in identifying portions of
the same image showing different compression histories.
In the following, we describe the experimental settings considered and the results
obtained on images coming from diverse sources, comparing the performance with existing
forensic methods.
3.4.1 Uncompressed vs Compressed discrimination
We first consider images belonging to the four benchmarking datasets (the 2K subset of
the RAISE dataset has been used [44]) and apply the three tests to the full-size images.
Other four state-of-the-art methods have been considered for comparisons, in partic-
ular the techniques proposed in [109], [59], [48] and [88], denoted as BF FFT, FSD, BLOCK
and DCT, respectively; all of them have been briefly described in Chapter 2 and require
a preliminary training phase (BF FFT and FSD are SVM-based, while the BLOCK and DCT
methods are threshold-based). Therefore, each dataset was randomly divided into two
equal parts, one for training and another one for testing. All the images have been
compressed at quality factors {90, 80, 70, 60, 50}, features were extracted from the ones
in the training set and used for obtaining the SVM models or determining the optimal
threshold. In this phase, SVM training was performed as suggested in the original papers
and the thresholds have been chosen by maximizing the detection rate while keeping the
false alarm rate below 1% (where the negatives are represented by uncompressed original
images and the positives are the five compressed versions of each image).
All the images were processed as in Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, thus obtaining a
value of R, log L0 and λ for each image; we fixed the value of ω = 8pi and we limited the
analysis to the first 10 AC DCT frequencies in zig-zag order, in order to avoid high number
of null coefficients. For each method, we first obtain an optimal threshold from the training
set, with same procedure used for the method [48] and [88]. We indicate such thresholds
as τRopt, τ
logL0
opt and τ
λ
opt, respectively. On the other hand, the automatic thresholds for the
R- and log L0-test are determined as described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 by fixing the
significance level α = 0.01 and are indicated as τR0.01 and τ
logL0
0.01 , respectively. For the
λ-test, τλ = 1.
Then, we consider the images in the testing set, analyzing each of them in their
uncompressed version or compressed with quality factor in {90, 80, 70, 60, 50}, comparing
the use of trained and automatic discriminative thresholds.
In Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we report the results for the different methods applied to the
test set of every dataset, where the quality factors considered are arranged column-wise.
For each method, the false positive rate (FP), the true positive rate (TP) and the to-
tal accuracy (ACC) are specified. In each row block the test and the threshold used is
specified. The last four row blocks refer to the state-of-the-art methods applied with the
SVM models and thresholds derived from the training set. The four datasets are treated
separately, i.e., each image is analyzed by using the models/thresholds obtained from the
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Table 3.2: Accuracy on the binary classification uncompressed vs compressed (LIU and UCID).
LIU
90 80 70 60 50
R-test, τRopt
FP 1.0
TP 88.4 95.6 95.0 91.6 89.4
ACC 93.7 93.7 97.0 95.3 94.2
R-test, τR0.01
FP 0.6
TP 86.2 94.6 93.8 91.0 88.4
ACC 92.8 97.0 96.6 95.2 93.9
logL0-test, τ
logL0
opt
FP 0.4
TP 89.8 99.4 99.2 99.4 99.4
ACC 94.7 99.5 99.4 99.5 99.5
logL0-test, τ
logL0
0.01
FP 0.0
TP 78.8 97.8 98.8 99.0 99.0
ACC 89.4 98.9 99.4 99.5 99.5
λ-test, τλopt
FP 1.2
TP 78.2 97.8 97.8 99.4 98.2
ACC 88.5 98.3 98.3 99.1 98.5
λ-test, τλ
FP 2.8
TP 97.2 98.6 99.2 99.8 99.6
ACC 97.2 97.9 98.2 98.5 98.4
BF FFT
FP 25.8
TP 99.4 99.8 96.6 98.8 98.2
ACC 86.8 87.0 85.4 86.5 86.2
FSD
FP 7.4
TP 87.4 97.8 94.8 87.8 82.8
ACC 90.2 95.2 92.4 86.1 84.2
BLOCK
FP 1.0
TP 59.0 77.2 86.4 91.2 93.0
ACC 79.0 88.1 92.7 95.1 96.0
DCT
FP 0.4
TP 99.0 98.0 96.4 95.8 94.6
ACC 99.3 98.8 98.0 97.7 97.1
UCID
90 80 70 60 50
R-test, τRopt
FP 1.2
TP 99.4 99.7 99.7 99.4 98.5
ACC 99.1 99.3 99.3 99.1 98.7
R-test, τR0.01
FP 1.1
TP 99.5 99.8 99.8 99.5 98.6
ACC 99.1 99.3 99.3 99.1 98.7
logL0-test, τ
logL0
opt
FP 0.4
TP 99.5 99.8 99.8 99.7 100
ACC 99.5 99.7 99.7 99.6 99.8
logL0-test, τ
logL0
0.01
FP 0.0
TP 99.0 99.4 99.7 99.7 100
ACC 99.5 99.7 99.9 99.9 100
λ-test, τλopt
FP 0.4
TP 99.3 99.4 99.9 99.9 99.9
ACC 99.4 99.5 99.7 99.7 99.7
λ-test, τλ
FP 1.2
TP 99.3 99.4 99.7 99.8 100
ACC 99.0 99.1 99.3 99.6 99.4
BF FFT
FP 6.4
TP 99.5 99.1 98.0 98.9 98.2
ACC 96.5 96.3 95.8 96.2 95.8
FSD
FP 2.5
TP 96.4 99.1 98.6 96.4 95.5
ACC 97.3 98.2 97.5 96.9 96.5
BLOCK
FP 1.3
TP 97.3 100 99.8 100 100
ACC 97.9 99.3 99.2 99.3 99.3
DCT
FP 0.4
TP 98.3 97.7 97.4 97.4 97.4
ACC 98.9 98.6 98.5 98.5 98.5
training phase of the same dataset.
We can notice that the proposed approaches achieves good performance in all the
datasets. Moreover, we can observe only a slight improvement in terms of accuracy when
the optimal thresholds are used instead of the automatic ones. Furthermore, the benefits
of the size-adaptive scheme compared to the other methods are particularly clear when
their training settings are modified. In Table 7.4, we report the results obtained by
replicating the previous experiments but applying the threshold/SVM model obtained
from the training phase of a certain dataset to the testing set of a different dataset, and
we can see that the performance generally drops. On the other hand, the R, log L0 and
λ statistics prove to be more stable through the different datasets, as the threshold 1
provides good results in every case.
It is interesting to notice that, differently from the R− and λ-test, the log L0 test
generally proves to be more accurate on the smaller datasets rather than the bigger
ones; for instance, we can notice a higher false alarm rate when the bigger images in the
RAISE2K dataset are analyzed. This suggests the use of the log L0-test in smaller images
or local parts of bigger pictures.
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Table 3.3: Accuracy on the binary classification uncompressed vs compressed (DRESDEN and
RAISE2K).
DRESDEN
90 80 70 60 50
R-test, τRopt
FP 0.9
TP 100 99.9 100 100 99.6
ACC 99.5 99.4 99.5 99.5 99.3
R-test, τR0.01
FP 1.4
TP 100 99.9 100 100 99.6
ACC 99.3 99.2 99.3 99.3 99.0
logL0-test, τ
logL0
opt
FP 0.1
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
logL0-test, τ
logL0
0.01
FP 0.6
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7
λ-test, τλopt
FP 0.2
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
λ-test, τλ
FP 0.2
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
BF FFT
FP 4.0
TP 100 99.7 97.3 99.3 99.8
ACC 97.9 97.8 96.6 97.6 97.9
FSD
FP 2.5
TP 98.3 100 98.5 91.1 89.1
ACC 99.1 99.9 97.9 95.2 94.5
BLOCK
FP 0.5
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7
DCT
FP 0.0
TP 99.7 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8
ACC 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
RAISE2K
90 80 70 60 50
R-test, τRopt
FP 0.0
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 100 100 100 100 100
R-test, τR0.01
FP 0.02
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 100 100 100 100 100
logL0-test, τ
logL0
opt
FP 0.3
TP 100 100 100 100 99.9
ACC 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9
logL0-test, τ
logL0
0.01
FP 4.3
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 97.9 97.9 97.9 97.9 97.9
λ-test, τλopt
FP 0.0
TP 99.7 99.9 100 100 100
ACC 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
λ-test, τλ
FP 0.0
TP 99.4 99.9 99.9 100 100
ACC 99.7 99.9 99.9 100 100
BF FFT
FP 4.7
TP 99.8 99.8 99.5 98.9 99.6
ACC 97.5 97.5 97.5 97.1 97.4
FSD
FP 0.8
TP 86.3 96.8 98.5 94.4 91.4
ACC 93.0 98.0 98.7 97.0 95.6
BLOCK
FP 1.8
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1
DCT
FP 0.7
TP 100 100 99.9 99.9 99.9
ACC 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6
Table 3.4: Accuracy with training and testing images of different datasets
90 80 70 60 50
TR: UCID. TS: LIU.
BLOCK
FP 65.9
TP 99.7 100 100 100 100
ACC 66.9 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0
TR: LIU. TS: RAISE2K.
DCT
FP 21.8
TP 100 100 100 100 100
ACC 89.1 89.1 89.1 89.1 89.1
TR: DRESDEN. TS: LIU.
FSD
FP 64.0
TP 91.5 90.2 98.0 99.8 98.6
ACC 63.1 63.1 67 67.9 67.3
TR: RAISE2K. TS: UCID.
BF FFT
FP 11.8
TP 98.7 99.1 98.2 99.5 99.6
ACC 93.5 93.7 93.2 93.8 93.9
3.4.2 Localization of forged areas
Although the results presented so far were obtained on full frame images, the proposed
method can also be applied locally and reveal inconsistencies within the same picture,
CHAPTER 3. SINGLE COMPRESSION TRACES IN UNCOMPRESSED FORMAT
IMAGES 44
thus suggesting that a manipulation occurred. This happens, for instance, when a JPEG
image is manipulated by adding one or more parts either coming from uncompressed
images or processed so that compression traces disappear. If the image is finally saved in
uncompressed format, the original part will present traces of compression while the added
part will behave as uncompressed in terms of DCT statistics.
In order to synthetically reproduce such situation, we considered images from the
Dresden dataset and compressed them with a random quality factor from 50 to 100.
Then, we replaced a square part of 1600 × 2240 pixels with its original uncompressed
version, so that the compression mask is as in Fig. 3.6.
In light of the results obtained in Section 3.4.1, for this localization task we used the
log L0 test, which proved to be more suitable for smaller pictures and also have a lower
computational complexity with respect to the λ-test. In particular, we performed a local
analysis by applying the test to non-overlapping windows of 400 × 560 pixels and by
classifying each of them as compressed or non compressed according to a threshold on
log L0, which is computed as function of the number of DCT blocks in each window (3500
in this case) and the desired significance level (0.01). The results, reported in Fig. 3.6,
show that the proposed method achieves very good accuracies also in a local analysis of
high resolution pictures, also thanks to its size-adaptive nature.
Average Total
FP 0.33 0.36
TP 98.7 98.8
ACC 99.2 99.2
Figure 3.6: Tampering mask and window grid (black and white corresponds to uncompressed
and compressed, respectively). The table beside reports in the first column the classification
results obtained in the single images averaged on the number of images considered, while the
second column refers to the total number of windows classified through all the images.
As further demonstration of the effectiveness of our approach also in non-synthetic
settings, we report in Fig. 3.7 an example obtained on a visually compelling manipulated
image. In this case, an object coming from a different picture has been inserted into
an existing JPEG image and the composite image has been saved in an uncompressed
format. We can see from the map that the background is characterized by lower values of
log L0, which are correctly classified as compressed according to the computed threshold.
3.5 Discussion
We have proposed a novel statistical analysis of BF coefficients, which is exploited to
design threshold-based forensic detectors able to reveal the traces of JPEG compression
in digital images stored in uncompressed formats. Thanks to the statistical models de-
veloped, for all the detectors it is possible to automatically determine the threshold to be
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Composite image maplogL0Original images
Figure 3.7: Local analysis on a forged image. Overlapping windows of 240 × 240 pixels have
been used.
used, thus avoiding any preliminary training phase on data. The experiments performed
on real images of different size and source cameras show that such an approach generally
overcomes existing methods and introduces significant benefits in terms of performance.
Indeed, both the detectors achieve a very good accuracy through the different kinds of
images, thus overcoming dataset-dependency issues, and also provide a valuable tool for
the localization of forged areas in certain forensic scenarios.
However, a number of aspects deserve a further analysis and represent future research
directions, like the extension of our methods to other compression standards and its
evaluation in an adversarial perspective. Moreover, the encouraging results we obtained
confirm the effectiveness of BF coefficients in characterizing DCT coefficients and intro-
duces the following chapter, where BF coefficients are used to analyzed images stored in
JPEG format.
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Chapter 4
Multiple compression traces in
JPEG format images
The goal of this chapter is the analysis of digital images in JPEG format, with the aim
of determining whether a number of aligned previous compressions occurred. To this
end, Benford–Fourier coefficients are again used to study the DCT coefficients of multiple
compressed images. A general hypothesis testing scheme is developed, allowing for the
reconstruction of the compression chain of an image. The method has been tested in
forensic scenarios, where up to three JPEG compressions are considered. Moreover, the
performance of the method are evaluated with respect to different ranges of quality factors
used and different encoding libraries.
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4.1 Background
In our forensic scenario, the image under investigation is a JPEG file, from which we can
extract the DCT coefficients and the quantization table. According to what we assumed
in Section 2.3, we can identify the quantization table with a quality factor that we denote
as QFc (current quality factor).
In the following, we will build hypotheses on the processing history of the image and each
hypothesis will be associated to a certain compression chain. A generic compression chain
is denoted as QF = [QF1, . . . , QFL], where assuming QF means assuming that the image
underwent L JPEG compressions with quality factors QF1, . . . , QFL in chronological or-
der. A certain sequence of quality factor QF defines 64 sequences qf = [qf1 , . . . , q
f
L] of L
quantization steps, one for each DCT frequency f = 1, . . . , 64 and determined according
to the quantization tables.
Then, our null hypothesis will be given by the compression chain [QFc], while alternative
hypotheses will be associated to compression chains in the form [. . . , QFc]. The forensic
47
CHAPTER 4. MULTIPLE COMPRESSION TRACES IN JPEG FORMAT IMAGES 48
JPEG image
JPEG 
compression
JPEG 
compression
JPEG 
compression
COMPRESSED 
ONCE
COMPRESSED 
MORE THAN ONCE
Figure 4.1: Forensic scenario considered in this Chapter.
task considered is depicted in Fig. 4.1, thus the proposed detector will analyze JPEG im-
ages and determine whether they underwent only one compression or other compressions
occurred before.
4.2 Benford-Fourier coefficients in JPEG images
As it was introduced in Chapter 3, we can consider BF coefficients as the expected value
of the random variable e−jω log10 Z and use as unbiased estimator the realization aˆω of the
sample mean
Aˆω =
∑M
m=1 e
−jω log10 Zm
M
, (4.1)
where Zm is the random variable representing the DCT coefficient at the chosen DCT fre-
quency in the m-th block (we assume the variables independent and identically distributed
between different blocks).
In the case of JPEG images, the values of each random variable Zm actually fall in a
specific set of numbers: the non-negative multiples of the quantization step qc used for
that DCT frequency in the last JPEG compression. Then, the BF coefficient estimates
can be expressed as
aˆω =
1
M
+∞∑
k=1
hc(kqc) · e−jω log10 kqc , (4.2)
where hc(n) is the number of DCT coefficients with absolute value equal to n. In other
words, aˆω is a sum of complex values (in practice, a finite number): in each summand,
the phase depends on the quantization step (i.e., it does not vary among images com-
pressed with the same quantization matrix and is known from the object image) and the
amplitude depends on the number of DCT coefficients falling in the quantization interval
before the last compression, thus being an intrinsic property of each image. By looking at
the expression (4.2), we observe that the BF coefficients can be interpreted as a compact
representation of a generic DCT histogram, depending on the chosen values of q and ω.
A preliminary experimental analysis shows that in the case of discrimination between sin-
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gle, double or multiple compression, the magnitude of the BF coefficients is not sufficient
for an accurate separation, as it happened in Chapter 3. On the other hand, we can notice
that the distribution of the aˆω in the complex contains useful information for our goal.
Indeed, the phase of the coefficients compressed at the same quality factor presents some
regularity. We can observe such phenomenon in Figure 4.2, where we report the complex
BF coefficients (frequency (1, 4), ω = 8pi) of the 1338 images in UCID compressed once
or twice at different quality factors.
This suggests to give a statistical characterization of the BF coefficients estimates
computed as in (4.2), in order to quantify the likelihood that an object JPEG image was
actually compressed just once or it underwent previous compressions in its digital history.
To this extent, we are interested in the probability of obtaining a certain realization aˆω
of Aˆω under the hypothesis that the DCT coefficients at the chosen frequency have been
quantized with a certain sequence of quantization steps q = [q1, . . . , qL] (we drop the
superscript f for the sake of simplicity). We will indicate such probability as
p(aˆω|q), (4.3)
and in our technique we evaluate it under the null hypothesis that the image is actually
single compressed (i.e., p(aˆω|[qc])), and the alternative hypothesis that multiple compres-
sions occurred (i.e., p(aˆω|[. . . , qc])). In particular, we first predict the value of aˆω according
to the specific quantization history and we study the distribution of the error between the
prediction and the actual value.
4.2.1 Prediction of BF coefficients
By observing (4.2), we have that, starting from an uncompressed image, we could exactly
predict the value of the BF coefficient aˆω for each DCT frequency if the image were
successively compressed with a certain quality factor: we have to compute the DCT
coefficients from the original image, count the number of elements in each quantization
interval according to the chosen quantization table and compute the sum as in (4.2).
Similarly, if we have a JPEG image and are able to provide a reliable estimation of the
original unquantized DCT coefficients, we can as well obtain a prediction with the same
procedure according to the quantization step qc used in the last compression, and compare
it with the real one, computed from the image as in (4.1). Moreover, once the estimated
unquantized DCT coefficients (that we will indicate with the vector yNQ) are available,
it is possible to predict the BF coefficients also for the case of a sequence of quantization
steps q by applying on yNQ a repeated quantization
1. Hence, we define as
a˜ω(yNQ,q) (4.4)
the BF coefficient at ω predicted from yNQ according to a sequence of quantization steps
q.
Clearly, we expect the estimate aˆω to be close (in some sense) to the prediction com-
1In this phase, errors due to rounding and truncating operations in the compression process should be consid-
ered. This is specified in details in Section 4.3.
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Figure 4.2: BF coefficient estimates for single (blue dots) and double (red dots) compressed im-
ages for different QFc. Primary quality factors {50, 60, 70, 80, 90} are used, reported in column-
wise order.
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puted with the quantization step sequence that was actually used in the image compression
history: if the considered frequency was actually quantized only once with step qc, aˆω will
be similar to a˜ω(yNQ, [qc]); otherwise, if a previous quantization step qp was applied, aˆω
will deviate from a˜ω(yNQ, [qc]) and lie closer to a˜ω(yNQ, [qp, qc]). This behavior will be
common to each frequency and can be captured in order to detect previous compressions
and estimate the quality factor used.
4.2.2 Prediction error
According to the prediction procedure described in Section 4.2.1, the prediction a˜ω(yNQ, ·)
will be in practice affected by an error, depending on the accuracy of yNQ as estimation
of the real unquantized DCT coefficients. We can indicate such error with the complex
r.v.
E = Aˆω − a˜ω(yNQ,q), (4.5)
so that
p(aˆω|q) = fE(aˆω − a˜ω(yNQ,q)), (4.6)
where fE(·) is the pdf of E.
In other words, our goal is to determine fE(·), that would allow us to compute p(aˆω|q)
given the BF coefficient estimate and its prediction, that are available from the image
under investigation.
A theoretical derivation of fE(·) starting from the error on yNQ is hard to achieve, since
the initial deviation of yNQ with respect to the real unquantized DCT vector is propagated
through a complex sum, making it hard to perform an error analysis. However, we can
choose a specific technique for the estimation of yNQ and rely on empirical observations.
After preliminary experiments where the calibration technique proposed in [29] has been
used, we observed that the prediction error is usually a Gaussian distributed r.v. in the
complex plane with different parameters for different values of ω and DCT frequencies,
showing a similar behavior even when diverse kinds of images are considered. Starting
from that, we adopt a bivariate Gaussian model2 for the calibration technique, and obtain
an estimate of the Gaussian’s parameters for a grid of values of ω and all the 64 DCT
frequencies, by computing the prediction error in different compression scenarios for a set
of images. In particular, for a given ω and a fixed DCT frequency, we have a mean vector
µω and a covariance matrix Σω, so that
fE(e) = N2(e;µω,Σω), (4.7)
where N2(·;µ,Σ) indicates the bivariate Gaussian pdf with mean vector µ and covariance
matrix Σ. Thus,
p(aˆω|q) = N2
([
Re(aˆω − a˜ω(yNQ,q))
Im(aˆω − a˜ω(yNQ,q))
]
;µω,Σω
)
, (4.8)
2As we did in 3.2.2, we treat a complex normal r.v. as a real bivariate r.v., i.e., in terms of variance and
covariance of the two single parts instead of complex covariance and pseudo-covariance (as it is usually done when
dealing with complex r.v.’s).
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An example is reported in Figure 4.3.
−0.2 −0.1 0 0.1
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Figure 4.3: A reference image has been compressed with quality factors [80] and [60, 80]; the DCT
frequency (3, 1) and ω = 27 have been fixed. In the complex plane, we report the computed
values of aˆω and a˜ω, represented by filled triangles and circles, respectively. Black markers
correspond to the case of compression with [80], red ones to the sequence [60, 80]. Contour plots
represent the bivariate pdf’s for the two different cases.
4.3 Hypothesis test
Starting from the formulation in 4.1 and statistical analysis developed in 4.2, we can define
an hypothesis test where we have a number of alternative hypotheses Hi, i = 1, . . . , T . In
particular, the null hypothesis is given by
H0: the compression chain of the image is [QFc]
and each Hi is given by
Hi: the compression chain of the image is QFi
where QFi is a sequence whose last element is QFc.
The pool of alternative hypotheses depends on the compression chains we want to test
and might include double, triple or multiple compression chains.
In the proposed methodology, we perform a binary hypothesis test for H0 versus each
Hi, i = 1, . . . , T . This is done by computing the likelihood function values `0 and `i for
both the hypotheses, as described in detail in Section 4.3.1. Then, a likelihood ratio is
computed for each binary test
λi =
`0
`i
, (4.9)
and the final decision is taken as follows
H0 is accepted if min
i=1,...,T
λi ≥ 1
H0 is rejected if min
i=1,...,T
λi < 1.
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The approach is similar to the one proposed in Section 3.3.3 and, in the same way,
it works by rejecting the null hypothesis as soon as we find an alternative one which
achieves an higher value of the likelihood function. Again, such choice is not derived from
a distribution model of λ but it proves to be effective in the forensic scenario considered.
For reasons due numerical stability of the computation of the λi, in the following
experiments we will equivalently compute the logarithmic likelihood ratio (LLR) [136]
λ′i = −2 · log λi, (4.10)
In this case, the decision rule is then modified as
H0 is accepted if max
i=1,...,T
λ′i ≤ 0
H0 is rejected if max
i=1,...,T
λ′i > 0.
4.3.1 Computation of the likelihood function
As in Section 3.3, we consider a subset F of DCT frequencies to be used and we will add
the superscript f to the quantities involved in the following analysis to indicate a specific
frequency f ∈ F . In this section, we give a detailed description of a generic binary test
H0 versus Hi for each i = 1, . . . , T .
Starting from the image under investigation, it is first necessary to estimate inherent
statistics. First, as mentioned in Section 4.2, we use the calibration technique from [29]
(widely used in multimedia forensics [19]) to estimate the unquantized DCT coefficients of
the object image, indicated as yfNQ for the different DCT frequencies. Second, we consider
the noise on the DCT coefficients occurred in consecutive compression processes, due the
quantization to 8-bit integers in the pixel domain and the rounding/truncation operations
in the computation of the DCT. We adopt the same strategy as in [19] to estimate the
parameters of such error, which are used in the following phase. In particular, a simulated
noise component is added to the DCT coefficients before every new quantization in the
computation of the predictions a˜ω as in (4.4).
Then, we can follow the procedures described in Section 4.2, to compute for a certain
DCT frequency f ∈ F :
• the BF coefficient estimate aˆf
ωf
as in (4.2),
• the predictions a˜f
ωf
(yfNQ,q
f
0) and a˜
f
ωf
(yfNQ,q
f
i ) as in (4.4), where q
f
0 is the sequence
of quantization steps at f under the null hypothesis H0 and q
f
i is the sequence of
quantization steps at f under the alternative hypothesis Hi,
• the probabilities of aˆf
ωf
under the two hypotheses p(aˆf
ωf
|qf0) and p(aˆfωf |qfi ) by means
of (4.8).
The value of ωf is selected for every frequency so that the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between p(·|qf0) and p(·|qfi ) (i.e., the respective bivariate Gaussians) is maximized; by
doing so, we obtain random variables that are statistically more distant, hence, more
easily distinguishable.
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Finally, by replicating this procedure for each f ∈ F , we obtain |F | different BF
coefficient estimates that we can assume as realizations of independent random variables.
Then, we can compute the likelihood functions for each hypothesis as follows:
`0 = p(aˆ
1
ω1 |q10) · . . . · p(aˆ|F |ω|F | |q
|F |
0 ), (4.11)
`i = p(aˆ
1
ω1|q1i ) · . . . · p(aˆ|F |ω|F | |q
|F |
i ), (4.12)
4.4 Experimental results
We conducted several experimental tests with two different datasets of uncompressed
images, that have been compressed a number of times with an aligned grid according to
the considered forensic scenario.
As initial step, we extracted the parameters of the bivariate Gaussian prediction error
for each frequency and 100 equally spaced values of ω in [0, 50]; in this phase, we used
600 images randomly selected from the UCID database [120] and compressed them with
random quality factors, computing the difference between the BF coefficient estimates
extracted from the image and the ones predicted as described in Section 4.2.
After this training stage, we then considered the widely studied binary classification
problem of single vs double compression, with estimation of the primary quality factor;
moreover, we faced the more challenging framework of multi-class classification between
single, double and triple compressed JPEG images, where the respective compression
chain is estimated.
4.4.1 Single vs Double compression
In this experiment, images compressed once or twice with compression chains composed
by quality factors in the set {50, 60, 70, 80, 90} are classified by means of the algorithm
described in Section 4.3. We used the first 9 non-adjacent DCT frequencies taken in zig-
zag order in the 8× 8 table.
A pool of 50 possible primary quality factors, {50, 51, . . . , 99} has been considered, thus
the alternative hypotheses are given by
H1: the compression chain of the image is QF1 = [50, QFc]
...
HT: the compression chain of the image is QFT = [99, QFc]
The testing set is composed by a subset of UCID dataset (different from the ones used
for estimating the noise parameters) and a subset of the Dresden database cropped to
their 1000× 1000 central part.
In Table 4.1, we report the classification accuracies (meant as accuracy in accepting
or rejecting the null hypothesis) for the different last quality factors QFc and different
primary quality factors QFp obtained by fixing the discriminative threshold for the maxi-
mum LLR to 0. From the plots in Figure 4.6, we see that the proposed method generally
achieves acceptable results in all the datasets although only UCID images have been used
CHAPTER 4. MULTIPLE COMPRESSION TRACES IN JPEG FORMAT IMAGES 55
(a) LIU
QFc/QFp NC 90 80 70 60 50
90 0.76 0.23 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
80 0.92 0.85 0.07 0.99 0.99 1.00
70 0.94 0.09 0.93 0.06 0.86 0.99
60 0.93 0.56 0.91 0.66 0.07 0.67
50 0.92 0.11 0.49 0.86 0.27 0.08
(b) UCID
QFc/QFp NC 90 80 70 60 50
90 0.72 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
80 0.85 1.00 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00
70 0.95 0.57 1.00 0.08 1.00 1.00
60 0.91 0.90 0.99 0.98 0.09 0.99
50 0.97 0.34 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.04
(c) DRESDEN
QFc/QFp NC 90 80 70 60 50
90 0.70 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
80 0.79 1.00 0.19 1.00 1.00 1.00
70 0.90 0.72 0.99 0.07 99.7 1.00
60 0.85 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.13 0.99
50 0.95 0.42 0.94 0.99 0.90 0.03
(d) RAISE2K
QFc/QFp NC 90 80 70 60 50
90 0.90 0.09 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
80 0.98 0.99 0.01 0.99 1.00 1.00
70 0.98 0.33 0.98 0.00 0.93 1.00
60 1.00 0.65 0.97 0.90 0.15 0.99
50 0.99 0.15 0.43 0.96 0.69 0.03
Table 4.1: Accuracies in the different datasets. Secondary quality factors QFc are placed row-
wise and primary quality factors QFp are arranged column-wise. NC means that only one
compression with QFc has been performed.
in the training stage, proving the robustness of the statistical model for the prediction
error. Although some differences among the datasets and the compression chains are
observed, the performance is generally good also when the last compression is heavier
than the first one, a common limitation of forensic detectors. On the other hand, the
discriminative power is very low when the image is recompressed with the same quality
factor: this is due to the intrinsic problem that quantization with the same step does not
lead to distinguishable DCT coefficient distribution [32], since only rounding/truncation
errors during JPEG recompression introduce a difference between once and twice quan-
tized DCT coefficients. This issue will be faced in detail in the next chapter.
Since some higher false alarm rate are observed, we also report in Fig. 4.4 an example of
ROC curve for every dataset by varying the threshold on the maximum LLR obtained.
We considered the case of single compression with QFc = 90 (which is prone to false
alarm) versus the case of double compression with QFp = 80 and QFc = 90. We can see
that in any case we could potentially obtain a good performance by tuning the threshold,
although that would imply a further training phase.
4.4.2 Sensitivity to JPEG implementation
In our tests we employed Matlab built-in JPEG encoder and decoder, although different
JPEG implementations exist and are likely used. In order to assess the impact of this
specific encoder, we also replicate the computation of the likelihood ratios by using the
state-of-the-art libraries libtiff 3.6.1 and libjpeg 8d released by the IJG to read
TIFF and write grayscale JPEG images, respectively. In Fig. 4.5, we report the results
of this comparison for 200 UCID images. Fig. 4.5a shows the boxplot of the absolute
differences between the maximum LLRs obtained with the two encoders in images with
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(c) DRESDEN
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Figure 4.4: ROC curved for the case of QFc = 90 vs QFp = 80, QFc = 90.
(a) Difference in the maximum LLR for QFc = 50.
QF_p=90 QF_p=80 QF_p=70 QF_p=60 QF_p=50
0
5
10
15
20
(b) Number of images classified differently.
QFc/QFp NC 90 80 70 60 50
90 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 0 3 0 0 0
70 0 0 1 0 0 0
60 0 0 0 1 0 1
50 0 4 1 0 0 0
Figure 4.5: Comparison between libjpeg and Matlab encoder.
QFc = 50 and different primary quality factors (reported horizontally). In Fig. 4.5b,
we report for each compression chain the number of images that are classified differently
when using the two different encoders. We can notice that differences are generally small
and do not impact significantly the performance of the method.
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(b) DRESDEN
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Figure 4.6: Accuracies of the proposed method BF (red diamonds) and the techniques proposed
in [81] (green diamonds) and [138] (blue diamonds) when varying the compression parameters.
The last quality factors used, QFc, are reported on the top of the plot, while the different primary
quality factors are indicated along the horizontal axis (NC means that no previous compression
occurred).
4.4.3 Comparison with existing tools
For the sake of completeness, in this section we perform a comparison with existing forensic
methods for the distinction of single and double compressed images for the UCID and
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DRESDEN datasets. In Figure 4.6, we report the classification accuracies of our method,
indicated as BF, and the ones proposed in [81] and [138]. The former is based on the
Fisher Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) using as features the First Significant Digit
probabilities of DCT coefficients in the first 20 frequencies and, in order to perform a
fair comparison, we train the LDA classifier with the same data used for the extraction
of the prediction error parameters. The latter relies on an arithmetic property of DCT
coefficients after double quantization, the shape of factor histogram, which is mainly
visible when the second compression is lighter than the first one. The technique measures
the peaks in such histogram by means of a certain statistic, which is thresholded in
order to classify the image as single or double compressed; also in this case, we used
the same data as before for determining a proper threshold. For our method, we simply
used 1 as discriminant threshold, thus avoiding a further training stage. We can notice
the superior performance of the BF approach, particularly evident in the case of heavier
post-compression.
As a by product of the hypothesis testing scheme, in case of rejection of the null
hypothesis we can also obtain an estimate of the compression chain as
QˆF = QFiˆ, iˆ = arg max
i=1,...,T
λ′i. (4.13)
With this regard, we evaluate also the accuracy in this task and we compare the results
obtained with our method and the one proposed in [19], which provide an estimate of the
quantization table used in the first compression. In order to obtain the related quality
factor, we consider the quantization steps estimated by the method for the first 20 DCT
frequencies and find the closest match among a set of known quantization tables related
to the quality factors {50, 51, . . . , 99}. In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we report the percentage
of estimated quality factors with an error lower than 2 with respect to the correct one
QFp (very close quality factors usually have almost identical quantization tables), for
the images that are correctly classified as double compressed. Except for the case where
QFc = 90, the method BF is generally more accurate than [19], especially when the second
quality factor is lower.
4.4.4 Single vs Double vs Triple compression
In this experimental setting, we now consider compression chains containing 1, 2 or 3
elements. In this case, in addition to accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis, we
also address the task of determining the number of distinct compressions occurred, i.e.,
compressions with not identical quality factors. By doing so, in light of the results obtained
in Section 4.4.1, we can assess the power of our method in detecting operation chains that
are actually distinguishable.
Precisely, we consider classes of compression chains that include chains with the same
number of distinct quality factors (up to three) and allowing up to two consecutive com-
pressions with the same quality factor. We denote such classes with bold square brackets.
For instance, images compressed as [70, 80], [70, 70, 80], [70, 80, 80] and [70, 70, 80, 80] be-
long to a single class, indicated as [70,80]. In our experimental setup, we created the
classes by considering all possible pairs and triplets obtained by combining the quality
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QFc/QFp Method 90 80 70 60 50
90
BF 0.20 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.84
[19] 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
80
BF 0.38 0.14 1.00 0.96 0.98
[19] 0.67 0.00 0.66 0.46 0.91
70
BF 0.85 0.96 0.15 0.98 0.95
[19] 0.03 0.72 0.00 0.61 1.00
60
BF 0.62 0.06 0.94 0.27 0.92
[19] 0.00 0.17 0.72 0.00 0.06
50
BF 0.86 0.97 0.55 0.92 ND
[19] 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.34 0.00
Table 4.2: Primary quality factor estimation for UCID dataset.
QFc/QFp Method 90 80 70 60 50
90
BF 0.31 0.22 0.03 0.01 0.99
[19] 0.17 0.83 0.90 0.74 0.87
80
BF 0.50 0.25 0.49 0.46 1.00
[19] 0.24 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.74
70
BF 0.89 0.99 0.29 1.00 1.00
[19] 0.01 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.95
60
BF 0.58 0.03 0.98 0.30 0.96
[19] 0.01 0.09 0.36 0.02 0.06
50
BF 0.87 0.99 0.56 0.95 ND
[19] 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.26 0
Table 4.3: Primary quality factor estimation for DRESDEN dataset.
factors {50, 55, . . . , 90, 95} and fixing as last element the current quality factor QFc. Then,
each alternative hypothesis is related to one class:
H1: the compression chain class of the image is [QF1]
.
= [50,QFc]
H2: the compression chain class of the image is [QF2]
.
= [50,55,QFc]
...
HT−1: the compression chain of the image is [QFT−1]
.
= [95,90,QFc]
HT: the compression chain of the image is [QFT]
.
= [95,QFc]
Note that the one likelihood value is computed for each alternative hypothesis, ac-
cording to the chains reported above.
We created 600 testing images from the UCID dataset belonging to 15 different com-
pression chain classes, created by combining quality factors 60, 70 and 80. First, we report
the accuracies in rejecting/accepting the null hypothesis for the different classes in Table
4.4.
Then, as in Section 4.4.1 we can considered an estimation of the compression chain
class as
ˆ[QF] = [QF]ˆi, iˆ = arg maxi=1,...,T
λ′i. (4.14)
This also allows us to estimate the number Nˆ of distinct compressions occurred as the
length of the chains representing the class ˆ[QF]. For instance, if ˆ[QF] = [95,70,QFc],
then Nˆ = 3, and so on.
In Table 4.5, we first report for the 15 classes tested the percentage of images for which
Nˆ = 1, 2, 3 (green cells indicate correct classification). The estimation of the number of
distinct compression is generally quite accurate, especially when the last compression
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Compression chain Accuracy
[60] 0.95
[70,60] 1.00
[80,60] 0.45
[80,70,60] 1.00
[70,80,60] 0.90
[70] 0.95
[60,70] 1.00
[80,70] 1.00
[80,60,70] 1.00
[60,80,70] 1.00
[80] 0.95
[60,80] 1.00
[70,80] 1.00
[70,60,80] 1.00
[60,70,80] 1.00
Table 4.4: Accuracy for the different compression chain classes (reported row-wise) in accepting
or rejecting the null hypothesis.
is lighter. We have errors mostly for double compressed images, that are classified by
the method as single compressed (where the primary compression was light) or triple
compressed. In the latter case, by looking at the classes detected we notice that, in
most cases, an additional very light compression is erroneously identified, for example
[95, 60, 80] is detected instead as [60, 80].
Then, in Table 4.6 accuracies on the estimation of the primary quality factors (com-
puted as in Section 4.4.1) are reported, showing that the proposed approach generally
achieves good performance also in this task.
4.5 Discussion
We have proposed a method for the detection of previous aligned compression operations
in JPEG images. Thanks to several experiments, we assessed its capability of identifying
the number of distinct compressions occurred and estimating the quality factors used,
obtaining encouraging results. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first technique allowing for the estimation of the parameters of more than one previous
compression operation.
However, we can identify a number of directions for which improvements could be pro-
posed in the future. Firstly, a theory-driven statistical characterization of the prediction
error would avoid the need of a training stage. Moreover, we plan to extend the approach
based on Benford-Fourier coefficients to a more general case where processing different
from aligned recompression are considered, as well as adapt the method in order to allow
for the localization of multiple JPEG compression traces.
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Tested compression chain/Nˆ Nˆ = 1 Nˆ = 2 Nˆ = 3
[60] 0.950 0.050 0.00
[70,60] 0 0.850 0.150
[80,60] 0.550 0.275 0.175
[80,70,60] 0 0.475 0.525
[70,80,60] 0.050 0.050 0.900
[70] 0.950 0 0.50
[60,70] 0 0.550 0.450
[80,70] 0 0.825 0.175
[80,60,70] 0 0.025 0.975
[60,80,70] 0 0.025 0.975
[80] 0.950 0.025 0.025
[60,80] 0 0.575 0.425
[70,80] 0 0.925 0.075
[70,60,80] 0 0.025 0.975
[60,70,80] 0 0.025 0.975
Table 4.5: Percentage of images for which Nˆ = 1, 2, 3 is estimated through the 15 different
compression chain classes.
Compression chain/Estimation accuracy Nˆ = 2 Nˆ = 3
[70,60] 1.00
[80,60] 0.27
[80,70,60] 0.48, 0.86
[70,80,60] 0.89, 0.89
[60,70] 1.00
[80,70] 1.00
[80,60,70] 0.79, 0.97
[60,80,70] 0.92, 0.97
[60,80] 0.91
[70,80] 1.00
[70,60,80] 0.87, 0.97
[60,70,80] 0.90, 0.97
Table 4.6: Accuracy in estimating the primary quality factors on images for which Nˆ is correctly
estimated.
CHAPTER 4. MULTIPLE COMPRESSION TRACES IN JPEG FORMAT IMAGES 62
Chapter 5
Double compression traces in high
quality JPEG format images
The analysis of multiple compression traces in JPEG images has been faced in the previous
chapter. Now, we focus on the more challenging forensic scenario where high quality and
nearly identical JPEG compression is applied to the images under investigation in its
compression history. The approach developed in Chapter 4 is adapted and integrated
with an existing forensic technique that copes with the case of identical recompression.
Experimental evaluation has been carried out on the benchmarking datasets.
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5.1 Background
By revising the literature in JPEG forensics, it can be noticed that multiple compression
detectors are generally evaluated by considering quite strong quantization, with quality
factors typically lower than 90, as we also proceed in Chapter 4. However, the study of
high and very high quality JPEG compression is relevant from a forensic perspective, as
the availability of memory and bandwidth progressively increases. One may also speculate
that counterfeiters store intermediate versions at high quality to avoid visible artifacts and
detectable traces.
In addition, the techniques based on DCT coefficients (including the BF analysis) typi-
cally fail in detecting previous compressions performed with the same quantization matrix.
While some progress has been made in this direction [66, 137, 79, 27], a combination of
these techniques with the ones based on DCT coefficients remains unexplored.
For this reasons, in this chapter we focus on the problem of discriminating single and
double compressed grayscale images where both the primary and secondary quality factors
are larger or equal to 90 and their difference is lower than 10.
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Figure 5.1: Forensic scenario considered in this Chapter.
We will see that in such scenario, denoted in the following as HQ-DC (high quality
double compression) and depicted in Fig. 5.1, difficulties related to the low statistical dis-
tance between the different compression chains intensify. In particular, the case of double
compression with the same quality factor compromises the performance of the method
and force us to rely on another forensic technique (the one based on block convergence
in the spatial domain [79, 27]) to cope with that case. The two approaches are then
combined by means of decision tree induction theory, complementing the discriminatory
capabilities of both the methods.
5.2 HQ-DC scenario
In our forensic scenario, images are single or double compressed. Thus, we can use the
same notation described in Section 4.1 by indicating as QFc the current quality factor
known by the JPEG file under investigation. The compression chain of each test image
will then be composed by a previous quality factor, that we can indicate as QFp, followed
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Figure 5.2: Euclidean norm of the quantization table difference in the different double compres-
sion chains
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by QFc. For the sake of clarity in the following tests, here we will use the notation
QFp = NC (hence, the compression chain is [NC,QFc]) if the image is single compressed
and has no primary quality factor.
In our tests, for each grayscale imageQFc ∈ {90, 91, . . . , 100} andQFp ∈ {90, 91, . . . , 100, NC}.
Thus, the compression history of the image under investigation can be either [NC,QFc]
(only the last JPEG compression occurred) or [QF,QFc] (a previous compression oc-
curred), where QF is searched within the set QF range = {90, 91, . . . , 100}.
This kind of setting implies a limited difference between the quantization tables used
in the primary and secondary JPEG compression, as well as generally small primary
quantization steps which makes the detection of a previous quantization more difficult.
Figure 5.2 shows the Euclidean norm of the differences between the quantization tables
(luminance channel) of the quality factors considered for the experimental setting in
Chapter 4, compared with the ones of the HQ-DC scenario1.
In our tests, we consider images in uncompressed format and for each of them we create
single and double compressed versions by combining all the quality factors in QF range.
Thus, each image is processed according to 132 different compression chains, 11 with
single compression and 121 with double compression.
For the sake of clarity in describing the tests, we can define the label SC for single
compressed images and the label DC for double compressed images. Indeed, the method
in Chapter 4 can be seen as a classifier discriminating SC and DC. In addition, we should
consider that double compressed images can be further divided in images that underwent
two compression with the same quality factor and images whose compression chain is
composed of two different quality factors. Thus, we can introduce two other mutually
exclusive labels indicating these cases, namely IDC (identical double compression) and
DDC (different double compression).
Finally, we can consider the BF analysis as a classifier which in principle is able to
distinguish between SC (assigned to an image if the maximum value of LLR is below 0),
DDC (if the estimated compression chain [QF,QFc] is such that QF 6= QFc) or IDC (if
the estimated compression chain is such that QF = QFc).
Table 5.1 serves an example of the result representation for our experimental setting.
Different colors correspond to different labels of the test images, SC, DDC or IDC.
In the following, the numbers in each cell will indicate the classification accuracy with
respect to the specific test considered.
We limit our analysis to grayscale images and consequently apply the approach to
the luminance channel only. In this experimental setup, we employ the state-of-the-art
libraries libtiff 3.6.1 and libjpeg 8d to read TIFF and write grayscale JPEG images,
respectively.
5.3 Improved approach
We first present a exploratory experiments on the UCID dataset, from which we de-
velop an improved approach. We use the method as in Chapter 4 and replicate the
1We refer to the standard quantization tables used by the libjpeg library released by the IJG (Independent
JPEG Group), as they are often used in common software.
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NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100
99
98
97
96
95
94
93
92
91
90
Table 5.1: Example of result representation. Each cell refers to a compression chain specified
by the quality factors at the corresponding row and column. Current quality factors QFc are
reported row-wise and primary ones are reported column-wise.
setting adopted in Section 4.4.1, by only changing the set of potential primary quality
factor considered as QF range = {90, 91, . . . , 100}. We will indicate such methodology as
BF baseline. Let us recall that in Section 4.4.1, a predefined set F of 9 DCT frequencies
(specifically F = {4, 6, 11, 13, 15, 22, 24, 26, 28} in zigzag order) is used to compute the
likelihood ratio (LLR).
We reproduced the experimental setting used in Chapter 4, where a set of 600 UCID
images was employed for estimating the prediction error parameters (extended also to
other datasets). Such images are then excluded from the Benford–Fourier analysis, while
the remaining ones are used for testing.
However, we can observe from Table 5.2 that the performance of BF baseline degrades
when moving from the scenario in Fig. 5.2a to the HQ-DC one.
We notice that, although the accuracy for DDC is generally high when QFp < QFc (the
upper triangle of the table), we have a substantial misclassification for SC. By exploring
the results more closely, we obtain that the Benford–Fourier analysis for images in SC
generally leads to values of LLR higher than 0 when the alternative hypothesis is given by
[QFc, QFc]. This can be observed in Fig. 5.3, where we report the values of the different
LLRs yielded by the quality factors in QF range for single compressed images.
Moreover, we have high values of the LLR when the primary quality factor tested is high
or close to QFc, even for lower current quality factors. The former phenomenon is due to
the small steps used in the primary quantization. The latter one is caused by the fact that
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 0.05 0.98 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.91 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.65 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.26 0.90 0.81 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.24 0.04 0.08 0.21 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.41 0.62 0.97 0.78 0.74 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.43 0.06 0.07 0.25 0.71 0.88 0.98 0.83 0.57 0.99 0.99 1.00
92 0.57 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.49 0.17 0.90 0.94 0.77 0.41 0.81 0.96
91 0.54 0.12 0.14 0.75 0.80 0.89 0.98 1.00 0.95 0.76 0.37 0.86
90 0.69 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.72 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.71 0.27
Table 5.2: Accuracy of the BF baseline test on UCID dataset.
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the quantization tables of QFc and the one tested might share the very same quantization
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Figure 5.3: Values of the LLRs among different QFc for 20 randomly selected UCID images. In
each plot the horizontal axis contains the quality factors in QFrange. The vertical axis represents
the value of LLR, that we report in the interval [−2000, 200] in order to compare its behavior
across the different QFc. Each black line corresponds to an image and each value of the LLR
that lies above 0 is marked in red.
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steps for all or some of the DCT frequencies used in the computation of the LLR, thus
decreasing the distinguishability of the two hypotheses. For instance, the quantization
table of 99 is equal to 1 up to the 37-th frequency and it fully coincides with the one of
100 at the DCT frequencies used for the computation of the LLR. Thus, when analyzing
a JPEG image with QFc = 100, the hypothesis [99, 100] will yield the very same LLR as
[100, 100]. This likely causes misclassification.
In order to cope with these issues, we design an improved procedure for the selection
of the set F of frequencies used. In particular, we propose to adaptively select the
set F according to the binary hypothesis test, i.e., choosing the first 9 DCT frequen-
cies in zigzag order among the ones that actually have different primary quantization
steps. In the case of [NC, 100] vs [99, 100], the algorithm will choose the frequencies
{37, 38, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49}, where quantization steps for 99 are equal to 2.
This implicitly forces to exclude the hypothesis [QFc, QFc] from the pool of alterna-
tive ones (as no suitable DCT frequencies would be identified) and to set QF range =
{90, 91, . . . , 100} \ QFc. By this, we reduce the misclassification for single compressed
images while being aware that the possibility of identical double compression needs to
be assessed. In other words, we can consider the resulting new BF test, that we will
denote as BF adaptive, as a classifier that discriminates between two classes: if LLR is
below 0 for every hypothesis, then images are classified as single compressed or identically
recompressed images (labeled as SC ∨ IDC); if at least one hypothesis has a LLR higher
than 0, then images are classified as double compressed with different quality factors and
labeled as DDC.
We report in Fig. 5.4 an example of the different values of LLR obtained with the two
different tests, where we can notice the benefit of the frequency selection.
The accuracy results of this approach across the four benchmarking datasets are reported
in Table 5.3. For the UCID dataset, the accuracy for DDC is unaltered with respect
to the baseline approach and misclassification for SC is now reduced, although it is no
longer distinguished from IDC (for this reason the accuracy on IDC is also very high).
On the other hand, the lower triangle of the table (especially when QFp > 95) remains
an issue. It is worth noticing that DRESDEN and RAISE2K show a similar behavior,
although accuracy on SC and IDC is higher. On the other hand, the performance on
the LIU dataset presents a significant misclassification for SC, that might be due to the
reduced size of the images. This suggests that in this case the threshold on the maximum
LLR should be tuned ad hoc.
Thus, we can conclude that the Benford–Fourier analysis with adaptive selection of the
DCT frequencies is suitable to detect non-identical double compression and is particularly
accurate when QFp < QFc or QFp ≤ 95. This suggests that other techniques can be used
to extend the analysis to the detection of identical recompression. To this aim, in the
next section we explore the possibility of combining the BF adaptive test with the block
convergence approach proposed in [79, 27].
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Figure 5.4: Effect of the adaptive DCT selection on the computation of LLR in case of a double
compressed image with QFp = 94 (for the BF adaptive test the LLR for [QFc, QFc] is not
available).
(a) LIU
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 0.71 0.29 0.90 0.95 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.95 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.55 0.51 0.54 0.45 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.51 0.60 0.63 0.84 0.49 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.57 0.47 0.48 0.66 0.89 0.44 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.65 0.90 0.94 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.97 0.98 0.46 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.50 0.58 0.59 0.66 0.69 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.49 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.45 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.78 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.56 0.98 1.00
91 0.22 0.81 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.86 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.78 1.00
90 0.34 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.66
(b) UCID
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.95 0.13 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.94 0.14 0.18 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.91 0.17 0.22 0.79 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.94 0.11 0.12 0.47 0.88 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.92 0.13 0.16 0.36 0.85 0.95 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.95 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.98 0.99 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.93 0.16 0.19 0.35 0.32 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00
92 0.94 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.53 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.99 1.00
91 0.91 0.16 0.18 0.69 0.79 0.83 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.90 1.00
90 0.93 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.38 0.44 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.93
(c) DRESDEN
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.82 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
91 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
90 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.88 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(d) RAISE2K
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00
99 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.59 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
91 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.62 0.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
90 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 5.3: Accuracy of the BF adaptive test across the datasets.
5.4 Combined approach
In this section, we first recall the approach based on block convergence in the spatial
domain and some exploratory results obtained with such technique in the HQ-DC scenario
(Section 5.4.1). Then, a possible combination approach based on decision tree theory is
proposed in Section 5.4.
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5.4.1 Block convergence in the HQ-DC scenario
In [79], the authors propose a technique to identify the number of JPEG compressions
with quality factor 100 in grayscale images. In this case the quantization table is composed
only of the value 1 and we will indicate such setting as JPEG-100. It is observed that for
JPEG-100 the 8× 8 blocks are transformed in the DCT domain, rounded to the nearest
integer and transformed back to the pixel domain, where they are again rounded to the
nearest positive integer and truncated to the value range. The authors show that for some
of the blocks none of the pixel values change during a JPEG-100 compression. They call
these blocks stable and conjecture that after repeated JPEG-100 compression, all blocks
of a grayscale image will converge, i.e., become stable. Furthermore, the percentage of
blocks that becomes stable after a certain number of recompressions is largely independent
of the image content. In particular, given a subject JPEG-100 image, the authors propose
to discard the flat blocks (i.e., the ones which contain a single value and are stable from
the beginning) and, among the remaining ones, count the ones that become stable after
each JPEG-100 recompression. Hence, the ratio of stable blocks (for different numbers of
JPEG compressions) is computed by:
r =
bstable − bflat
btotal − bflat , (5.1)
where btotal is the total number of blocks in the image, bflat is the number of flat ones and
bstable is the number of stable ones. The value of r is then used to identify the number of
previous JPEG-100 compressions.
This approach has been extended in [27] to color images, for which all the three color
channels need to be analyzed and the block convergence path is studied with respect
to a number of additional aspects, such as the kind of color space conversion and the
subsampling/upsampling methods. Moreover, in this work the authors propose to fit a
theoretical distribution (specifically, the beta distribution) to the ratios of stable blocks
observed after different numbers of recompressions. The technique has been tested on
images that were recompressed multiple times with the very same quality factor and
provided accurate results in case of very high quality images (QF ∈ {100, 99}). It also
has been noted that the accuracy decreases together with the quality factor.
Now, we want to observe the behavior of the block convergence property in the HQ-DC
scenario. To this end, we compute for each UCID image the ratio r as in Equation (5.1),
by recompressing the image with the current quality factor QFc. Then, we used the 600
UCID images discarded in the Benford–Fourier analysis for fitting theoretical models,
while the remaining ones are used for evaluating the different tests designed (i.e., the
results in the tables refer to the very same images for both methods).
As a first approach, we adopt a maximum likelihood test as proposed in [27], which
searches among the pool of potential primary quality factors QF range = {90, 91, . . . , 100}
and is based on a theoretical approximation of the empirical data distribution. In partic-
ular, we fit a beta distribution for each of the 132 different compression chains and design
a first discrimination test, that we will indicate as BC ML, consisting of the following steps:
• Given an image with a certain QFc, the value of r is computed.
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NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
99 0.78 0.53 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
98 0.75 0.27 0.28 0.99 0.76 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98
97 0.26 0.75 0.76 0.81 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
96 0.38 0.64 0.63 0.69 0.76 0.98 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.94
95 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
94 0.12 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.89
93 0.10 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.96 0.94 0.94
92 0.17 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.33 0.89 0.88
91 0.19 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.16 0.88
90 0.07 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.18
Table 5.4: Accuracy of the BC ML test
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.77 0.70 0.67 0.96 0.51 0.59 0.61
92 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.01
91 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.99 0.00
90 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.99
(a) Accuracy of the BC threshold test with t = t1
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
99 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
98 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.72 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.09
97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.78 0.57 0.29 0.35 0.27 0.23 0.22
96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.83 0.90 0.75 0.26 0.50 0.53
95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.77
94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 1.00 1.00
91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.16 1.00
90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.11
(b) Accuracy of the BC threshold test with t = t2
• We consider all the beta distribution pdfs p[QF,QFc](·) that were previously estimated
from every compression chain [QF,QFc], where QF varies in QF range ∪ {NC}.
• We evaluate each pdf for r and pick the one that yields the maximum value: if it
corresponds to a QF ∈ QF range then the image is classified as double compressed,
while if it corresponds to the case of NC it is classified as single compressed.
It has to be pointed out that the BC ML is in principle able to distinguish between the
three different sets SC, DDC and IDC, as is the BF baseline. However, it also has
problems in accurately classifying SC, as shown in Table 5.4.
On the other hand the double compressed images are usually correctly identified,
in both the DDC and IDC set (for QFc ≥ 94). We can identify the reason of the
misclassification for SC by looking at the estimated beta pdfs reported in Fig. 5.5.
Notice that they are strongly overlapping in the cases of single compression and double
compression with QFp > QFc.
Similarly as it happens for the BF Adaptive, this suggests to reformulate the test with
the goal of correctly distinguishing SC and IDC. In this case, the fitted distribution is
clearly separated from the other ones (at least for QFc ≥ 94) and represents a relevant
open issue for the Benford–Fourier analysis. Moreover, Figure 5.5 also indicates that
for QFc ≤ 93 almost all of the blocks are already stable. Thus, we would not gain any
information by recompressing the image multiple times and get the whole convergence
path, as suggested in [27].
Then, we can design a simple threshold-based test (indicated as BC threshold) on r
such that an image is classified as single compressed or double compressed with different
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Figure 5.5: Beta distributions of r fitted for different QFc and QFp. In each plot the black
bold line represents the single compression case with the corresponding QFc, while the red bold
line represents the identical double compression [QFc, QFc]; other previous quality factors are
reported in the legend.
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quality factors (SC ∨ DDC) if r ≤ t, or as identically recompressed (IDC) otherwise.
The choice of the threshold t can be performed according to different criteria related to
the application scenario. As an example, we report in Table 5.5a and 5.5b the results
obtained by fixing the threshold for each QFc in two different ways:
• t1 is such that
∫ t1
0
p[QFc,QFc](r)dr = 0.01 (we target 99% accuracy on IDC),
• t2 is such that
∫ 1
t2
p[NC,QFc](r)dr = 0.01 (we target 99% accuracy on SC).
In practice, we have that both thresholds yield good accuracies when QFc ≥ 94 (as
it can be expected from Fig. 5.5), while if QFc ≤ 93 we have misclassification either for
SC and DDC or IDC. Then, we can consider the threshold-based approach on block
convergence ratio as accurate for the discrimination of single compressed and identically
recompressed images when quality factors are ≥ 94.
In light of the results from Section 5.3, we can notice that the pros and cons of the two
techniques are mostly complementary, thus suggesting the development of a combined
approach for coping with the HQ-DC scenario. In particular, results from the previous
section show that the BF adaptive test distinguishes with good accuracy SC ∨ IDC
images from DDC images (with misclassification cases for QFp > QFc); on the other
hand, the BC threshold correctly distinguishes SC ∨ DDC images from IDC images
(with misclassification cases for QFc ≤ 93).
The goal is to design a classification test for high quality JPEG images that is able to
correctly assign an image to one of the three classes (SC, DDC or IDC) by relying on
the knowledge of λ′M (defined as the maximum LLR value obtained from the Benford–
Fourier analysis by excluding QFc) and r (the ratio of stable blocks after recompressing
with QFc).
This task can be accomplished by means of decision tree induction theory [24, 118],
which allows us to determine decision rules on the pair (λ′M , r) ∈ R× [0, 1] obtained from
the analyzed image.
5.4.2 Decision tree induction
The decision tree (DT) is one of the most used ways to represent a classification test,
which is expressed as a recursive partitioning of the instance space (in our case R× [0, 1]).
The problem of building (or inducing) a tree starting from a set of labeled cases (i.e.,
a set of attribute tuples and corresponding classes) has been extensively studied in the
literature [24], providing a number of effective and efficient solutions. A tree is composed
by a number of nodes, each of them related to a specific attribute thresholding operation.
Nodes that are followed by a subtree are called internal nodes. Otherwise, they are called
leaves and they represent the fact that a decision has been reached (i.e, the analyzed
attribute tuple has been assigned to a class and no further thresholding is performed). In
our case every attribute tuple is a pair (λ′M , r), while the possible classes are SC, DDC
or IDC.
In our visual representations of the trees, we will indicate internal nodes as diamonds
containing the name of the test used (i.e., BF for Benford–Fourier and BC for block con-
vergence analysis), while leaves are denoted with squares. We number each internal node
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(a) Benford-Fourier test
BF
SC ∨ IDC DDC
λ′M < τ1 λ
′
M ≥ τ1
(b) Block convergence test
BC
SC ∨ DDC IDC
r < τ1 r ≥ τ1
(c) Desired global classification test
Global
SC IDC DDC
Figure 5.6: Decision trees for different tests.
in top-bottom/left-right order and we denoted as τi the threshold used in the i-th internal
node. As an example, in Fig. 5.6 we represent the classification tests used in Section 5.3
and 5.4.1, and the one that we want to design.
The induction process generally consists of a growing phase, where the tree is developed
according to greedy algorithms, and a pruning phase, where the tree is further reduced
by replacing a subtree with a decision leaf [118]. All these operations pursue the goal
of maximizing accuracy on a given training set (a set of samples for which both the
attributes and the corresponding classes are known) while minimizing the complexity of
the tree, and are performed according to certain criteria and metrics. The result is a
list of sequential decision rules that indicates how to optimally threshold the values λ′M
and r, and in which order. In the following, DT induction is used to derive accurate
classification tests starting from a number of labeled training images.
It is worth pointing out that, differently from other kind of classifiers, decision trees are
easy to interpret and represent. Moreover, their complexity can be controlled in several
ways, like fixing a maximum number of nodes or a minimum number of leaves. This
results in a classification test combining multiple attributes that can be easily conveyed
and explained.
5.5 Experimental results
For the sake of brevity, in this phase we consider only UCID (the 738 images used in
the previous section) and DRESDEN database, as representatives of smaller and bigger
images. For both datasets a number of images has been randomly chosen for the training
set of the DT (200 and 100 images, respectively), while the remaining ones are used for
testing.
Among the existing toolboxes available for the DT induction, we used the fitctree
MatLab function contained in the Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox. We used the
default options, with the exception of the prior probability of each class, that we explicitly
set uniform. In other words, we consider as equally probable images in SC, DDC and
IDC.
Moreover, in each experiment we both determine a full DT (i.e., the one that is built
in the growing phase) and a pruned one, obtained by forcing the algorithm to reduce the
tree until it contains less than 8 nodes, in order to have a simplified version.
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(a) Training set
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.97 0.10 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.96 0.11 0.15 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.95 0.12 0.17 0.69 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.99 0.04 0.03 0.39 0.79 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.76 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99
93 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.91 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.99
92 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.35 0.91 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.99
91 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.43 0.56 0.69 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 0.98
90 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.21 0.81 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.93 1.00
(b) Testing set
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.95 0.13 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.95 0.13 0.16 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.94 0.11 0.16 0.83 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.98 0.04 0.07 0.41 0.90 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.87 0.95 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.16 0.96 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.96 0.98 1.00
92 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.95 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.96 1.00
91 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.48 0.68 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.95
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.28 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 1.00
Table 5.6: Accuracies of overall pruned DT for UCID dataset
5.5.1 Overall decision tree
We first try to build a DT that can be applied to a high quality image regardless of its
current quality factor. In this case, the training set is composed of each training image
processed according to the 132 different quantization chains, i.e., by using all the quality
factors.
The full DTs obtained are quite complex for both datasets, presenting 3137 and 1395
nodes for UCID and DRESDEN datasets, respectively. They are quite accurate on the
training set, while the performance strongly degrades when moving to the testing set (see
Tables B.1, and B.2 in Appendix B.0.1). This suggests that the algorithm is forced to
create a high number of nodes to cope with the specificity of the training set, but it is
sensitive to the images it contains. In other words, it suffers from overfitting.
On the other hand, it is worth noticing that the pruned DTs obtained (reported in
Fig. 5.7) have the same structure for both datasets (i.e., using BF analysis first to identify
DDC images and then employ block convergence to distinguish between SC and IDC),
thus differing only in the thresholds used.
BF
BC
SC IDC
DDC
λ′M < τ1 λ
′
M ≥ τ1
r < τ2 r ≥ τ2
Figure 5.7: Overall best pruned decision tree
Moreover, by observing the accuracies (reported in Tables 5.6 and 5.7) we can notice
that the pruned versions achieve good results both in the training and testing set when
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(a) Training set
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.99 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.24 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.66 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.83 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
91 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
90 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.89 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(b) Testing set
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.62 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.84 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
91 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.90 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
90 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.91 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 5.7: Accuracies of overall pruned DT for DRESDEN dataset
QFc is high, whereas the misclassification for SC is noticeably higher for lower values of
QFc in both datasets.
In line with what we observed in Section 5.4.1, these results confirm that the thresholds
to be used differ when varying QFc due to the non-homogeneous behavior of the attributes,
especially for r.
5.5.2 QFc-specific decision trees
Given the results obtained when using the same thresholds for every image, a reasonable
solution would be to differentiate the classification test according to the current quality
factor, i.e., performing the tree induction process separately for different QFc. Indeed, it
is worth observing that the current quality factor is known, thus such approach is feasible
in a realistic forensic scenario.
We repeat the DT building for the 11 different values of QFc, where the training set is
now composed only of images compressed once or twice with QFc as last quality factor.
On the one hand, we have that the full trees have very good accuracies on the training
sets but the performance degrades when applied to the testing sets, as shown in Tables
B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B.0.2.
On the other hand, pruned trees lead to stable results for training and testing set for
both datasets (Tables 5.8 and 5.9). For the sake of brevity, we only report the pruned
trees obtained for the different QFc from the UCID dataset (Fig. 5.8), together with the
different thresholds determined in each case. It is interesting to observe how the structure
of tree varies among the quality factors, allowing either two or three levels of depth and
splitting the nodes in different ways. For instance, we can observe that the first attribute
chosen by the algorithm is λ′M for QFc ≤ 92, while it switches to r for higher QFc for
which the block convergence is more accurate.
The results in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 indicate that the pruned DTs determined separately
for different values of QFc yield accurate results. Note that in Tables 5.3, 5.5a and 5.5b the
accuracies are computed with respect to the classes discriminated in the two single tests
(SC ∨ IDC vs DDC for BF and SC ∨ DDC vs IDC for BC). Thus, we can conclude
that the capability of BF and BC of correctly identifying DDC and IDC, respectively,
is generally maintained, while the global misclassification on the three classes is highly
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(a) Training set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.04 0.09 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
97 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.68 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.99 0.04 0.04 0.40 0.80 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.99 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.76 0.91 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99
94 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.99 0.99
93 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.86 0.97 0.98 1.00
92 0.99 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.39 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.36 0.97 1.00
91 0.98 0.01 0.03 0.44 0.56 0.69 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.28 0.98
90 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.85 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.23
(b) Testing set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.99 0.08 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.99 0.02 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
97 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.98 0.06 0.08 0.42 0.91 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.99 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.86 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.99 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.00
92 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.49 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.40 0.97 1.00
91 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.48 0.68 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.28 0.96
90 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.32 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.26
Table 5.8: Accuracies of QFc-specific pruned DT for UCID dataset.
(a) Training set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.96 0.01 0.04 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98
96 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.98 0.06 0.10 0.30 0.47 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.97 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.78 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.99 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.87 0.73 0.99
91 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.88
90 0.99 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.90 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76
(b) Testing set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.99 0.02 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.94 0.04 0.05 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
96 0.97 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.85 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
95 0.97 0.06 0.07 0.28 0.36 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.99 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.89 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.94 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.71 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.96 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.86 0.99 1.00 0.89 0.68 0.98
91 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.90 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.85
90 0.97 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.92 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.75
Table 5.9: Accuracies of QFc-specific pruned DT for DRESDEN dataset.
reduced.
In light of these results, we can consider the QFc-specific decision trees as a possible
effective solution for the distinction of images in SC, DDC and IDC in the HQ-DC
scenario.
5.6 Discussion
We have addressed the single vs double compression discrimination problem for grayscale
JPEG images compressed with high nearly-identical quality factors (≥ 90). After analyz-
ing the performance of the Benford–Fourier analysis in the DCT domain and the block
convergence analysis in the pixel domain, we have studied the problem of combining the
two techniques to obtain an accurate discrimination between single compressed images
(SC), double compressed images with a different quality factor (DDC) and images re-
compressed with the same quality factor (IDC).
The final set of detectors on both the datasets considered proves to be very accurate
for SC images (accuracy ≥ 97.5%), DDC images with QFp < QFc (accuracy ≥ 99.0%)
and IDC with QFc ≥ 93 (accuracy ≥ 99.5%).
The results obtained suggest a number of open issues and directions for future work.
The first evident space of improvement is represented by the low detection rate of certain
CHAPTER 5. DOUBLE COMPRESSION TRACES IN HIGH QUALITY JPEG FORMAT
IMAGES 78
compression chains. For instance, the DDC cases where QFp > QFc are often misclas-
sified when QFp ≥ 96. The same happens for the IDC images when QFc ≤ 92. Indeed,
none of the methods considered is able to correctly identify them and the combined global
test does not achieve good performance in those cases, although it leads to improvements
with respect to the two separate techniques. As a future perspective, additional methods
could be used to cope with these specific issues and incorporated in the final decision tree.
For instance, the approaches in [66] or [137] could be employed for identifying IDC with
QFc ≤ 92. Moreover, a limitation of the proposed approach is that it does not explicitly
incorporate the knowledge of the size of the image under investigation.
With respect to the process of decision tree induction, currently it is performed by
means of standard tools. A potential improvement would be to design induction tools
specifically tailored to the forensic scenario considered, by customizing the criteria that
rule the construction of the tree. Another, important issue would be to assess the sensi-
tivity to different training conditions, by creating mixed training sets and progressively
reducing the number of images. This would also help in building more general decision
trees, able to achieve good performance on a generic dataset.
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(a) Decision tree for QFc ∈ {100, 98}
BC
BF
BC
SC DDC
DDC
IDC
r < τ1 r ≥ τ1
λ′M < τ2 λ
′
M ≥ τ2
r < τ3 r ≥ τ3
(b) Decision tree for QFc ∈ {99, 97, 96}
BC
BF
SC DDC
BF
IDC DDC
r < τ1 r ≥ τ1
λ′M < τ2 λ
′
M ≥ τ2 λ′M < τ3 λ′M ≥ τ3
(c) Decision tree for QFc ∈ {95, 93}
BC
BF
SC DDC
IDC
r < τ1 r ≥ τ1
λ′M < τ2 λ
′
M ≥ τ2
(d) Decision tree for QFc = 94
BC
BF
BC
SC IDC
DDC
IDC
r < τ1 r ≥ τ1
λ′M < τ2 λ
′
M ≥ τ2
r < τ3 r ≥ τ3
(e) Decision tree for QFc ∈ {92, 91, 90}
BF
BC
SC IDC
DDC
λ′M < τ1 λ
′
M ≥ τ1
r < τ2 r ≥ τ2
(f) Values of τ1, τ2, τ3 for all DTs
QF τ1 τ2 τ3
100 0.52 324.13 0.34
99 0.41 749.80 5369.97
98 0.47 316.85 0.24
97 0.47 192.85 5088.69
96 0.54 27.56 5033.25
95 0.61 38.13 –
94 0.74 38.46 0.71
93 0.92 19.93 –
92 19.35 0.99 –
91 33.66 0.99 –
90 22.79 0.99 –
Figure 5.8: Pruned decision trees and thresholds for different quality factors for the UCID
dataset
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Chapter 6
Counterforensics of JPEG
compression
Counterforensics is the act of deliberately trying to conceal the traces of data manipulation.
In this chapter, two counterforensic techniques are proposed for the reconstruction of
statistical properties of natural and JPEG images. They both target the modification of
the First Significant Digit (FSD) histogram of the DCT coefficients, in order to conceal
traces of single and, in some cases, multiple compression. While the first one indirectly
modifies the FSD domain by operating in the modular logarithmic domain, the second one
directly targets the reconstruction of a given FSD histogram and can be seen as universal
to detectors based on FSD first-order histogram.
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6.1 Background
By recalling the notation used in Chapter 3 for a certain DCT frequency, we have that
X is the r.v. representing DCT coefficients (6.1)
Z is the r.v. representing the absolute value of nonzero DCT coefficients (6.2)
Z˜ = log10 Z mod 1. (6.3)
Clearly, Z˜ is defined in [0, 1], that we will denote as the modular logarithmic domain.
Alternatively, given a realization z of Z, we will call the correspondent realization z˜ =
log10(z) mod 1 of Z˜ the logarithmic remainder of z.
Moreover, let FSD : R+ −→ D,D .= {0, . . . , 9}, be the function mapping any non-
81
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negative real value a to its first significant digit, i.e.,
FSD(a) =

⌊
a
10blog10 ac
⌋
if a 6= 0
0 otherwise.
Then, we can define the additional r.v. Zˆ
.
= FSD(Z), that will play a central role in our
methods. While the r.v.’s introduced above are continuous, Zˆ is discrete and is defined
in the FSD domain D.
As remarked in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, the FSD domain has been exploited for sev-
eral decision problems in JPEG image forensics. Since the values of DCT coefficients
are remapped at any compression step, the distribution of Zˆ also changes depending on
the quantization factor. Usually, the empirical pmf of Zˆ at certain DCT frequencies is
analyzed by forensic detectors, as proposed in [59] (uncompressed vs compressed images
discrimination), [81] (single vs double compressed images discrimination) and [91] (mul-
tiple compression discrimination).
By relying on a known relationship between Z˜ and Zˆ, our first technique (described
in Section 6.2) modifies the realizations of Z (i.e., the DCT coefficients of the image)
so that Z˜ follows a certain distribution, in order to reconstruct statistical properties
typical of uncompressed images starting from JPEG compression images. It is based on
a randomization strategy that guarantees an upperbound on the distortion introduced.
The second techniques (described in Section 6.3) tackles the problem of modifying the
realizations of Z so that the correspondent realizations of Zˆ have a specific pmf (or,
equivalently, a specific histogram), trying to minimize the MSE distortion. This is done
by formulating the problem as a two-step optimization process and providing a close-to-
optimal solution based on heuristic criteria.
6.2 Reconstruction of the modular logarithmic domain statistics
It has been shown in several works [70, 108, 59] that the r.v. Zˆ in natural uncompressed
images usually follows Benford’s law, i.e., its pmf is given by
PZˆ(d) = log10
(
1 +
1
d
)
, d ∈ D. (6.4)
With this respect, for a generic r.v. Z, the following property holds [109, 34]:
Proposition 6.2.1 If Z˜ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], then Zˆ is distributed according
to Benford’s law.
In other words, the uniform distribution of Z˜ is a sufficient (not necessary) condition for
Zˆ to follow Benford’s law.
Starting from this result, we design our anti-forensic attack, indicated in the following
as FSD AF, aimed at modifying the statistics of images that have been compressed once
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Figure 6.1: Scenario considered in this Section.
with a known quality factor so that they look never compressed, as depicted in Fig.
6.1. Thus, we suppose the image has been decompressed and is now an uncompressed
format file, from which we can compute the 8× 8-block DCT. The goal is to modify the
current DCT coefficients (which presents traces of compressions) so that their logarithmic
remainders are approximately uniformly distributed, thus automatically recovering the
Benford distribution in the FSD domain.
As observed also in Section 3.2.2, when computing the DCT from an image stored
in uncompressed format that was previously compressed, the absolute values of nonzero
DCT coefficients at a certain frequency fall around the multiples of the quantization
step q (which is known in this case). We can then consider single quantization intervals
Ik
.
= [kq − q/2, kq + q/2[, k ∈ Z+, and denote as nk the number of realizations of Z
(absolute values of nonzero realizations of X) falling within each of them. Thus, we
define as pk, k ∈ Z+ the vectors containing such nk coefficients.
Before compression, the elements of pk were distributed among their quantization in-
terval Ik. The well-known anti-forensic methods in [124] adds a properly distributed noise
to any DCT coefficient to recover the original distribution. Differently, from such an ap-
proach, we aim at recovering the original uniform distribution of logarithmic remainders,
altered during the compression together with DCT coefficients and FSDs.
In particular, for any non-empty vector pk we consider the values
L1 = log10(|kq − q/2|), (6.5)
L2 = log10(|kq + q/2|), (6.6)
Then, we generate a vector ek of nk uniformly distributed values in [L1, L2]. Vector
pk is finally substituted with its anti-forensically modified version
ak = [10nk ]
ek · sk (6.7)
where 10nk is a vector in Rnk whose elements are equal to 10 and sk ∈ Rnk contains
the sign of the corresponding DCT coefficients in pk; the power operation and the vector
product are then applied element by element.
It is worth noting that, by doing so we obtain a distribution of the logarithmic remainders
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which is approximately uniform. Thanks to proposition 6.2.1, this guarantees a Benford’s
distribution of FSDs. On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, no theoretic
results would assure to get a specific distribution of DCT coefficients (r.v. X in 6.2.1)
starting from the distribution of logarithmic remainders, while the vice versa has been
done in [109] for the Generalized Gaussian. However, the typical Laplacian shape of the
DCT histogram is recovered as well (as shown in Figure 6.2), also thanks to the fact that
every coefficient cannot be moved to a different quantization interval. Such phenomenon
suggests that the FSD AF attack could be effective also when dealing with forensic meth-
ods based on the DCT histogram analysis instead of the FSD distribution, as we will show
in the next section.
Moreover, this method overcomes a drawback of [124] highlighted in [80]. Indeed, when
all (or a very high percentage) of the DCT coefficients in a given subband are quantized to
zero, it is not possible to compute the estimation of the Laplacian’s distribution parame-
ter. This step is necessary to generate the dither, thus such subbands remain untouched.
Following our approach, it is possible to apply the anti-forensic action also in these cases
by uniformly randomizing the logarithmic remainders in ]0, q/2].
Finally, this procedure can be directly applied to grayscale images, while the three chan-
nels in RGB images are treated like in [124].
6.2.1 Visual distortion measure
In order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed anti-forensic action, we first compare
our method with the one proposed in [124] in terms of quality of the resulting image. We
considered the first 500 images of UCID dataset and compressed them with different
quality factors. Then, we applied the anti-forensic attacks (FSD and [124]) and compared
the fidelity of the two resulting images with respect to the compressed one. Specifically,
we computed for each image the PSNR between the compressed version and the anti-
forensically modified image with FSD AF, PSNRFSD, and the AF in [124], PSNRDCT .
Generally, these values are quite similar (the absolute difference is less than 2 dB for any
image) and in most cases the FSD approach gives better results, showing the feasibility
of our method in realistic tampering. In Table 6.1, we report the percentage of images
for which the difference D = PSNRFSD−PSNRDCT is positive, together with the mean
values of PSNR for both the attacks in dB.
QF 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Mean PSNR value for FSD AF 33.8 33.7 34.7 34.8 35.3 36.6 39.1
Mean PSNR value for AF in [124] 33.2 33.2 34.1 34.3 34.9 36.2 39.1
Percentage of positive D 99.4 98.2 95.2 87.2 78.8 73.0 60.6
Table 6.1: Quality comparison between the anti-forensic attacks
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Figure 6.2: Statistics for luminance channel (2,2) DCT coefficients of UCID image 10. Loga-
rithmic remainders and first significant digits are computed for non-zero coefficients. In order
to compute the statistics of logarithmic remainders, the interval [0, 1] has been partitioned in 50
equispaced subintervals. In red, number of coefficients whose logarithmic remainder lies within
any sub-interval is reported and the blue line represents the ideal uniform distribution, given
by the number of subintervals divided by the total number of DCT coefficients. Regarding first
significant digits, the curve in blue is standard Benford’s law, while frequencies of the nine FSD
are reported in red. In the third column, histogram of DCT coefficients are plotted: the curve
in red is the Laplacian distribution fitteq starting from the unquantized coefficient like in [124].
Thanks to the uniform randomization of logarithmic remainders, both the Benford distribution
of FSDs and the Laplacian distribution of DCT coefficients are accurately restored.
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6.2.2 Single versus double compression classification
The first one is the technique proposed by Li et al. in [81], which builds a binary classi-
fier trained to discriminate single and double compressed images by exploiting the FSD
frequencies for 20 DCT subbands. The second algorithm, introduced by Bianchi et al.
in [20], detects localized forgeries by means of a statistical analysis of DCT coefficients.
It is worth noting, that the former one is based on the analysis of FSD distribution of
the DCT coefficients, which is exactly the statistics targeted by our approach, while the
latter one operates only on the histogram, i.e. the values of the DCT coefficients.
We used the binary SVM classifier designed in [81], trained to distinguish single com-
pressed images from double compressed images, where the quality factor QF2 of the last
compression has been fixed at 80 and the first quality factor QF1 varies in [70, 90]. Pri-
mary quality factors QF1 have been chosen such that 5 ≤ |QF1−QF2| ≤ 10, as suggested
in [92], in order to avoid a severe degradation of the image but, at the same time, obtain
distinguishable data.
We tested the accuracy of the classifier on 138 UCID images (the other 1200 have been
used for the training phase), considering the following cases:
• No AF: compression with quality QF1 −→ compression with quality QF2 = 80
• FSD AF: compression with quality QF1 −→ proposed FSD anti-forensic attack −→
compression with quality QF2 = 80
• AF in [124]: compression with quality QF1 −→ anti-forensic attack in [124] −→
compression with quality QF2 = 80
Results of the experiments conducted are reported in Table 7.6.
QF1 70 72 74 86 88 90
No AF 75.36% 97.10% 97.10% 96.38% 100.00% 100.00%
FSD AF 10.87% 7.97% 7.97% 1.45% 1.45% 2.90%
AF in [124] 6.52% 10.14% 10.14% 31.88% 39.13% 59.42%
Table 6.2: Accuracy of the SVM classifier in [81]
As a result of the counter-forensic action, the performance of the forensic method strongly
decreases, reducing the accuracy of the classifier under 10% in most cases. This proves
the effectiveness of the proposed FSD anti-forensics. Moreover, Table 7.6 shows that in
all cases (except for QF1 = 70) it outperforms the approach described in [124].
6.2.3 Forgery localization via DCT analysis
After comparing the visual distortion introduced by the two procedures in images belong-
ing to UCID database [120], we considered two forensic methods based on the detection
of double quantization artifacts and tested them on the same dataset.
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In this second experimental session, we considered the method described in [20]. Here,
a probability value of being tampered is computed for each 8× 8 block. Since it relies on
the assumption that a portion of a single compressed image has been replaced with an
uncompressed one and the composite has been finally recompressed, low probability values
are assigned to blocks presenting traces of double quantization while single quantized
coefficients lead to high tampering probabilities.
In order to assess the effects of our anti-forensic attack and compare it with previous
approaches, we applied such algorithm in three different frameworks:
1. compression with quality QF1 −→ substitution of the central portion with its original
uncompressed version (like in [20]) −→ compression with quality QF2
2. compression with quality QF1 −→ proposed anti-forensic attack −→ substitution
of the central portion with its original uncompressed version −→ compression with
quality QF2
3. compression with quality QF1 −→ anti-forensic attack in [124] −→ substitution of
the central portion with its original uncompressed version −→ compression with
quality QF2
Because of the counter-forensic action, the algorithm should indicate single compression
within the whole image, i.e. the probability map should be uniformly high-valued. This
would persuade the forensic analyst of the authenticity of the image, since no evidence of
tampering would emerge and it would be classified as simply single compressed.
In Figure 6.3, examples of probability maps (for the image 1 in UCID) with QF1 = 70
and QF2 = 80 are shown.
According to [20], in order to evaluate the impact of anti-forensics on the forensic detector
performance, in Table 6.3 we report its false alarm rate in the different frameworks, i.e. the
percentage of blocks in the double compressed part of the image that receive a probability
over 0.5 to be single compressed. Values are averaged over 500 randomly selected images
in UCID; quality factors pairs for which best performance is reported in [20] have been
chosen.
(QF1,QF2) (50,80) (60,80) (70,80) (90,80)
No AF 8.26% 10.72% 20.31% 23.18%
FSD AF 96.13% 96.62% 95.89% 63.85%
AF in [124] 75.94% 92.48% 93.69% 44.58%
Table 6.3: False alarm rate of the forensic detector in [20]
From Table 6.3 it is evident that the FSD AF attack strongly increases the false alarm
rate, i.e. decreases the reliability of the forensic tool. Moreover, its counter-forensic
effectiveness is higher with respect to the attack in [124] in any case, especially when the
first compression is stronger than the second one.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 6.3: In (a) the image is simply double compressed, while (b), (c) and (d) were obtained
following the procedures described in 1), 2) and 3), with QF1 = 70 and QF2 = 80. Respective
probability maps computed with the algorithm in [20] are reported below. No evident visual
distortion is introduced by the manipulation, but the probability map in (f) clearly reveals a
forgery in the central portion of the image. When anti-forensics is applied (FSD AF in (g) and
AF by [124] in (h) ), uniformly high-valued probability maps are obtained.
6.3 Reconstruction of FSD domain statistics
As previously specified, this technique aims at reproducing a specific pmf PZˆ in the FSD
domain. In particular, we focus on the problem of FSD histogram modification and
propose a method to replicate a set of target histograms starting from the ones of a given
image.
Existing FSD anti-forensic approaches [92] for this specific task present limitations in
terms of distortion introduced in the image or lack of flexibility with respect to the
forensic scenario. With the same meaning as in [11], our attack can be seen as universal to
detectors based on FSD first-order histogram, since no specific method is targeted but we
consider a generic binary detector taking as input a set of vectors and analyzing their FSD
histograms in order to decide between a null hypothesis H0 and an alternative hypothesis
H1. Such hypotheses can be adapted to suit different forensic problems coping also with
multiple compression, differently from the approach in Section 6.2. In the following,
we will always assume hypothesis H1 is verified for the given image and we want to
modify its FSD first-order histogram so that its attacked version leads to the acceptance
of H0. Since a generic detector is addressed, we do not express the acceptance region
analytically nor rely on specific models for FSD first-order statistics. However, in our
framework we assume to have a reference histogram to be replicated for each frequency,
obtained by averaging the histograms of a set of images for which H0 is verified. Though
such assumption might sound restrictive, it proves to be suitable for the forensic scenarios
mentioned before. Indeed, it is possible to exploit the fact that the distribution of DCT
coefficients at the same frequency is similar among images and so are the FSD first-order
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statistics, even after quantization with the same quality factor. Then, we will assume
the decision region to be convex and consider as target the histograms obtained from
the averaging operation. This leads to a conservative attack, since it is guarantees that
the input signal is moved to the acceptance region regardless of the particular detector
(thus preserving the universality of the attack), even if a smaller modification might be
sufficient.
6.3.1 Problem formulation
In order to use a compact notation throughout the paper, we formally define the First
Significant Digits and their histogram.
Given x ∈ RN , with a slight abuse of notation, we will indicate as FSD(x) the vector
given by (FSD(x1), . . . , FSD(xN)) ∈ DN .
Now, we can define the function H mapping any FSD vector d ∈ DN to a vector
h ∈ {0, . . . , N}10, representing its histogram computed by considering bins corresponding
to 0, . . . , 9.
In our case, x contains all the DCT coefficients, i.e., the realizations of X. Our goal will
be to modify x such that FSD(x) has a certain histogram h∗. In the notation introduced
in Section 6.1, it is equivalent to impose a certain pmf on Zˆ.
As mentioned before, binary forensic detectors proposed in the literature analyze a
number of histograms, corresponding to a set of frequencies. However, if a target his-
togram for each frequency is provided, the process of replicating such histograms can be
performed separately on each frequency by means of the same procedure. Therefore, in
the following we will consider a single vector x¯, containing the DCT coefficients at a cer-
tain frequency, and a given target histogram h∗. We consider a distance gx defined over
RN × RN as a measure for comparing x¯ and its modified version.
Then, the problem of modifying x¯ such that its FSD first-order histogram is equal to
h∗ minimizing the distortion is equivalent to solving the following optimization problem
x∗ = arg min
{x|H(FSD(x))=h∗}
gx(x¯,x). (6.8)
In order to express the problem in (6.8) in terms of optimal transportation theory [114],
as it is done in [33], we define d¯ := FSD(x¯) and a similarity measure for FSD vectors
with respect to d¯:
gd(d¯,d) := min
{x|FSD(x)=d}
gx(x¯,x).
Now, we can state that the solution of (6.8) is equivalent to following sequence of
problems:
d] = arg min
{d|H(d)=h∗}
gd(d¯,d), (6.9)
x∗ = arg min
{x|FSD(x)=d]}
gx(x¯,x). (6.10)
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It is worth noticing that, unlike in [33], we do not need to optimize over a set of
histograms, since we consider a single target one.
However, in order to find the optimal solution, gd(d¯, ·) must be minimized over all
the FSD vectors having histogram h∗. If h∗ = (h0, . . . , h9), the number of vectors to be
considered is given by(
N
h0
)(
N − h0
h1
)
· · ·
(
N − (h0 + h1 + · · ·+ h8)
h9
)
.
Such number is generally very high, even for small values of N , thus making the search
of the exact d] computationally unfeasible.
For this reason, we propose a procedure based on a simple and yet effective strategy,
that provides a close-to-optimal solution of (6.9) and (6.10) simultaneously.
6.3.2 Proposed method
As mentioned before, the optimization in (6.9) requires the evaluation of gd over every
element of {d|H(d) = h∗}. Regarding (6.10), it can be solved more easily if we assume
that gy is a component-wise sum
gx(x¯,x) =
N∑
j=1
g(x¯j, xj), (6.11)
where g is a symmetric convex function depending on the difference between its input
arguments. This is the case of the MSE, the most extensively used distortion measure.
Indeed, under these assumptions, minimizing gx(x¯, ·) is equivalent to minimizing each
g(x¯j, ·).
This significantly simplifies solving (6.10). Indeed, if we define S to be the subset
of R to which we can move the initial values, then S is the union of the disjoint sets
Sd = {s ∈ S|FSD(s) = d}, d ∈ D. For any real value y and any digit d, the elements in
Sd that minimize the absolute difference with respect to y can then be identified.
Then, we define
fS(x, d) := arg min
x′∈Sd
|x− x′|,
DistS(x, d) := |x− fS(x, d)|.
If the optimization problem in (6.3.2) has more than one minimizer, one of them
is arbitrarily chosen, thus guaranteeing that fS is well-defined. For instance, if S =
Z · 10−1 then fS(50, 5) = 50 (DistS(50, 5) = 0), fS(−50, 7) = −70 (DistS(−50, 7) = 20),
fS(50, 3) = 39.9 (DistS(50, 3) = 10.1).
Considering this, in the following we propose a sub-optimal approach to solve (6.9),
while (6.10) is solved optimally by means of the map fS . The procedure determines a
new vector a starting from a given input vector x¯ and a target histogram h∗. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume x¯ is non-negative; otherwise we should just consider the
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absolute values of its components and recover the signs of the original vector after the
transformation. Our approach relies on the heuristic idea that, in order to obtain a low
distortion of x¯, the elements with largest values should be modified as less as possible,
since they clearly introduce heavier distortion than the smallest ones. To this end, in our
method a suitable new digit is selected for every element of x¯ and each new component
is chosen by means of fS , as described below.
Precisely, starting from h∗, we define as Dt0 the unique set of N elements belonging to
D such that its histogram is h∗.
Then, the input vector x¯ is sorted in descending order by means of a permutation1
x˜ = σ(x¯),
and, starting from j = 0 (greatest value) until j = N−1 (smallest value), every component
of x˜ is transformed as follows
d+j = argmind∈DtjDistS(x˜j, d),
a+j = fS(x˜j, d
+
j ),
Dtj+1 = Dtj \ d+j .
Finally, the modified vector is given by
a = σ−1(a+),
where σ−1 is the inverse permutation of σ, and its FSD histogram is exactly h∗. Therefore,
a and d = σ−1(d+) are obtained as approximate solutions instead of the exact ones, x∗
and d], respectively.
Because of the sorting operation, for elements with higher values the corresponding
new FSD can be chosen among a larger pool of digits; hence, they will be likely kept
unaltered or assigned to a digit that leads to a small DistS(x˜i, dt). On the other hand,
small coefficients might be moved to a new digit that is far from the original one.
Such procedure clearly does not lead to the theoretical optimal solution, since (6.9) is
suboptimally solved. However, the fact that the highest values in x¯ (i.e., the ones that
would potentially introduce a higher distortion) are mapped to a new FSD such that
DistS is low, helps to keep a low distortion between x¯ and a. Specifically, such approach
will be particularly effective when the values of x˜j decay rapidly as j increases, as it
happens for DCT coefficients.
6.3.3 Observations and related work
It is worth noticing that, in the framework of JPEG image forensics described before, the
vectors x¯ are a transformation of the signal in the pixel domain. However, as pointed out
in [33], if the distortion between the provided image and the modified one is measured in
1We remark that, since in (6.11) the function g is the same for every j, any permutation that sorts x¯ in
descending order can be used (there might be more than one because of repeated values in x¯).
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terms of the MSE (or equivalently the PSNR) in the pixel domain, the method proposed
in Section 6.3.2 can be applied straightforwardly to x¯. Indeed, the orthonormality of the
block-DCT transformation allows us to consider the MSE as a distance directly in the
DCT domain, thus satisfying the assumptions on gx required in Section 6.3.2.
To the best of our knowledge, all of the forensic detectors based on FSD histograms
proposed in the literature only consider non-zero-valued DCT coefficients in their analysis,
while null coefficients are discarded and the FSD histogram is computed only for bins
1, . . . , 9. The formulation in Section 6.3.1 copes with the more general case where also
the null coefficients can be moved in order to replicate a target histogram defined over
the 10 bins corresponding to 0, . . . , 9. However, our procedure can be easily adapted to
the 9 bin case by simply defining x¯ as the vector containing the non-zero coefficients at
a DCT frequency and considering D = {1, . . . , 9} when computing the histogram, thus
keeping unaltered the null values.
A significant difference of the proposed method with respect to the approach in [92] is
that coefficients are moved in sequence depending on their absolute value, and regardless
of their initial distribution. Indeed, in such technique, inspired to waterfilling solutions
[127], FSD histogram bins with an exceeding or lacking number of elements with respect
to the target histogram are first identified and only transfers from the former to the
latter ones are allowed. This generally leads to a quite heavy modification in the DCT
coefficients, since it reduces the degrees of freedom in the movement of coefficients.
Unlike [100], the procedure proposed here is able to restore any target histogram and
it can then be suitable for a larger number of forensic problems. Indeed, the method in
[100] imposes a reasonable upperbound to the distance between every coefficient and its
attacked version, but it can be applied only for the case where the attacker wants to restore
the statistics of uncompressed images, since it does not allow to produce an arbitrary
histogram. On the other hand, as long as a reference target histogram is available, the
proposed method can potentially be applied in any hypothesis testing problem where H0
is “image has been compressed n times” and H1 is “image has been compressed m times”.
Furthermore, the procedure in [100] only approximately provides a histogram that verifies
Benford’s law and, especially for high frequencies (or, in general, frequencies were a strong
quantization is performed), such approximation can be not accurate. Indeed, it proves
to be effective when the lower frequencies are considered, which is true for most forensic
methods proposed in the literature (see [81] and [91]), but might not happen for a generic
detector.
6.3.4 Experimental results
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we considered the forensic
scenario described in Section 6.3.1, i.e., where a binary forensic detector takes as in-
put a set of FSD histograms corresponding to 8 × 8 block-DCT coefficients at different
frequencies.
The images used in our experiments belong to the UCID database [120].
We considered three different binary hypothesis testing problems, specified in Table
6.4. In each situation, we are interested in modifying the block-DCT coefficients of images
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in the decision region corresponding to H1, in order to be in the decision region of H0, by
introducing a minimal distortion.
H0 H1
A uncompressed single compressed
B uncompressed double compressed
C single compressed double compressed
Table 6.4
Reference sets of FSD histograms have been obtained by averaging the histograms
of 600 randomly chosen images in UCID for every frequency, from 1 to 64: specifi-
cally, we computed a set (hunq1 , . . . ,h
unq
64 ) from uncompressed images and the families
(hQFt1 , . . . ,h
QFt
64 ) from single compressed images with quality factorsQFt = {50, 60, 70, 80, 90}.
Then, the averaged histograms have been normalized, so that we have a reference proba-
bility for each digit, that is transformed into an integer value according to the number of
coefficients in each frequency.
A set of images (different of those used for the computation of the target histogram)
are applied the processing corresponding to H1 for the three cases considered in Table 6.4.
For each of them, and each frequency, the FSD histogram is modified in order to yield
the target FSD histogram. The set S has been considered, for each frequency, as a lattice
with step equal to the maximum over a row of the 8× 8-DCT transformation matrix, in
order to encompass in the modification the further distortion due to the quantization in
the pixel domain. In a first set of experiments we focus on the nonzero coefficients, i.e.,
D = {1, . . . , 9}.
In Tables 6.5 and 6.6 we report the PSNR corresponding to the average value of the
MSE of the modified images with respect to the provided compressed versions (the ones
for which H1 is verified) for each binary decision problem. In order to evaluate the validity
of our approach, we implemented the method described in [92] and compared the results
obtained when the same target histogram is considered. Indeed, such technique is also
designed to replicate a given histogram, thus allowing for a fair comparison with the
proposed method. The two methods are denoted in the Tables as TT and WF, indicating
the transportation-theoretic formulation and the waterfilling approach, respectively.
In problem A, images were first single compressed with different quality factors QF1
and then (hunq1 , . . . ,h
unq
64 ) have been targeted. The same happens in problem B, where
images were first compressed with fixed quality factor 75 and then re-compressed with
different QF2. In problem C, images are first compressed with fixed quality factor 75, re-
compressed with QF2 and the histogram sets (h
QFt
1 , . . . ,h
QFt
64 ) were replicated for different
QFt.
As we can see from the tables, the distortion introduced in the image by the proposed
method is significantly lower than the one obtained by applying [92]. The difference in
terms of PSNR ranges from 3 dB to 12.61 dB.In a second set of experiments, we included also null coefficients in the modification,
i.e., the bin corresponding to 0 is also considered. In this case, the computational com-
plexity significantly increases, since more coefficients need to be moved in every frequency.
PSNR results for a subset of images, computed in a similar way to those in Tables 6.5 and
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QF1 50 60 70 80 90
TT 41.03 41.56 42.11 43.38 46.22
WF 34.47 34.22 34.58 34.91 34.77
QF2 50 60 70 80 90
TT 38.21 38.58 41.33 44.17 42.83
WF 33.14 33.14 34.29 35.86 35.12
Table 6.5: Case A and B, nonzero coefficients, 738 images.
6.6, are reported in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. They are generally different with respect to the
previous case, due to the additional constraint on the null values and the availability of
more coefficients to be moved, but still we find similar results as before when considering
the difference between the two methods.
6.4 Discussion
Two anti-forensic attack to JPEG compression forensic detectors has been proposed.
The first one s applied to single compressed JPEG images and reconstructs the typ-
ical distributions of Z, Zˆ and Z˜ for uncompressed images. It restores the Gaussian-like
statistical distribution of DCT coefficients and the Benford’s law distribution of the FSD
randomization strategy in a specific domain but it is based on a randomization strategy
whose optimality is not discussed.
The second one directly targets the reconstruction of a given First Significant Digit
(FSD) distribution and can be seen as universal to detectors based on FSD first-order
histogram. Based on heuristic criteria, the technique provides a close-to-optimal solution
for the problem of FSD histogram modification with minimal distortion in terms of Mean
Square Error (MSE) distortion. Moreover, it can be applied in a more general forensic
scenario where statistics after an arbitrary number of compressions is targeted. However,
the distribution of DCT coefficients is not controlled.
We can also perform a comparison between the two methods (FSD AF and TT), although
some observations are in order. Indeed, FSD AF leads to a FSD histogram that depends
QFt QF2 50 60 70 80 90
50
TT 42.71 41.37 38.49 39.20 38.61
WF 38.43 37.32 36.33 35.03 36.05
60
TT 42.08 42.95 41.33 39.08 40.70
WF 33.65 38.20 36.49 36.11 36.55
70
TT 39.23 42.25 42.98 42.16 43.57
WF 32.34 32.77 37.66 37.36 37.45
80
TT 36.99 38.93 41.93 44.04 43.82
WF 32.17 32.40 33.31 39.13 34.57
90
TT 36.17 36.73 39.22 44.16 40.85
WF 32.99 32.46 33.41 35.14 34.35
Table 6.6: Case C, nonzero coefficients, 738 images.
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QF1 50 60 70 80 90
TT 43.67 43.67 43.60 43.54 43.43
WF 37.67 37.79 37.71 37.93 36.98
QF2 50 60 70 80 90
TT 43.23 43.19 43.58 43.60 43.63
WF 34.79 34.36 36.88 38.45 37.78
Table 6.7: Case A and B, zero coefficients included, 300 images.
QFt QF2 50 60 70 80 90
50
TT 34.36 34.26 34.79 36.05 35.28
WF 33.66 31.63 31.98 32.30 32.28
60
TT 35.03 34.89 35.47 36.45 35.96
WF 31.03 33.67 32.17 32.33 32.34
70
TT 35.66 35.76 36.45 37.56 37.04
WF 30.69 30.81 34.43 32.74 33.05
80
TT 36.06 36.49 37.79 39.41 38.74
WF 30.82 31.13 31.54 34.81 32.27
90
TT 37.12 37.14 39.36 42.88 40.71
WF 31.08 30.98 32.09 33.23 32.87
Table 6.8: Case C, zero coefficients included, 100 images.
on the input signal and is obtained by means of a random process and it is not targeted to
optimality. However, in order to compare the quality of the resulting image in a realistic
forensic scenario, we applied both approaches to the first 20 DCT frequencies only, as
state-of-the-art forensic detectors limit their analysis to these frequencies. In particular,
we consider single compressed images and target the statistics of uncompressed images.
The behavior of the average MSE (whose corresponding PSNR is reported in Table 6.9)
varies together with the quality factors. This is due to the fact that, when a heavier
quantization is performed, the two methods restore histograms that are not very close for
frequencies 15-20, because FSD AF exploits a random signal-dependent process while we
impose a conservative reconstruction. On the other hand, when quantization is lighter,
the histograms almost coincide and our strategy leads to a better quality in the resulting
image.
QF1 50 60 70 80 90
TT 44.58 46.00 47.71 50.46 54.50
FSD AF 45.18 46.16 47.80 49.99 53.65
Table 6.9: Comparison of FSD AF and TT.
Both the techniques represent a further threat to the reliability of forensic analysis
and an incentive for the development of enhanced forensic tools in an adversary-aware
perspective.
The analysis of the traces left by such counter-forensic action and their detectability by
means of forensic methods would represent an interesting direction [132, 80]. Moreover,
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it would be of great interest to extend our approach to distortion measures different from
the MSE (i.e., the PSNR), such as the SSIM or the WPSNR.
Chapter 7
1D median filtering: an example of
deterministic forensics
Differently from the approaches presented in the previous chapters, the forensic technique
presented in this final chapter is based on deterministic properties. It is targeted to the
detection of a median filter application in 1D data. The method relies on mathematical
properties of the median filter, which lead to the identification of specific relationships
among the sample values that cannot be found in filtered sequences. Hence, their presence
in the analyzed 1D sequence allows excluding the application of the median filter. Owing
to its deterministic nature, the method ensures 0% false negatives and, although false
positives (not filtered sequences classified as filtered) are theoretically possible, experimental
results show that the false alarm rate is null for sufficiently long sequences. Furthermore,
the proposed technique has the capability to locate with good precision a median filtered
part of 1D data and provides a good estimate of the window size used.
7.1 Background
As a result of globalization and worldwide connectivity, people from all over the planet
are exchanging ever increasing amounts of information of whatsoever type and form, in
the most diverse fields of human activity including science, economy, social relationships,
news, entertainment. Forensics technologies provide powerful tools to verify the authen-
ticity of data and their possible manipulation, either they refer to multimodal sensed
signals, medical records, geophysical observations, marketing statistics or financial re-
ports. In this framework, the detection of any operation that could have been employed
to post-process a set of data, either for malicious purposes or simply to improve their
content or presentation, turns out to be of interest for a comprehensive forensic data
analysis.
Here, we consider the median filter [128], a widely known technique commonly used
for data smoothing. Thanks to its ability to effectively discard outliers while preserving
relevant information, median filtering has been extensively adopted as a post-processing
operator in different fields, including audio processing [113, 72], image processing [4, 94],
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geophysics [85], economics [135], biomedical signal processing [99], both for 1D and 2D
signals. Several methods have been proposed for the forensic detection of median filtering,
with particular attention to images. Most of them are based on a statistical characteri-
zation of the filtered signal in different domains, often relying on machine learning tools
for the detection.
To the best of our knowledge, no specific methods for the forensic analysis on 1D data
are available, as they usually focus on the two-dimensional case, although part of them
can be easily conceived and adapted to the 1D domain and will represent a benchmark
comparison in our experimental validation phase. In [77] Kirchner and Fridrich proposed
a simple yet effective median detector that exploits the artifacts introduced by the filter.
The ratio of histogram bins and the subtractive pixel adjacency matrix features in the first-
order difference domain are used as traces to detect median filtering in bitmap images. The
first-order difference map is employed in [25] by Cao et al. to compute the probability of
zero-values in texture areas of the image. A more complex median detector was proposed
by Yuan in [139], based on the idea that median filtering, applied to overlapping blocks,
affects the pixels ordering in each block, thus introducing a strong dependence between
median values originating from overlapping filter window. Kang et al. in [71] analyzed
the statistical properties of the median filter residual by using an autoregressive model. In
[31] Chen et al. proposed an effective median detector based on two sets of features, the
cumulative distribution function of k-th order image difference (global probability) and
the local correlations between different adjacent image difference pairs (local correlation).
Recently, an effective median forensic algorithm was proposed in [141], where the second-
order local ternary patterns are used to capture the changes of local textures due to
median filtering. All of the above techniques rely on statistical classification as a final
step of the detector, thus producing both false alarms and missed detections.
On the other hand, we propose a deterministic approach that exploits some basic
mathematical properties of the median filter, which are a consequence of its very defi-
nition and enforce specific relationships among the samples of the original and filtered
sequences. Such properties lead to the identification of sets of 1D patterns (called in the
following unfeasible classes) that cannot be output by a median filter. While the problem
of identifying roots of median filters (i.e., patterns that are certainly preserved after the
filtering) has been widely addressed in the past [61], to the best of our knowledge this is
the first work focusing on the study of patterns that are certainly not introduced by a
median filter.
This turns out to be particularly important for forensic purposes, as the subject signal
can be scanned sequentially and the presence of such patterns can be checked by means of
a simple algorithm: if they are detected, then the signal is classified as negative to median
filtering; otherwise, it is classified as positive to median filtering. It is worth pointing out
that the detection does not require any thresholding or training operation, as it is a direct
result of the scanning procedure. Moreover, given the nature of the algorithm, the rate of
false negatives is guaranteed to be null, as no unfeasible classes can be present in filtered
sequences.
The effectiveness of the technique is proved by extensive experiments on different kinds
of 1D data, including audio tracks, economical series, physiological signals. Besides con-
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firming the absence of false negatives, experimental results demonstrate that in practical
cases the method easily achieves 0% false positives, which would be possible in princi-
ple. Indeed, the occurrence of the unfeasible classes in common data originated from
different sources is extremely frequent. Moreover, the detector is able to provide as a
side-information the size of the applied median filter and, thanks to the capability of de-
tecting the unfeasible classes throughout the entire sequence, the technique can be used
to segment with a high precision the filtered subsequence in the case of local filtering.
Although the proposed scheme is deterministic when the median filter is the very last
process applied, we also explored the possibility to exploit the distribution of the unfeasi-
ble classes in the signal to detect median filtering even when a post-processing operation
is applied, thus addressing robustness issues of the deterministic detector.
7.2 Median filter detection and unfeasible sequences
In this work, we design a forensic detector of median filtering for 1D data based on
deterministic properties of such processing, which can be applied to 1D signals or, in
general, to any set of ordered one-dimensional data samples.
First, we introduce the theoretical background and the main rationale behind our
method in Section 7.2.1. Then, in Section 7.2.2 we propose an algorithmic procedure for
the analysis of 1D data, that will be exploited in the following sections.
7.2.1 Theoretical background
We will represent the one-dimensional objects analyzed as numerical sequences {yi}∞i=1 ⊂
R, that we will simply denote as {yi} for the sake of brevity1 . Then, the action of median
filtering can be defined as follows:
Definition Given a sequence {xi} and a natural odd number N , the output of a median
filter with size N applied to {xi} is a sequence {yi} such that
yi = median(Xi),
Xi := {xi−bN
2
c, . . . , xi, . . . , xi+bN
2
c},
when i > bN
2
c and yi = 0 otherwise.
In a forensic framework, we assume to analyze a 1D data and look for traces of previous
median filtering. In other words, we deal with an “inverse” problem, where we are given
a sequence {yi} and we need to determine whether it is the output of a median filter of a
certain size N applied to an original unknown sequence {xi} or not.
In order to provide an answer to this question, we can now exploit the following
consequence of the median filtering definition:
1In practice the sequences to be analyzed will be finite, thus we will have that yi = 0 when i is higher than a
certain value.
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yi+2yi 2
xi+2xi 2
yi yi+1yi 1
xi 1 xi xi+1
xi 1 = yi xi   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi xi  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi xi   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi xi  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi x   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi x  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi x  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi x   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 2 = yi 1 xi 1   yi 1 xi  yi 1
xi 2 = yi 1 xi 1  yi 1 xi   yi 1
xi 2   yi 1 xi 1 = yi 1 xi  yi 1
xi 2  yi 1 xi 1 = yi 1 xi   yi 1
xi 2   yi 1 xi 1  yi 1 xi = yi 1
xi 2  yi 1 xi 1   yi 1 xi = yi 1
xi 2 = yi 1 xi 1   yi 1 xi  yi 1
xi 2 = yi 1 xi 1  yi 1 xi   yi 1
xi 2   yi 1 xi 1 = yi 1 xi  yi 1
xi 2  yi 1 xi 1 = yi 1 xi   yi 1
xi 2   yi 1 xi 1  yi 1 xi = yi 1
xi 2  yi 1 xi 1   yi 1 xi = yi 1
xi 2 = yi 1 xi 1   yi 1 xi  yi 1
xi 2 = yi 1 xi 1  yi 1 xi   yi 1
xi 2   yi 1 xi 1 = yi 1 xi  yi 1
xi 2  yi 1 xi 1 = yi 1 xi   yi 1
xi 2   yi 1 xi 1  yi 1 xi = yi 1
xi 2  yi 1 xi 1   yi 1 xi = yi 1
xi = yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
Figure 7.1: Representation of the influence of {yi} on {xi} for the case of N = 3.
Property Let {yi} be the output of a median filter of size N applied to {xi}. Then,
∀i > bN
2
c the following facts hold:
• at least one value in Xi is equal to yi
• among the other values of Xi, bN2 c of them are equal to or greater than yi and the
remaining bN
2
c are equal to or lower than yi.
As an example, we consider the simple case where N = 3. In such case, if {yi} is
the sequence to be analyzed and we suppose it is the output of a median filter with
size 3 applied to an unknown sequence {xi}, a generic value yi, i > bN2 c introduces some
knowledge on the 3 elements of Xi, as illustrated in Fig. 7.1. In particular, we can observe
that xi−1, xi and xi+1 must satisfy at least one of the 6 sets of conditions reported in the
central grey block in Fig. 7.1, and the same holds for all the values in {yi}: yi+1 enforces
6 possible sets of conditions involving the 3 elements xi, xi+1, xi+2, as well as yi−1 for
xi−2, xi−1, xi, and so on. We can replicate the procedure for a generic filter size N , and
we obtain that each yi affects the N values in Xi by imposing a number of possible sets
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yi+2yi yi+1
HN set of conditions
on xi bN2 c, . . . xi+bN2 c
HN set of conditions
on xi+1 bN2 c, . . . xi+1+bN2 c
HN set of conditions
on xi+2 bN2 c, . . . , xi+2+bN2 c
xi 1 = yi xi   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi xi  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi xi   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi xi  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi xi   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi xi  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi xi   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi xi  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi xi   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi xi  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi x   yi xi+1  yi
xi 1 = yi x  yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi x = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi x = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi x  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi x   yi xi+1 = yi
i 1 = i i   yi xi+1  yi
i 1 = i i yi xi+1   yi
i   i i = yi xi+1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
i = i i   i i  i
i = i i i i   i
i   i i = i i  i
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
i = i   i i  i
i = i i i   i
i   i = i i  i
xi 1  yi x = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi x  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi x   yi xi+1 = yi
=   
=  
  = 
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
=   
=  
  = 
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
= i   
= i  
i   i = 
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
= i   i xi 1  yi
= i i xi 1   yi
  i = i xi 1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
i =   i 1  yi
i = i 1   yi
i   = i 1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1 = yi i   
xi 1 = yi i  
xi 1   yi i = i 
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
=   i i 1  yi
= i i 1   yi
  i = i i 1  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
=   i  i
= i   yi
  = i  yi
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
=   
=  
  = 
xi 1  yi xi = yi xi+1   yi
xi 1   yi xi  yi xi+1 = yi
xi 1  yi xi   yi xi+1 = yi
xi = yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi +1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi +1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi +1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1 = yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
xi   yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi  yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2 = yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1   y xi+2  y 1
xi = yi+1 xi+1  y xi+2   y 1
xi   yi+1 xi+1 = y xi+2  y 1
xi  yi+1 xi+1 = y xi+2   y 1
xi   yi+1 xi+1  y xi+2 = y 1
xi  yi+1 xi+1   y xi+2 = y 1
xi = yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
xi = yi+1 xi+1  yi+1 xi+2   yi+1
  = i i 1
 = i i 1
 i = i 1
i i i   i i = i 1
xi = yi+1 xi+1   yi+1 xi+2  yi+1
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Figure 7.2: Hypothesis tree for a median filter N = 3.
of conditions that is equal to
HN = N
(N − 1)!(
N − 1
2
)
!
(
N − 1
2
)
!
.
Clearly, HN significantly increases with N : HN = 6, 30, 140, 630 for N = 3, 5, 7, 9,
respectively.
If we start from a value yi and move forward in {yi}, at each step we will have HN
possible systems introduced and the elements of {xi} must fulfill at least one of them.
This can be represented by a tree, as in Fig. 7.2, where at each node one of the possible set
of conditions is added to the ones cumulated in the previous steps along the corresponding
path, thus obtaining an equality/inequality system at each node. Now, at each step the
systems introduced and the ones of the previous step will share N−1 overlapping variables
(the intersection of Xi and Xi+1). Hence, according to the values in {yi}, at each node the
system cumulated along the branch might contain conditions on the same variable that
are not compatible: in such cases, the cumulated system has an empty feasibility region
and we will define the branch as unfeasible; otherwise, we will denote it as feasible.
Clearly, if at a certain step j all the branches are unfeasible, it means that no sequence
{xi} exists such that it could generate {yi} when median filtered with size N . In other
words, we have the deterministic proof that {yi} is not the output of a median filter of
size N and we obtain a response for the forensic problem we face. Although the specific
framework and mathematical tools used are different, such approach can be compared to
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the ones proposed in [134] and [58], where a similar rationale is employed for the detection
of resampling in signals and steganography in digital images, respectively.
7.2.2 Algorithmic checking procedure
In the light of the above, a possible approach for analyzing a given sequence {yi} could
be to progressively scan it and determine at each step whether the tree generated by the
samples contains at least one feasible branch, meaning that a median filtering with size N
might have occurred. In this regard, we propose a recursive algorithmic procedure for the
analysis of the sequence {yi} starting from a generic element at position i up to a certain
number Tmax of successive values. It is based on a recursive algorithm consisting of a
depth-first visit of the tree and its pseudo-code is reported in Algorithm 1. In particular,
it takes as input arguments the size N of the median filter, the sequence {yi}, the index
i of the first element of {yi} to be considered, the maximum number Tmax of successive
values to be scanned and the current level T of the tree (which is initially set to 1 and
increases at each iteration up to Tmax).
Algorithm 1
function Check(N ,{yi},i,T ,Tmax)
Get yi from {yi}
Create the HN sets of conditions imposed by yi
for each set of conditions do
Check conditions overlapping for that T
if conditions are compatible then
if T = Tmax then
return OK
else
R = Check(N , {yi},i+ 1,T + 1,Tmax)
if R = OK then
return OK
end if
end if
end if
end for
return ¬OK
end function
In other words, at each call of the Check function the algorithm creates all the HN
possible sets of conditions generated by the sample at the current location and check their
consistency with the existing branches (created at the previous call) in a sequential order.
When the first feasible condition is found, the function recursively launches itself and
moves to the successive sample. As we observed, the number HN substantially increases
with N , thus leading to a higher computational complexity of the algorithm when raising
N .
Fig. 7.3 shows an example referred to a practical case for the filter size N = 3. Here,
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y2 = 5 y3 = 8 y4 = 9 y5 = 6
x1 = 5 x2   5 x3  5
x2 = 8 x3   8 x4  8
x2 = 8 x4   8x3  8
x2   8 x3 = 8 x4  8
x3 = 8x2  8 x4   8
x4 = 8x2  8
x4 = 8x2   8
x3   8
x3  8
x5 = 9x4   9x3  9
x5 = 9x4  9x3   9
x3 = 9 x4  9 x5   9
x4 = 9x3  9 x5   9
x3 = 9 x4   9 x5  9
x4 = 9x3   9 x5  9
x6 = 6x4   6 x5  6
x6 = 6x4  6 x5   6
x4 = 6 x5  6 x6   6
x5 = 6x4  6 x6   6
x4 = 6 x5   6 x6  6
x5 = 6x4   6 x6  6
x5 = 9x4   9x3  9
x5 = 9x4  9x3   9
x3 = 9 x4  9 x5   9
x4 = 9x3  9 x5   9
x3 = 9 x4   9 x5  9
x4 = 9x3   9 x5  9
x6 = 6x4   6 x5  6
x6 = 6x4  6 x5   6
x4 = 6 x5  6 x6   6
x5 = 6x4  6 x6   6
x4 = 6 x5   6 x6  6
x5 = 6x4   6 x6  6
y1 y6
x1 = 5 x2  5 x3   5
¬OK
¬OK
¬OK
¬OK
Figure 7.3: Representation of the Check function with N = 3 for a specific sequence {yi}
starting from the position 2.
we consider a sequence {yi} such that
y2 = 5, y3 = 8, y4 = 9, y5 = 6,
and illustrate the algorithmic procedure when Check(3,{yi},2,1,Tmax) (where Tmax ≥ 4)
is called. The analyzed sequence is reported at the bottom and the tree generated is
represented above. The blue arrows show the branches sequentially analyzed by the
algorithm, where the dotted ones indicate a new call of the Check function. Conditions
on same elements of {xi} are aligned vertically and a red box indicates that an explicit
inconsistency with respect to the previous set of conditions along the current branch is
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found. On the other hand, a grey box indicates that the current set of conditions is
compatible and the Check function is recursively called with the third and fourth input
arguments increased by a unit. For the sake of brevity, only the check on the first set of
conditions generated by the first sample y2 = 5 is represented (i.e., x1 = 5, x2 ≥ 5, x3 ≤ 5);
however, the following ones are treated in the same way and all of them turn out to be
closed, thus showing that the analyzed sequence cannot be generated by a median filter
of size 3.
Although a progressive scanning by means of such algorithmic procedure would rep-
resent a valid solution from a theoretical point of view, the actual application to data
sequences of considerable length is computationally demanding, especially when N in-
creases. However, we will see in the next section that we can exploit additional properties
of the median filter and adopt smarter strategies in order to simplify the analysis from
both a theoretical and a computational perspective.
7.3 Unfeasible classes and N -detectors
A peculiar property of the median filter is the fact that it is based on a sorting operation
and, because of that, the set of conditions on {xi} that we defined in the previous section
are composed of equalities and non-strict inequalities. By looking at Fig. 7.2, we have
that the structure of the tree (the number and kind of conditions added at each step) is
determined uniquely by the specific filter size N we are considering. On the other hand,
the feasibility of each branch only depends on the values of the yi’s, as it is easy to observe
that in an equality/inequality system the existence of a solution only depends on the order
relations between all the constant terms involved, that in our case are represented by the
elements of {yi}. Indeed, in Section 7.2.2 we have shown how to verify that for N = 3 a
sequence such that
y2 = 5, y3 = 8, y4 = 9, y5 = 6,
generates a tree with only unfeasible branches, but we would have obtained the same
result by applying the checking procedure to any sequence with the same 6 order relations
between y2, y3, y4 and y5, i.e., such that
y2 < y3, y2 < y4, y2 < y5,
y3 < y4, y3 > y5,
y4 > y5.
Let us now suppose to analyze a generic subsequence of {yi} composed of L elements
in consecutive positions, regardless of its starting point in {yi}, which can be seen as
a vector of length L with values in R. Thus, we can identify RL as the set of all such
possible objects and, consistently with the notation on trees, we can denote each vector
aL ∈ RL as feasible (unfeasible) for a filter size N if the corresponding tree, generated as
described in Section 7.2, contains at least one feasible branch (contains only unfeasible
branches).
According to the previous observations, we can give the following definition and lemma:
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Definition Let ∼ be a binary relation over RL such that for aL,bL ∈ RL
aL ∼ bL ⇐⇒ all the L(L− 1)/2 order relations
between the elements of aL
hold also for the corresponding
elements of bL
Example
(1, 3, 2, 4) ∼ (100, 300, 200, 400),
(1, 3, 2, 4) ∼ (−20,−1,−7, 50),
(1, 3, 2, 4)  (−50, 0, 50, 100).
Lemma If aL ∈ RL is feasible (unfeasible) for a certain filter size N , then any bL ∈ RL
such that bL ∼ aL is feasible (unfeasible) for N .
Proof: Let A and B be the trees generated for the fixed value of N from aL and bL,
respectively, as described in Section 7.2.1 (see Fig. 7.2). Let then FA(i, l) be the cumulated
system at the i-th node of the l-th level of A, where 1 ≤ i ≤ (HN)l and 1 ≤ l ≤ L; the
same holds for FB(i, l). Being fixed the value of N , FA(i, l) and FB(i, l) share the same
variables and they are subject to the very same equality or inequality conditions with
the exception of the constant terms, which are given by the elements of aL and bL. By
hypothesis, the corresponding elements of aL and bL have the same order relations and
the systems FA(i, l) and FB(i, l) have either empty or not empty feasibility regions. 
In other words, we can limit the analysis to the classes on RL (that we will denote
as L-classes) defined by the relation ∼ , since all the vectors of RL with the same order
relations between their components will be either feasible or unfeasible. This represents a
crucial result, as such L-classes are in a finite number (for a given L they can be explicitly
determined by means of combinatorics rules) and we can perform our analysis a priori,
thus avoiding the application of the algorithmic procedure in 7.2.2 to the given sequence.
As an example, we proved in Section 7.2.2 that (5, 8, 9, 6) is unfeasible in R4 for N = 3.
Given a generic sequence {yi}, if we find along the sequence 4 values in a consecutive
position which have the same order relations as (5, 8, 9, 6), we can deterministically assert
that such sequence (or such part of the sequence) has not been median filtered with N = 3.
To this extent, we can generate all the L-classes for any value of L and determine
which of them are feasible or unfeasible for a given filter size N . We will then denote
as UNL the set of L-classes that are unfeasible for a certain N and do not contain any
L′-class, L′ < L, that is itself unfeasible for N . By building such sets, we can obtain a
set of patterns (meant as order relations between consecutive elements) to be sought in
the given sequence {yi} in order to determine whether it has been filtered or not, as it is
explored in the next section.
7.3.1 Identification of feasible and unfeasible classes
In order to identify a priori the feasible and unfeasible patterns for a certain filter size N ,
we exploited the algorithm proposed in 7.2.2 by analyzing the L-classes up to a certain
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length.
First, we observed that the filter size N determines a maximum length for its unfeasible
classes, which is equal to 2N − 1. Indeed, the following lemma holds:
Lemma Let {xi} be a numerical sequence in R and {yi} the output of a median filter
with size N applied to {xi}. Then each yi will be related to its adjacent values within a
maximum window of size 2N − 1.
Proof: By definition of the median filter, each yi depends uniquely on Xi. At the same
time, Xi affects the values in the set Yi = {yk, k = i−bN2 c, . . . , i+bN2 c}, thus establishing
a mutual relationship between yi and the elements of Yi, whose cardinality is 2N − 1. 
Hence, we have that the maximum length is given by 5, 9, 13 and 17 for N = 3, 5, 7, 9,
respectively.
Then, we employed the function UnfeasibleClasses, whose pseudocode is reported
in Algorithm 2, to identify the unfeasible L-classes for a specific filter size N and for L
starting from 2 up to 2N − 1. In particular, at each step all the possible L-classes for the
current L are created, the ones which contain a (L − 1)-class identified as unfeasible at
the previous iteration are discarded and, among the remaining ones, the Check function
determines which ones are unfeasible, thus obtaining the set UNL for each length L.
Algorithm 2 Identification of unfeasible classes
function UnfeasibleClasses(N)
for L = 2, . . . , 2N − 1 do
Create all the possible L-classes
for each L-class do
if it does not contain an element of UNL−1 then
Choose an aL ∈ RL in the current class
Create the sequence {ai},
whose first L values are the elements of aL
if Check(N ,{ai},1,1,L)= ¬OK then
Save current class in UNL
end if
end if
end for
end for
end function
In Table 7.1, we report the cardinality of the UNL obtained, indicated as |UNL |. The
computational complexity of the procedure increases both with L (because of the total
number of L-classes, which is reported in the second column) and with N (because of the
number of possible sets of conditions). Thus, we limited the analysis to the classes up to
L = 11 and in the hardest cases (marked with the symbol ∗), instead of all the possible
L-classes, we considered only the ones where the relations between the L elements are
strict inequalities, which can be seen as the L! possible permutations of L elements (for
L = 11 we have almost 40 million permutations). Although this does not provide an
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Table 7.1: Number of unfeasible L-classes derived for different values of N . The symbol ∗ means
that only classes with strict inequality relations between the L elements have been considered.
The last row reports the total time (in seconds) necessary to derive all the unfeasible classes of
the corresponding value of N .
L N. of L-classes |U3L| |U5L| |U7L| |U9L|
2 2 0 0 0 0
3 13 0 0 0 0
4 75 12 0 0 0
5 541 20 60 36 36
6 4683 0 468 270 222
7 47293 0 74 1712 980
8 545835 0 34 7666 5578
9 7087261 0 2 1802 31496
10 102247563 0 0 838 29776*
11 ∼ 1 billion 0 0 478 6510*
Total computation time 0.15s 580.3s 27320s 51960s
exhaustive analysis (2N − 1 would be higher for N = 7, 9), the number of unfeasible
classes detected among the L! considered is significant and sufficient to correctly detect
the filter, as we will see in the next sections. It is to be pointed out that, although it is
time consuming for higher values of N , the above operation can be performed off-line and
once-for-all, and can be easily parallelized; moreover, aggregating all unfeasible classes
detected among different values of L and N requires very limited memory requirements.
As an example, in Fig. 7.4 the 12 unfeasible 4-classes for N = 3 are graphically
represented, where the distance between each value has been normalized to a common
unit. We can notice that in most of the classes the values satisfy strict inequalities, while
in 4 classes the first and the last elements are equal. Moreover, for each class its symmetric
counterpart in the vertical and horizontal direction are included in U34 . Indeed, it is easy
to observe that in case of vertical or horizontal symmetry the building of the tree leads to
the same results, thus suggesting that a further equivalence could be introduced in order
to represent the unfeasible patterns in a more compact way.
Furthermore, it is interesting to visualize how much the unfeasible classes are similar
Figure 7.4: Graphical visualization of the elements in U34 .
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L = 5 L = 6
L = 7 L = 8
U35 U55
U75 ⌘ U95
2
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5578
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U57 U
7
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U98
Figure 7.5: Relative sharing of the unfeasible classes among different values of N and L. A
number indicating the cardinality is placed in every set. Notice that for N = 3 the sets UN4 and
UN5 are empty.
for different values of N . To this end, we identified the unfeasible classes at a certain L
that are shared by more than one value of N and the ones that are unfeasible for only
one value of N . In Fig. 7.5, such analysis is graphically represented as Euler diagram,
highlighting the different behaviour of the unfeasible classes when L varies. For instance,
we can notice that the sets U75 and U95 coincide and, in general, the unfeasible classes for
N = 7 and N = 9 have a significant overlap (which decreases by increasing L). Clearly,
this intrinsically affects the detection performance of the method when a different window
size is used in the filtering. Indeed, it is easy to predict that if a sequence has been median
filtered with N = 7, the probability that it will contain classes that are unfeasible for
N = 9 will strongly decrease, as most of them are unfeasible also for N = 7 and have
been certainly removed.
7.3.2 N -detectors
Once the sets UNL are identified, the definition of simple and fast detectors is straightfor-
ward. Indeed, differently as the solution proposed in Section 7.2.2, it is now possible to
simply scan the sequence progressively and check whether the elements of {yi} fulfill or
not the order relations corresponding to the classes in the sets UNL : if such classes are
present in the sequence, we can deterministically classify {yi} as not filtered; if none of
the unfeasible classes is found, we classify the sequence as filtered. Although this sec-
ond assumption is not deterministic (unfeasible patterns might be missing also in a not
filtered sequence), we will see that in practice the false alarm rate is basically null for
sequences with a sufficient length, since pristine signals most likely contain unfeasible
classes. A deeper analysis of such aspect is provided in Section 7.4.1, where we establish a
relationship between the length of the analyzed sequence and the false alarm probability.
Moreover, the implementation of such procedure leads to algorithms with a quite low
computational complexity, consisting of a simple check on order relations.
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N = 3 N = 5
pU Tmin pU Tmin
Original 0.40 50 0.32 84
Median 3 0 - 0.23 126
Median 5 9.8 · 10 2 2235 0 -
Median 7 1.1 · 10 2 2025 5.1 · 10 3 6307
Median 9 1.1 · 10 2 1180 1.3 · 10 2 2317
N = 3 N = 5
pU Tmin pU Tmin
Original 0.47 40 0.39 70
Median 3 0 - 0.19 147
Median 5 2.0 · 10 2 1100 0 -
Median 7 1.4 · 10 2 1575 1.5 · 10 2 2037
Median 9 1.2 · 10 2 1825 1.7 · 10 2 1813
N = 3 N = 5
pU Tmin pU Tmin
Original 0.40 45 0.38 70
Median 3 0 - 0.12 252
Median 5 1.7 · 10 2 1315 0 -
Median 7 1.0 · 10 2 2110 9.4 · 10 3 3430
Median 9 8.1 · 10 3 2845 7.8 · 10 3 4144
N = 3 N = 5
pU Tmin pU Tmin
Original 0.20 100 0.21 133
Median 3 0 - 5.2 · 10 2 602
Median 5 5.3 · 10 3 4300 0 -
Median 7 6.0 · 10 3 3810 6.0 · 10 3 5383
Median 9 3.1 · 10 3 7300 4.0 · 10 3 7959
Figure 7.6: Pmf of the 5-classes and 7-classes in the different datasets. The histogram depicted
refers to the Original case for each dataset and the 252 classes belonging to 〈U35 〉 have been
placed in the first bins. For the different processing (reported row wise), we computed the value
of pU and the value Tmin, by imposing a false alarm probability upper bound equal to 0.01.
Finally, the knowledge of the UNL ’s for the different values of N allows for a median
filter detection targeted to one or more values of the filter size N . Precisely, considering
a generic set of integer odd values N , we can define its corresponding N -detector: in this
case, the presence of all the unfeasible classes in
⋃
N∈N
UNL will be checked and the sequence
will be considered as positive to median filtering detection if only feasible classes for at
least one value of N ∈ N are detected; on the other hand, we consider the sequence
as negative to median filtering detection if at least one unfeasible class for each value of
N ∈ N is detected.
7.4 Experimental results
The proposed detection method has been tested on various kinds of 1D data. In particular,
we considered 4 different datasets:
• Music: music audio clips of different length and sources have been taken from the
entire version of the publicly available dataset used in [129], which includes 64 clips
of 30 seconds and a genre collection composed by 1000 tracks of 30 seconds. They
are stored in .wav and .au format and their sources vary from CD to radio and
microphone recordings. The total number of clips is 1064, each one sampled at
22050Hz and consisting of 661500 samples.
• Speech: similarly, speech audio clips have been taken from [129] (where the technical
specifications are the same as the music clips) and from the AMI Corpus [3], which
includes 36 conference recordings of 20-60 minutes. From the latter, the first 20
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millions samples (20 minutes) of each recording have been considered. The total
duration of the dataset is 752 minutes.
• Stock: we downloaded historical stock data [2] of all the companies listed on NAS-
DAQ stock exchange since at least 10 years. In particular, we considered the daily
closing price of each company’s security, thus obtaining a total number of 1299 se-
quences whose length varies from 3650 to about 9000 (depending on the date they
entered the stock market).
• Ecg: Electrocardiogram (ECG) data (used in [99]) have been downloaded from the
publicly available MIT-BIH Arrhythmia Database [93], the MIT-BIH Supraventric-
ular Arrhythmia Database [64] and from the European ST-T Database [126]. The
three datasets provide a total number of 216 ECG sequences containing on average
300000 samples.
7.4.1 False alarm probability analysis
As previously stressed, our detection method can guarantee a null rate of false negatives
(median filtered data classified as not filtered), as filtered sequences will not present
unfeasible classes by definition. On the other hand, not filtered sequences that do not
contain unfeasible classes are possible in principle. In those cases, the detector would fail
and classify the sequence as filtered, thus leading to false positives.
In order to quantify such false alarm probability, we performed a preliminary analysis
on a subset of each dataset. Let us consider a value of N and a sequence with length equal
to T . Then, we want to estimate pFA(T ), the false alarm probability of the {N}-detector
for a given dataset as a function of T , which can be seen as the probability of finding
only feasible classes for N in sequences with T samples that have not been filtered. For
the sake of simplicity, let L be such that ∃L′ ≤ L with UNL′ 6= ∅, and let us suppose to
consider only non-overlapping subsequences of length L contained in the dataset, whose
corresponding L-class is represented by a random variable CL.
Then, we can assume that all the L-classes (meant as the L-classes corresponding to
the subsequences of length L) contained in the dataset are independent realizations of CL,
and that we have an estimate of the probability mass function of CL. Now, the sample
space of CL coincides with all the possible L-classes and is composed of two disjoint parts:
the L-classes that do not contain nor are themselves unfeasible classes and the ones that
either belong to UNL or contain a L′-class that belongs to UNL′ . We will denote the latter set
as 〈UNL 〉 and by summing up the pmf values of all the elements in 〈UNL 〉 we can quantify
the probability pU that a realization of CL is unfeasible.
Finally, these probability values provide some information on pFA(T ) for a generic
sequence. Indeed, a sequence of length T contains bT/Lc non-overlapping subsequences
of length L and, thanks to the independence assumption and the knowledge of pU , we
can compute the probability of finding a given number of L-classes in 〈UNL 〉 among them.
This is done be seeing the sequential analysis of the non-overlapping subsequences as a
Bernoulli process (where the success is represented by the fact that the corresponding
L-class belongs to 〈UNL 〉) and model the number of successes as a binomial distribution
with parameters bT/Lc and pU . We can then obtain the probability pLFA(T ) of finding
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only feasible L-classes among the bT/Lc non-overlapping subsequences in the sequence
as follows:
pFA(T ) ≤ pLFA(T ) =
(bT/Lc
0
)
p0U(1− pU)bT/Lc
= (1− pU)bT/Lc. (7.1)
As stated in (7.1), pLFA(T ) is an upper bound of the global false alarm probability
pFA(T ) as it refers to non-overlapping subsequences only, while overlapping ones could
belong to 〈UNL 〉 as well; moreover, unfeasible classes for N with a higher length might be
present in the sequence. However, such a result allows us to find a value of T for which
the false alarm probability is certainly lower than a desired value.
In Fig. 7.6, we report the results of such kind of analysis for two pair of N and L
values: for N = 3 we considered L = 5 (which excludes the possibility of longer unfeasible
sequences) and for N = 5 we considered L = 7, as higher values would imply a significantly
higher computational cost. For each sequence of each dataset we considered its original
version (denoted as Original) and we created four other sequences, resulting from the
application of a median filter with a varying window size M , respectively denoted as
Median M for M = 3, 5, 7, 9. Then, we estimated the pmf in each case by randomly
collecting 500000 subsequences of the chosen length and creating a normalized histogram
of the corresponding possible L-classes (see Fig. 7.6, where the pmf estimation for the
Original sequences in the case N = 3 and L = 5 is represented for each dataset).
By knowing U35 and U57 , we identified the 252 5-classes in 〈U35 〉 and the 33232 7-classes
in 〈U57 〉. Then, we computed the value of pU in each case and, by means of expression (7.1),
we derived the length value Tmin which is necessary to guarantee that pFA(T ) ≤ 0.01. It is
interesting to notice that, although the pmfs present some differences among the datasets
due to the different nature of the data, the general shape of the histogram is quite similar.
We also observe in any case a decrease of pU when a window size M = 5, 7, 9 is used,
while it is clearly null when M = N . However, the value of Tmin turns out to be quite low
(not higher than 8000 in each case) for both the values of N considered, and allows for
acceptable results in terms of detection, as it will be explored in the following experiments.
7.4.2 Filter detection
After assessing the false alarm probability, we applied the N -detectors (as described in
Section 7.3.2) for different N to the sequences of all the datasets (assuming to stop the
search as soon as one unfeasible class for each element of N is found) and tested also the
effectiveness of the proposed approach in identifying and discriminating median filtering
with respect to other processing. In fact, in addition to the Original and Median M
cases, for each sequence of each dataset we also created other two versions, resulting from
the application of a moving average filter (with window size 3) and a Gaussian lowpass
filter (with window size 3 and standard deviation equal to 0.5), respectively denoted as
Moving Average and Gaussian Lowpass.
First, we applied a {3, 5, 7, 9}-detector, thus using all the unfeasible classes that we
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derived in Section 7.3.1. As we specified in Section 7.3.2, the algorithm checks the presence
of unfeasible classes for N = 3, 5, 7, 9 and the sequence is classified as positive if only
feasible classes for at least one value of N are detected, while it is classified as negative
if at least one unfeasible class for each value of N is found. Clearly, the Original,
Moving Average and Gaussian Lowpass cases should be negative to such detector,
while the Median M cases should be positive. As expected from the theory, the rate of
false negatives was null in all tests, so in Table 7.2 we report the results only on sequences
that were not median filtered in terms of false alarm, which is the only type of error
that might occur. By observing the results, we can notice that we also have a null rate
of false positives both in the Original row (as we predicted in Section 7.4.1) and the
Moving Average/Gaussian lowpass rows, thus showing the ability of the method
in distinguishing between median filtering and other kind of processing.
Regarding the complexity and computational time of the detection, the search will
be more demanding as N increases, as the number and the length of unfeasible classes
increase as well (for N = 9, a total number of 74598 unfeasible classes need to be checked
with a length up to 11), but the first unfeasible class is usually detected very soon. In
Table 7.3, we report the average computational time in seconds necessary to process 100
samples, showing the short time frame for the analysis of not filtered sequences (about 6
milliseconds for a 30 second long audio track).
As further analysis, we applied the detectors for a specific N to sequences that have
been median filtered with a window size M 6= N , thus evaluating the ability of the
technique to discriminate the size of the filter used. For instance, sequences filtered with
M = 3 should be positive to a {3}-detector and negative to the {5}-, {7}- and {9}-
detectors, and so on. However, we observed in Section 7.3.1 that the sets of unfeasible
classes for N and M usually share a number of classes (in particular for L = 5, 6), which
are certainly removed when a median filter with size M is applied. In addition, the action
of a median filter with size M 6= N generally decreases the frequency of occurrence of
unfeasible classes for N even though they are feasible for M , as we observed in Section
7.4.1 for N = 3. Because of that, the presence of unfeasible classes for N in sequences
filtered with size M is less probable, thus affecting the performance of {N}-detectors. In
Tables 7.4, we report the percentage of sequences classified as positives in the different
cases. Similarly as before, the different values of M are reported row wise, while the
values of N are placed column wise. We can observe that the false alarm rate is generally
lower than 1% for the {3}-detector, which is again coherent with the analysis performed
in Section 7.4.1 as the length of the sequence is in any case higher than the correspondent
Tmin values reported in Fig. 7.6. While the false alarm rate is generally acceptable up
to N = 7, it substantially increases for the {9}-detector when a median filter with size
M = 5, 7 is used, thus confirming that such filters tend to remove the unfeasible classes
for N = 9. However, it is worth pointing out that for the sequences with a substantially
higher length (i.e., part of the Speech dataset), such classes are generally found.
7.4.3 Comparison with state-of-the-art techniques
We also tested our method against some existing detection techniques. As we stressed,
no specific methods for 1D data exists, thus we adapted three different state-of-the-art
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Music Speech Stock Ecg
Original 0% 0% 0% 0%
Moving average 0% 0% 0% 0%
Gaussian lowpass 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table 7.2: False alarm of the {3, 5, 7, 9}-detector.
Music Speech Stock Ecg
Original 8.5 ·10-6 8.0 ·10-6 3.4 ·10-4 1.8 ·10-5
Moving average 8.3 ·10-6 7.9 ·10-6 3.5 ·10-4 1.7 ·10-5
Gaussian lowpass 8.4·10-6 7.9 ·10-6 3.4 ·10-3 1.7 ·10-5
Table 7.3: Average computational time in seconds of the {3, 5, 7, 9}-detector for 100 samples.
(a) Music
N = 3 N = 5 N = 7 N = 9
Median 3 100% 0% 0.% 0%
Median 5 0% 100% 0.4% 100%
Median 7 0% 0% 100% 100%
Median 9 0% 0% 0.2% 100%
(b) Speech
N = 3 N = 5 N = 7 N = 9
Median 3 100% 0% 7.0% 85.3%
Median 5 0% 100% 1.0% 78.0%
Median 7 0% 0% 100% 78.0%
Median 9 0% 0% 0% 100%
(c) Stock
N = 3 N = 5 N = 7 N = 9
Median 3 100% 0.3% 0.1% 0%
Median 5 0.4% 100% 6.8% 100%
Median 7 0.3% 16.9% 100% 100%
Median 9 0.7% 25.7% 45.7% 0%
(d) Ecg
N = 3 N = 5 N = 7 N = 9
Median 3 100% 0% 0%% 0%
Median 5 0.9% 100% 20.8% 100%
Median 7 0% 13.4% 100% 100%
Median 9 0.1% 11.5% 27.8% 0%
Table 7.4: Percentage of positives for the {N}-detectors when a different window size is used in
the filtering.
approaches that were originally conceived for images (2D median filtering), but their
rationale can be applied also to 1D data. In particular, we considered the techniques
proposed in [77], [25] and [71]. All of them require some training phase, as the former
two are threshold-based and the latter employs an SVM classifier. Thus, we divided each
dataset in two equal parts, one used for the training and the other one for the testing
phase. For the methods in [77] and [25], the optimal threshold was determined by fixing a
maximum false alarm rate of 5% and choosing the threshold value yielding the lowest false
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Music Speech Stock ECG
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Figure 7.7: Accuracies obtained by applying our approach and the existing state-of-the-art
methods.
Music Speech Stock Ecg
[25] 7.4 ·10-3 6.5 ·10-3 5.9 ·10-3 5.8 ·10-3
[77] 3.4 ·10-3 2.2 ·10-3 5.8 ·10-3 3.8 ·10-3
[71] 6.2 ·10-4 1.2 ·10-4 1.2 ·10-4 1.3 ·10-4
Table 7.5: Average computational time in seconds of different methods for 100 samples.
negative rate, while for the method in [71] we trained the SVM classifiers as suggested in
the original paper.
Because of the different properties of each method, we could perform a comparison only
for certain experimental scenarios. Indeed, the detectors [77] and [25] are not targeted
to a specific filter size but they indicate that a generic median filter operation has been
applied, thus they have been compared with the {3, 5, 7, 9}-detector. On the other hand,
the technique in [71] is able to discriminate among different values of N and it has been
compared with different {N}-detectors. Moreover, the detector in [77] can be applied
only on data containing integer values, as it is based on an histogram bin ratio, thus in
our experiments we could employ it only for the audio datasets. According to this consid-
erations, in Fig. 7.7 we report the results obtained when applying the different detectors
on non median filtered sequences (including original, average filtered, Gaussian lowpass
filtered) and median filtered with the same window as the detector. Here, we report the
accuracy value (meant as the percentage of sequences correctly classified as filtered or not
filtered) in the different cases, as false negatives are also possible for the other methods.
In this setting, we can observe that our technique achieves the maximum accuracy in
any case. The performance of [25] and [77] is also good in the corresponding scenario,
while we can notice that the technique in [71] has a different behaviour throughout the
different datasets. Moreover, in Table 7.5 we report the average computational time that
is necessary to each technique to process (i.e., extracting the features) 100 samples from
the different datasets.
7.4.4 Tampering localization
In this section, we exploit the proposed detection algorithm to locate parts of the 1D data
that have been median filtered. In particular, we partition each sequence into seven non-
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Figure 7.8: Example of median filter localization with the {3, 5, 7, 9}-detector. The black aster-
isks are the unfeasible classes detected through the whole 1D signal.
overlapping parts, each of them processed according to the different operations employed
in the previous experiments (Original, Moving Average, Gaussian Lowpass, Me-
dian with window size 3, 5, 7, 9, applied in this order). In this phase, we limited the
analysis to a subset of the Music and Speech dataset and applied each processing oper-
ation to a signal part of 30000 samples.
We then run the {3, 5, 7, 9}-detector through the whole sequence (i.e., not stopping at
the first unfeasible class detected but analyzing the sequence entirely) and perform a local
analysis by considering smaller non-overlapping blocks of 5000 samples. In particular, we
classify each of them as positive to median filtering if only feasible classes for at least one
values of N lie within it (i.e., blocks belonging to the first three parts are true negatives
and the ones belonging to the last four parts are true positives). In Fig. 7.8, we graphically
represent the behaviour of the detector by means of an exemplifying test sequence. The
black asterisks below the signal are the unfeasible classes detected through the whole
sequence for the different values of N ; clearly, no unfeasible classes for a certain N are
detected in the part of the sequence median filtered with window size N . Also in this case,
we obtain 0% false negatives in every sequence, which means that at least one unfeasible
class is detected in each one of the not median filtered blocks. Moreover, we can notice
that the unfeasible classes for any N are dense in the first three parts, while they are
more sparse when another filter size is used. In particular, coherently with the results in
the previous section, no unfeasible classes for N = 9 are found in the last three parts,
although this does not affect the performance of the {3, 5, 7, 9}-detector.
7.4.5 Robustness analysis
In this section, we deal with the issues of assessing the robustness of our method with
respect to post processing, i.e., we consider the problem of detecting median filtering even
when a further successive operation is applied after it. Firstly, we can observe that our
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technique is based on the order relationships between the samples and it is robust to any
post-processing that preserve them, such as amplitude re-scaling, monotonic corrections,
normalization, shifting. With regards to other operations, it is easy to state that when
the median filter has not been the very last process, the method loses its deterministic
nature since the post processing would potentially introduce unfeasible classes. However,
we can notice that in such situation the effect of the previous median filtering is still
visible in the distribution of the unfeasible classes detected in the sequence. In particular,
we considered the sequences of the different datasets with no processing at all (denoted
again as Original) and we processed the same sequences by first applying a median
filter with N = 3 or N = 5 followed by a post processing operation among moving
average and Gaussian lowpass filter, thus obtaining four different scenarios. Then, we
run the respective {N}-detector on all the sequences and we created an histogram of all
the unfeasible classes for that value of N , normalized by the total number of unfeasible
classes detected. In particular, for N = 3 the histogram has |U34 |+ |U35 | = 32 bins and for
N = 5 it has |U55 |+ |U56 |+ |U57 |+ |U58 |+ |U59 | = 638 bins.
A possible approach is to use the histogram bin values as features and feed a classifier.
Hence, as we did for the state-of-the-art approaches, we divided each dataset in two equal
parts, one for training and one for testing, and we extracted features from each training
set. Then, for each of the four scenarios we trained an SVM classifier with Gaussian
kernel (optimal parameters have been derived by means of a grid search procedure) using
features from all the datasets. Finally, we performed a classification for the testing set of
each dataset in the different scenarios. In Table 7.6, we report the accuracies obtained.
We can observe that the accuracy values are higher than 90% almost in any case and, as
expected, the performance are better for the case of N = 5 and the Gaussian lowpass filter,
which has less impact than the moving average filter. In order to have a comparison with
state-of-the-art methods, we considered the approach in [71] (the only one which detects
median filter with a specific value of N) and report in Table 7.7 the results obtained by
replicating the same experimental settings, showing a clear performance drop in case of
post-processing and worse accuracies with respect to the proposed method.
Music Speech Stock Ecg
Original vs Median N = 3 + Moving Average 97.8% 93.7% 92.2% 73.1%
Original vs Median N = 5 + Moving Average 100% 100% 98.6% 94.4%
Original vs Median N = 3 + Gaussian Lowpass 99.0% 96.8% 96.8% 78.2%
Original vs Median N = 5 + Gaussian Lowpass 100% 100% 97.8% 98.2%
Table 7.6: Classification accuracy by means of SVM with post-processing.
Music Speech Stock Ecg
Original vs Median N = 3 + Moving Average 55.0% 48.4% 50.7% 50.1%
Original vs Median N = 5 + Moving Average 50.0% 56.2% 74.4% 55.4%
Original vs Median N = 3 + Gaussian Lowpass 62.3% 67.2% 56.7% 60.2%
Original vs Median N = 5 + Gaussian Lowpass 66.2% 76.6% 69.4% 74.2%
Table 7.7: Classification accuracy by means of method in [71] with post-processing.
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7.5 Discussion
We have proposed a forensic detector of median filtering on 1D data based on deterministic
properties of such processing operation. According to a well defined theoretical rationale,
a set of patterns that cannot be present in median filtered sequences have been computed
oﬄine and the final algorithm consists in searching such patterns in the test sequence.
The proposed method has been tested on 1D signals and time series coming from different
sources, and proved to be extremely accurate in detecting and locating the occurrence of
median filtering as well as identifying the size of the filter employed, which is a quite rare
feature in existing techniques for 2D median forensics. Moreover, we also proved that
the study of the unfeasible classes can be used to detect median filtering also in case of
post-processing.
Such promising results open the way for future developments of this work in differ-
ent directions. A natural step further would be to approach 2D median filtering, which
is commonly applied to images. Unfortunately, treating bidimensional data and filters
introduces significant problems, both in terms of theoretical results and computational
complexity. Indeed, although the theoretical concepts can be easily extended, the deriva-
tion of the unfeasible classes presents two main issues: due to the distribution in the
2D domain, the actual overlapping variables at each step is reduced with respect to the
1D case (at most 6 overlapping variables for a 3 × 3 filter), together with the chance of
encountering unfeasible branches; as a consequence, the number of possible branches in
the tree (630 new ones are introduced at each step for a 3 × 3 filter) and the number of
L-classes required is higher, leading to extremely demanding computational efforts. For
this reasons, a significant optimization of the technique would be required and will be
certainly subject of future work.
Moreover, much work can be developed regarding a further analysis of robustness issues
of the proposed method, by designing more specific and advanced approaches allowing
for the identification of the median filtering occurrence even after a wider range of post-
processing operations.
Finally, whether the study of deterministic properties can be extended also to other
kind of processing is still an open and fascinating research question, that will be certainly
subject to future work.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this doctoral study we have developed innovative methodologies for the forensic anal-
ysis of multimedia data. For each of the solutions proposed, experimental validation on
benchmarking datasets has been carried out, thus identifying the strengths and contri-
butions with respect to existing tools, as well as aspects leaving space of improvement.
The latter have been discussed at the conclusion of each chapter, being natural future re-
search directions. However, we can identify two general aspects that particularly deserve
our attention.
First, we stress that the main rationale behind our work has been to exploit statistical
and deterministic properties that are known and common to multimedia data. When
possible, we have tried to derive closed-form models resulting in well-defined discrimina-
tion tests that are generally computationally lightweight and easy to convey, particularly
relevant aspects in digital forensic practices. With this respect, it is certainly possible
to devise further advances, both for statistical and deterministic models, that could in-
clude the use of theoretical tools from statistics, information theory, detection theory. For
instance, assessing the fundamental limits of our detectors and determine under which
conditions the hypotheses we consider are actually distinguishable would represent a sig-
nificant step forward.
Second, it is worth pointing out that the experimental validation of our novel ap-
proaches has been performed in controlled scenarios with the goal of assessing the per-
formance and foundations of the methods, as it happens for the vast majority of existing
multimedia forensic techniques. However, real-world cases include an extremely wide
variety of contents, sources, resolution, processing history. A future challenge for this
populated group of methodologies is to go beyond laboratory hypotheses, which are not
necessarily met in data coming from unreliable sources [140]. For instance, this issue
arises when assessing the reliability of data found in the web, both for content verification
and investigation practices. With this respect, on one hand the proposed solutions have
the positive features to be largely independent from the semantic content of the objects
under investigation and to require none or very limited training phases on preliminary
datasets. Thus, they can be considered as off-the-shelf tools to analyze data with diverse
content and coming from diverse sources. On the other hand, opening to multimedia web
applications (social networks are the perfect examples) implies also a wider variety of pre-
and post- processing operations, which can compromise the effectiveness of the existing
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techniques. To this extent, a promising possibility (explored in recent works [104, 6]),
would be to support the forensic analysis by exploiting the richness of the web in terms
of metadata and visual/textual information.
In conclusion, extensions of the contributions proposed in this thesis can be devised
both from a theoretical and application-driven perspective. How to jointly cope with such
aspects and design comprehensive solutions in these directions represent the main future
challenge for our work.
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Appendix A
Derivation of σ2Wr,i
In order to obtain the variance of Wr,i, we need to consider the pdf of Zq and study the
real and imaginary parts of the r.v. e−jω log10 Z , i.e., the r.v.’s C .= cos(ω log10 Zq) and
S
.
= − sin(ω log10 Zq), respectively. For the sake of simplicity, in the following analysis we
drop the subscript q of Z. For deriving the pdf of C, the following r.v. transformations
need to be applied
Z
log10−→ Z ′ ·ω−→ Z ′′ cos−→ C
and the same happens for S by applying − sin(·) as last transformation.
Since they are monotonic, the first two transformations can be treated with the formula
fY (y) = fX(h
−1(y)) ·
∣∣∣ ∂∂yh−1(y)∣∣∣
Y = h(X), X ∼ fX(x)
(A.1)
and we obtain
fZ′′(z
′′) = L(10 z
′′
ω ) · 10 z
′′
ω · ln 10
ω
.
The third transformation is not monotonic and a generalization of formula (A.1) should
be used [78]:
fY (y) =
∑
{x|h(x)=y}
fX(x)∣∣ ∂
∂x
h(x)
∣∣ (A.2)
So, if we define IZ′′ = [ω log10(q − q/2), ω log10(q + q/2)[, we have that
fC(c) =
∑
{z′′|cos(z′′)=c}∩IZ′′
fZ′′ (z′′)
|−sin z′′|
=
∑
Dc
e−
√
2
σ |10
z′′
ω −q|10
z′′
ω ln 10
σ
√
2Nσ,qω
1√
1−c2
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where
Dc = {z′′| cos(z′′) = c} ∩ IZ′′
= ∪n∈Z{2pin+ t, 2pi(n+ 1)− t} ∩ IZ′′ ,
t
.
= arccos(c).
By definition, the variance of C is given by
σ2C =
1∫
−1
c2fC(c)dc− µ2C
=
1∫
−1
c2
∑
z′′∈Dc
e−
√
2
σ
|10
z′′
ω −q|10
z′′
ω
σ
√
2Nσ,qω
ln 10√
1−c2 dc−<(aω,q)2.
Similarly, the variance of S is given by
σ2S =
∫ 1
−1 s
2fS(s)ds− µ2S
=
∫ 1
−1 s
2
∑
z′′∈Ds
e−
√
2
σ
|10
z′′
ω −q|10
z′′
ω
σ
√
2Nσ,qω
ln 10√
1−s2 ds−=(aω,q)2,
where
Ds = {z′′| sin(z′′) = c} ∩ IZ′′
= ∪n∈Z{2pin+ t, 2pin+ sign(t)pi − t} ∩ IZ′′ ,
t
.
= arcsin(s).
Finally, in order to obtain the variance of the real and imaginary parts of W0,q =
Aˆω,q − aω,q we should consider that W0,q is a shift (i.e., has the same variance) of Aˆω,q,
which is the sample mean of e−jω log10 Zq . By applying the Central Limit Theorem on both
real and imaginary parts, we can obtain the two variances by dividing σ2C and σ
2
S by the
number of samples Mq (see (3.16) and (3.17)).
Appendix B
Results for full decision trees
We report the results obtained in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 with the full decision trees for
the two datasets considered.
B.0.1 Overall full decision tree
(a) Training set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.62 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.67 0.69 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.64 0.64 0.85 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 0.70 0.72 0.79 0.93 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
95 0.98 0.64 0.63 0.70 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.96 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.95 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99
93 0.95 0.49 0.53 0.59 0.60 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.92 0.98 0.99 0.99
92 0.95 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.69 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.99 1.00
91 0.97 0.49 0.55 0.76 0.83 0.85 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.99
90 0.94 0.50 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.65 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96
(b) Testing set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 0.91 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.70 0.44 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.54 0.45 0.46 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.54 0.49 0.47 0.89 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.45 0.61 0.60 0.75 0.96 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.35 0.56 0.58 0.66 0.93 0.94 0.77 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.98 0.98 0.57 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.46 0.47 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.45 0.99 0.99 1.00
92 0.32 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.64 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.58 0.99 1.00
91 0.32 0.34 0.42 0.72 0.84 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.56 0.99
90 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.52 0.58 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.53
Table B.1: Accuracies of overall full DT for UCID dataset.
(a) Training set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.99 0.68 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.68 0.63 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.96 0.71 0.67 0.80 0.79 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.99 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.86 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 1.00 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.85 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.94 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.64 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
91 1.00 0.58 0.59 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
90 0.99 0.76 0.77 0.82 0.74 0.75 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98
(b) Testing set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 0.93 0.98 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.74 0.47 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.54 0.54 0.45 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.56 0.42 0.43 0.68 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.54 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.71 0.76 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.43 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.97 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.43 0.63 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.91 0.98 1.00 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00
91 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.60 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00
90 0.34 0.52 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83
Table B.2: Accuracies of overall full DT for DRESDEN dataset.
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B.0.2 QFc-specific full decision trees
(a) Training set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.65 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 0.78 0.69 0.82 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 1.00 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.95 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 1.00 0.77 0.80 0.74 0.79 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
93 0.98 0.66 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00
92 0.97 0.48 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.75 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99 1.00
91 0.95 0.47 0.53 0.76 0.79 0.88 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 1.00
90 0.95 0.52 0.51 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95
(b) Testing set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.77 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.58 0.43 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.41 0.61 0.63 0.74 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.43 0.62 0.64 0.71 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.38 0.64 0.63 0.68 0.64 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.42 0.57 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00
92 0.40 0.38 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.69 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.55 0.99 1.00
91 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.73 0.80 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.56 0.97
90 0.30 0.44 0.51 0.50 0.66 0.66 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.46
Table B.3: Accuracies of QFc-specific full DT for UCID dataset.
(a) Training set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 1.00 0.51 0.54 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 1.00 0.57 0.65 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 1.00 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 1.00 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 1.00 0.79 0.72 0.83 0.82 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 1.00 0.77 0.78 0.86 0.77 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 1.00 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00
91 1.00 0.69 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00
90 0.99 0.62 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
(b) Testing set.
NC 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90
100 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
99 0.79 0.40 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
98 0.59 0.43 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
97 0.57 0.40 0.41 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
96 0.55 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
95 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.75 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
94 0.51 0.61 0.69 0.72 0.64 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
93 0.44 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
92 0.47 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00
91 0.41 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00
90 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82
Table B.4: Accuracies of QFc-specific full DT for DRESDEN dataset.
